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Abstract 
 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of television news media in maintaining 
cultural hegemony in the United States. The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was used as a 
window into this process. For this investigation, a qualitative frame analysis was conducted 
on samples of television news coverage from major moments during the financial crisis and 
the resulting economic recession. Additionally, peer group discussions were conducted as a 
window into how people who fit the social and cultural imaginary of “Middle America,” an 
important part of the historic bloc which forms the contemporary United States cultural 
hegemony, discussed the financial crisis and recession in a social context.  The results found 
five major explanatory frames which dominated coverage of the financial crisis; strategy-
game frame, survivor stories, bootstraps frame, opportunity in disaster, and populism. Taken 
in aggregate, these frames directed attention away from the actions of the economic elite 
and onto either the actions of politicians or the responsibilities of non-elite individuals. 
Moreover, these frames deprived the information environment of information which might 
otherwise facilitate an understanding of the financial crisis as resulting from the actions and 
practices of the business elite or the economic structure.  
Participants in the peer group discussions seemed to echo much of the picture 
provided by television media, demonstrating in particular a pervasive belief in a 
dysfunctional American government. Overall, participants struggled to demonstrate a 
fundamental understanding of the financial crisis, and this hindered their ability to form and 
express counter-ideologies. This was in spite of pervasive, emotional expression of betrayal, 
dissatisfaction and economic vulnerability.  
Overall, it is concluded that television news media functions as a hegemonic 
apparatus due to its practices producing frames and narratives which obscure the role of the 
capitalist classes even in the event of an economic crisis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE AMERICAN (NON) REVOLUTION 
 
Between these two extremes of democratic communities stands an innumerable multitude of 
men almost alike, who, without being exactly either rich or poor, possess sufficient property to 
desire the maintenance of order, yet not enough to excite envy…. 
Not, indeed, that even these men are contented with what they have got or that they feel a 
natural abhorrence for a revolution in which they might share the spoil without sharing the 
calamity; on the contrary, they desire, with unexampled ardor, to get rich, but the difficulty is 
to know from whom riches can be taken. The same state of society that constantly prompts 
desires, restrains these desires within necessary limits; it gives men more liberty of changing, 
and less interest in change. 
       ~ Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) made the prediction that revolution would no longer be 
seen in the lands of America right on the heels of the successful Revolutionary War. The 
reason for this, he argues, was the existence of a secure and numerous American middle class. 
Tocqueville believed the ownership of property and the ability of this new society to satiate 
most of their material needs would prevent the middle class from risking their relative security 
for the hope of wresting real power from the new ruling elite. Like so much of his writing on 
American culture in the late 18th and early 19th century, within this observation is a seed of 
what appears to be insight into one of America’s contradictions at the start of the 21st century: 
given all that the U.S. has faced in just the last few decades - multiple recessions, unpopular 
wars, racial and ethnic clashes, and growing inequality - where have all the revolutions gone?  
The bulk of media and communications research is concerned with power, as are most 
of the social sciences, but this is often a discussion about the power of the media; the power of 
the media to “set the agenda,” the power of the media to marginalize or the power of the 
media to trigger cognitive pathways. However, we do not live in a media system, even if we 
live in a system that is heavily mediated. We live, here in the Western world in the first half of 
the 21st century, in a capitalist system. Media’s power exists insomuch as it interacts with that 
system. To understand the media it must be understood first as existing within, and 
participating in, capitalism. Without this understanding, many studies in the communications 
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field produce two major blind-spots. Some focus overly on the behavior of individuals, 
missing the broader system within which those individuals move in and interact with. Others, 
taking a broader, cultural perspective, tend to get stuck in purely discursive analysis and fail to 
take the role of material conditions seriously. 
Media must be analyzed as an intrinsic part of our current capitalist power structure, 
and this must be done while also avoiding the more reductive tendencies of Marxist analysis 
and maintaining the lessons we have learned from culture-focused analyses (Hall 1992, 1996). 
The roadmap for such a project was provided nearly a century ago by Antonio Gramsci in his 
concept of cultural hegemony. This lens effectively marries the ontological and the 
epistemological and places at the center of the analysis their interaction in a broader system of 
political, economic, and social power.  
In the following chapter, I will first define cultural hegemony as it used in this paper. I 
will then map the significant trends of communications research onto Steven Lukes’ (1974) 
three dimensions of power, whose third dimension of power is closely related to Gramsci’s 
cultural hegemony. I do this to demonstrate the gaps that early and current approaches to the 
media have left in our understanding of power and the media. I will then explain how two 
current conceptual tools, framing and informational climates, can be used as an 
operationalization of cultural hegemony for the media, specifically the news. I will then 
introduce William Gamson’s use of the collective action frame as a way to perceive and 
analyze emerging counter-hegemonies. Finally, I will introduce the events of the 2008 
financial crisis and explain how approaching this event with a hegemonic lens provides a 
unique opportunity for us to investigate media’s role in negotiating and maintaining cultural 
hegemony in the contemporary United States of America.  
CULTURAL HEGEMONY 
 
 Antonio Gramsci’s (1967; 1947/1971; 1988) concept of cultural hegemony describes 
society – all societies – as self-perpetuating systems of material conditions interacting with 
ideology.  It describes power in society as functioning as a process of rule and domination via 
consent. Gramsci, an organizer and activist, focused less on describing socioeconomic 
conditions and systems of domination, and was more interested in how those conditions came 
to be accepted and given meaning, or “how these conditions were socially constructed through 
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communication and practice”  (Artz & Murphy 2000, p.11; see also Pozzolini 1990). The 
media inevitably plays a central role in this hegemonic process. Often the media is approached 
by critical theorists and scholars as a system of propaganda involved in the “manufacture of 
consent” to the prevailing hegemony (McCombs & Shaw 1972; Therborn 1983; Herman & 
Chomsky 1988; Kellner 1990; McChesney 1997; McCombs et al. 1997). Many analyses 
which use hegemony tend to reduce it to one main mechanism and in some circles hegemony 
is understood as a solely discursive process, existing mainly in ideology and beliefs (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985; Nelson & Grossberg 1988; Amariglio 1991). Others focus on the strategic angle 
in the hegemony concept and largely see it as another term for the negotiation of social power 
(Bennett 1986; Condit 1994). Still others have rejected its usefulness outright after 
interpreting it as another term for simple domination (Altheide 1984; Gottdeiner 1985; Scott 
1990; Lull 2000). However, Gramsci’s full concept of hegemony allows for a perspective that 
is more nuanced than these uses suggest. The full power of Gramsci’s idea is that it manages 
to incorporate the role of material conditions and everyday practices into its analytical lens. 
Cultural hegemony is most useful when all parts are brought together and understood as a 
process of continual consent that is founded on material conditions and an understanding of 
ideology as lived practice (Gitlin 1987; Fink 1988; Rachlin 1988; Good 1990; Artz & Murphy 
2000). 
A cultural hegemony can be said to exist when the dominant group of a society 
manages to advance their own interests while incorporating just enough of the concerns and 
interests of the dominated group to maintain their consent to the system (Gitlin 1987; Sassoon 
1987; Artz & Murphy 2000).  In Gramsci’s world, hegemony played out as the continued 
acceptance of the Italian government by the Sardinian working class through their willingness 
to work in the face of continual political and economic subjugation and their utilization of 
Catholic practices and beliefs to reconcile themselves to the power disparity (Pozzolini 1990; 
Artz & Murphy 2000). In the contemporary United States, the dominated classes of working 
people consent to the system through obtaining degrees, working jobs, and buying consumer 
products. Because so many average Americans actively participate in the system, and because 
this system provides so many of their critical needs – shelter, food, basic security, 
entertainment – it is difficult for most Americans to not only challenge the existing hegemony, 
but to even hypothetically see themselves existing outside of it.  
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This is precisely the picture of a successful cultural hegemony. Successful hegemonies 
are not successful because they manage to maintain a perfect propaganda environment. In fact, 
there is evidently plenty of room for passionate disagreement as evidenced by the American 
two-party system of Republicans and Democrats. Rather, hegemonies are successful because 
the majority actively participate in it and come to identify their activity as natural and not as a 
form of domination. Gramsci’s explorations of hegemony in his notebooks describe a cycle of 
ideology and “hegemonic apparatuses” (1967; 1947/1971): ideologies organize practices; 
going to work, buying groceries, and learning a trade are all considered basic acts for 
responsible individuals in our society to perform. These practices eventually ossify into 
hegemonic apparatuses; corporations, stores, and universities all exist to serve these practices. 
These hegemonic apparatuses then promote and organize ideologies that perpetuate their 
existence. For example, modern industry conferences, advertising, and internship credits all 
feed back into the original belief system that requires the existence of the institutions.  
 The real point of Gramsci, however, was that cultural hegemony can serve a dual 
purpose. Hegemony is both a process of a ruling order and a potential strategy for 
overthrowing that ruling order. Counter-hegemonies are the practices and ideologies that can 
overthrow the prevailing hegemony. This was Gramsci’s main insight – that the subordinate 
classes would not be able to overthrow current hegemonies until they could think and act 
outside of it. For its part, a hegemony can resist counter-hegemonies without violence by 
absorbing just enough of subordinated group concerns to bring the counter-group back into the 
fold, without giving up enough strategic ground that they effectively lose power. In this way, 
many movements have been partially absorbed and then deflected. The classic example of this 
as experienced in the United States is where the socialist and communist labor movements in 
1930s were co-opted by in the introduction of The New Deal by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. The programs that made up The New Deal were a series of socialist reforms that 
took on many of the concerns of those who made up the counter-movements while still 
preserving an economic system of capitalism and a government that supported that system 
(Pries 1964; Artz & Murphy 2000). We can see here in this example the importance of 
material conditions to cultural hegemony. When material conditions are acceptable, hegemony 
has a chance. When material conditions fail for the majority, hegemony will shrink and 
counter-hegemonies will arise. Of course, this situation too may be deflected if there are 
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simply no imaginable alternatives – the unknown may remain too frightening and hegemony 
can prevail in spite of substandard material conditions (Gramsci 1967, 1947/1971, 1988).  
 Media’s role in our cultural hegemony is as one of many intricately interlaced 
hegemonic apparatuses. Media channels and firms are owned by corporations, and staffed by 
professionally trained producers, technicians, writers and journalists trained in schools and 
universities. They rely on political institutions for regulatory permissions and access 
(Tuchman 1978; Manoff & Schudson 1986; Bennett 1988; Hertsgaard 1992; McChesney & 
Nichols 2010). Most obtain revenue from advertising, which enforces a need for significant 
and reliable audiences who accept being advertised to as part of their quest for entertainment 
and information (McChesney 1997; 2015; McChesney & Nichols 2010). Understanding this 
and approaching the media as a hegemonic apparatus helps place the question of power in the 
center of our analysis of the media in its appropriate context to other institutions, forces, and 
experiences we encounter in our lives.  In the following section, this advantage will be 
explained by comparing it to other influential approaches to the media as mapped on to Lukes’ 
(1974) three faces of power.  
THE THREE FACES OF (MEDIA) POWER 
 
The results of our quest to understand the media power, with a little simplification, can 
be mapped onto the attempts of social science to understand the function of power in society 
in general. If we were to fit the major movements of communication research onto Lukes’ 
(1974) description of a “three faces,” or a three-dimensional approach to power, we can see 
parallel tracks. One major early attempt to tackle this question of media’s power in society 
was the “effects tradition” (Lewis 2001; Schroder et al. 2003; Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Davis 
& Baron 1981; Couldry et al. 2007). Early media researchers saw the rise of broadcast radio, 
cinema, and the very start of television. Like many people in society they were struck with 
simultaneous senses of anxiety and opportunity around these new forms of communication.  
These early concerns recognized that there was an inherent imbalance between who could 
broadcast and who would be the audience. The natural question arose - what could the former 
do to the latter?  This is a question, ultimately, of the “first-dimension” of power, what Dahl 
(1969) described classically as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1969, p.80; see also Gaventa 1980). The key 
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to the first dimension of power is its focus on behavior – particularly the behavior of 
individuals. In media research, the first dimensional approach to a question of power appeared 
as a straight forward line of inquiry and the early media researchers set about trying to answer 
it through what they considered their best tool at hand: surveys and experiments. The 
hypotheses underpinning this early approach to media became known as the “hypodermic 
needle” and “bullet” models after the imagery used to describe them (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; 
Katz 1973; for discussion see Gauntlett 1997; Lewis 1999; Schroder et al. 2003; McCombs 
2004). The effects tradition has never fully gone away. Many researchers concerned with 
violent and “anti-social” behavior still look for a direct causal relationship between media and 
their audiences. This is particularly the case for child and youth audiences (Schroder et al. 
2003; McCombs 2004). The effects tradition is often reborn with each new major medium, 
with current concerns revolving around video games and various aspects of the internet 
(Anderson 2003). However, from the earliest studies of Lazarsfeld in the 1940s, the effects 
tradition has had tremendous difficulty demonstrating what it set out to find – that the media 
can and will cause significant changes of opinion. The (reassuring) lack of evidence for this 
approach of media power led to a declaration that the media was subject to the “law of 
minimal effects” (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld et al. 1968; Katz 1973; Gauntlett 1997; 
McCombs 2004). In an attempt to correct for the initial findings of Katz, Lazarsfeld and 
others, and explain this new “law of minimal effects,” they created the “two-step flow” model 
(Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Katz 1973; Lewis 2001; Schroder et al. 2003), “where media effects 
are weak, delayed, and indirect, because the way media messages may contribute to an 
individual’s change of opinion on some political issue is mediated by so-called 'opinion 
leaders' - that is, significant others whose opinion caries decisive weight in the individual’s 
social network” (Schroder et al. 2003, p.36). In other words, media “effects” become muddied 
as they get processed through a layer of social relationships.  
Two major theoretical/methodological approaches arose in response to these early set 
of findings.  One reaction was to turn the previous set of questions on its head, and ask not 
“what does media do to their audience”, but “what does the audience do with their media?”  
This new line of questioning led to the uses and gratifications tradition which, in direct 
contrast to the effects tradition, saw the audience as “active” consumers rather than passive 
receptors in a linear model of message transmission. The uses and gratifications approach as 
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laid out by Blumler and Katz (1974) is summed up as “the social and psychological origins of 
needs, which generate expectations of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), 
resulting in need gratification and other consequences” (Schrøder et al. 2003, p.38). 
Like the effects tradition, uses and gratifications theorists insisted on quantification, 
which led the field to consist almost entirely of survey questionnaires filled out by audience 
members. These answers were then compared to how much media they consumed (Schroder 
et al. 2003; Gillespie 2005).  Conceptualizing the audience as active individuals who make 
their own decisions about what media to watch and listen to, forced a theoretical recognition 
that audiences have their own needs and desires that inevitably influence these decisions. 
However, despite the initial nod to the social by Blumler and Katz in 1974, the “needs” that 
become the focus of uses and gratifications research are almost entirely psychological in 
nature(Schroder et al. 2003). To the uses and gratifications tradition, the audience is still a 
happenstance collection of individuals who happen to watch the same media. One gets the 
sense that the only reason any program has an audience greater than one is due to a similarity 
of the individuals watching in their needs and their ability to satisfy these needs through the 
program, not from any connection that the audience might have with each other. Under the 
uses and gratifications perspective, the audience holds the power of choice and use. The 
power of the media, therefore, lies in its capacity to meet the psychological needs of its 
audience. The audience is an individual standing alone with their own personal satisfactions 
(or frustrations). The big difference between the early effects tradition and the uses and 
gratifications models is that the media is given a pass on the question of power and ethics. 
Where the effects tradition initially approached the media with great concern about its 
potential for outsized impact given its authoritative voice and its ability to broadcast to huge 
portions of the population, the uses and gratifications model casts the media simply as 
“gratifiers.” In this task the media can only succeed or fail. There is a limited analytical ability 
from this perspective to ask further questions even within the domain of psychological needs 
and desires. Huge questions remained indefinitely on the table, questions about where 
audiences “needs” and “wants” might originate, or whether or not the range of choices made 
available was exhaustive, or a true reflection of audiences’ needs.  
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The problematic conclusion that came out of the effects tradition and its failure to 
produce measurable effects was if media could not be demonstrated to change opinions or 
beliefs on an individual level, then media must therefore have no actual power.  Even the two-
step flow model failed to reach beyond the first dimension of power.  The power of A to 
change the behavior of B against B’s wishes is a form of power that exists in everyday life – 
we see it function all the time in every legislative decision or in a citizen’s encounter with the 
police, for example.  But the attempt to understand all power as a form of the first-dimension 
type of power is ultimately naïve, and this is generally not the type of power that the media 
deals in.   
The second dimension of power adds some sophistication to the insights of the first. 
Often power appears not only in the final outcome of any decision, but in what issues are 
brought to the table around which decisions can be made. In trying to explain the lack of 
political participation among ordinary people, Schattschneider (1960) suggested:  
 
Absenteeism [of voters] reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives 
that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants. It is not necessarily true that 
people with the greatest needs participate in politics most actively- whoever 
decides what the game is about also decides who gets in the game. (p.105)  
 
The second dimension of power is about this ability to “set the agenda,” which maps right on 
to the subfield of communications that shares the same name – agenda-setting theory 
(McCombs & Shaw 1972; McCombs & Shaw 1982; McCombs et al. 1997; Shaw & 
McCombs 1977). This perspective on media power suggests if media cannot “tell us what to 
think,” it may have the ability to at least tell us “what to think about” (Lewis 2001; McCombs 
2004). As McCombs put it: 
 
Through their day-to-day selection and display of the news, editors and news 
directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most 
important issues of the day. This ability to influence the salience of topics on 
the public agenda has come to be called the agenda-setting role of the news 
media. (2004, p.1)  
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This second-dimensional approach to media power began with the U.S. Presidential campaign 
of 1968.  McCombs and Shaw (1972) took a group of “undecided” voters from Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina and gave them a survey.  This survey probed the participants’ sense of 
importance attributed to political “issues.”  The major news sources these participants cited 
were then investigated and found nine sources listed between them.  This list included 
newspapers, television channels, and news magazines.  The number of stories devoted to each 
issue were counted and then compared with the respondents’ issue rankings.  They matched. 
The issues of “foreign policy, law and order, economics, public welfare, and civil rights” were 
the prominent stories for the participants as well as for the news of the last 25 days prior to the 
participants taking the survey.  The significance of these findings was immediately evident, 
“contrary to the law of minimal consequences, this is a statement about a strong causal effect 
of mass communication on the public - the transfer of salience from the media agenda to the 
public agenda” (2004, p.5).  The body of agenda-setting research demonstrates that the media 
does appear to operate along this second-dimension of power.  However, the power of the 
media to choose a social agenda is an analytical lens that often gets turned back onto the 
audience and their cognitive processes.  The focus quickly turns to their “reaction to cues” and 
to the “transfer of salience” from the media to the audience.  The second-dimension of power 
in these discussions often becomes an exploration into an opaque psychological phenomenon 
within the viewer.  The social role of the media, given these “strong effects,” is implied, but 
rarely explored directly (Rogers & Dearing 1988; Zhu 1991; McCombs 2004).  The first and 
second dimensions of power often lead us - repeatedly - down this road to a privileging of 
behavior and individuals as the main stages upon which power is enacted in society 
(McCombs & Shaw 1972; 1982; Rogers & Dearing 1988; Zhu 1991; McCombs 2004).  The 
point of evidence, the viewer, becomes the point of analysis and thus the larger social system 
tends to get lost.  
Both the first and second dimensions of power exist in many interactions and 
institutions in our lives. The media, which deals primarily in the processing and distributing of 
information, is going to naturally wield its power more through the second dimension than the 
first. However, as one moves through society it becomes apparent that these first two 
dimensions are not adequate for describing the entire scenario. The insight of Lukes (1974) 
was to point to the enormous mass of power that lies under the surface of conscious decision 
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making, the unseen power that underpins most of society at any given moment. While power 
is exerted at a point of disagreement and demonstrated in the ability to set the agenda for what 
is allowed to become a disagreement, Lukes’ third-dimension of power shows how power 
exists in the perpetual processes of consent and in the creation of desires. The analysis of 
power in society must allow “for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are 
kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices 
or through individuals' decisions” (Lukes 1974, p.24).  He did this by stepping away from the 
point of visible disagreement and states simply “A exercises power over B when A affects B 
in a manner contrary to B's interest" (p.34). This realm of pre-conflict is where media power 
really exists, in our everyday normal lives where we make a thousand small decisions that 
appear to have no real conflict behind them at all, and yet these decisions form the foundations 
for our lives and our place within the greater power structures of the economy and political 
institutions.  It is here where the media holds its power within society, in the everyday shaping 
of opinions, beliefs, and desires.  
The cultural studies tradition began to take on this third-dimensional approach to 
media power with its recognition of an active audience (Hall 1980; Hall & Jefferson 1976; 
Philo 2001).  Stuart Hall (1980) recognized the audience as an integral part of the media 
process:  
 
Broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a 
meaningful discourse....This initiates a further differentiate moment, in which 
the formal rules of discourse and language are in dominance. Before this 
message can have an “effect” (however defined), satisfy a “need” or be put to a 
“use”, it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse, and be 
meaningfully decoded. (p.165)  
 
Cultural studies took the media’s role in actively building culture seriously. Media 
texts, particularly the body of work that formed pop-culture, were recognized as important 
parts of everyday life, from which people not only made decisions in conflict, but used to 
develop aspirations and to find archetypes from which to model themselves on. The cultural 
studies tradition also stepped away somewhat from the preoccupation with behavior and 
individuals. Instead of fulfilling personal, psychological needs, cultural studies scholars saw 
audiences engaged in a struggle to define and redefine the texts they were being presented 
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with by the elite groups producing the media they consumed. Particularly early on, cultural 
studies saw audiences as put-upon by an alien media with foreign meanings - nationally, 
culturally, and along class lines (and eventually along sexual, gendered, racial, and ethnic 
lines). Media texts become sites of resistance as well as identity formation and affirmation 
(Gilroy 2009).  
For many cultural studies scholars, this approach was interpreted through Marx’s 
concept of the Superstructure, the ideological reasoning which supports the exploitative 
economic infrastructure (Hall & Walton 1972).  In this we can see a key recognition that the 
media actually sits within our society, and that brings us closer to the potential insight of 
Lukes’ third-dimension of power. In the first and second-dimensional approaches of the 
effects and agenda-setting traditions, the audience was atomized into individuals of various 
psychological responses and needs. In the cultural studies approach, the audience is 
recognized as existing within a culture and that they are socially connected to one another. 
Moreover, there is recognition that there were multiple audiences with different cultures and 
identities, which do not necessarily align with each other or with the media. Interpretation by 
the audience is contextual and rooted in a world outside of the media.  
Methodologically, cultural studies introduced another shift in paradigm.  Qualitative 
methodologies allowed researchers to approach audiences and texts in a way that did not 
presuppose that the researcher had the entire range of potential meanings on hand. These 
approaches were rewarded when they revealed a rich inter-textual world within the decoding 
audiences (Gilroy 2009). In Hall’s formula, audiences have power, and so does the media. The 
moment of media/audience connection is approached as a site of power, particularly 
discursive power. Hall points out that “reality exists outside language, but it is constantly 
mediated by and through language: and what we can know and say has to be produced in and 
through discourse” (1980, p.167). With this focus on discourse, the relationship between 
language and reality takes center stage.  
However, for all of its new insight, the cultural studies missed a key component of 
power as it functions in contemporary society, both within and without the media. Hall’s 
model has two poles of activity – encoding and decoding. Much of the cultural studies 
tradition is primarily interested in the “decoding” side of this process. This tendency originally 
rose out of an anxiety that “traditional” British working-class culture was being overrun by 
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“Americanized” pop-culture in the 1970s and early 1980s, and by an interest in the arrival of 
multiple cultural sub-groups with various critiques on government, industry, and cultural 
inclusion during that same time (Hall & Jefferson 1976; Schroder et al. 2003; for discussion 
see Philo 2008). This tradition is and was fundamentally concerned with the play of power 
between media and audience (Hall & Jefferson 1976; Hall & Grossberg 1986; Slack 1996; 
Gilroy 2009). But, as some critics of the cultural studies tradition have pointed out, in the 
search for “agency” of the audience and the focus on audience-as-decoder cultural studies 
analysis too often descended into a paradoxical relationship with its fundamental concept of a 
class-based struggle (Lewis 2001; Philo 2001). On one hand, the power of the media to shape 
what the audience sees is explicitly called-out and condemned. But on the other hand that very 
power is then immediately denied when theorists insist on an endlessly empowered audience 
with an ability to re-interpret and “de-code” the text in their own way, without restriction. For 
example, Douglas Kellner’s (1995) cultural studies engagement with the American television 
show Beavis and Butt-head argued that the show was simultaneously a slander of working 
class adolescent youth and a critique of the society that put it there. While texts are inherently 
complex, the focus on the potential of the text without grounding it in some sort of 
investigation of the actual audience and their material conditions seems to miss the original 
point of Stuart Hall, who found significance in actual moments of oppositional readings, not 
in descriptions of potential oppositional readings lying dormant in the text (Hall 1980). Others 
have criticized cultural studies for going farther than simply recognizing differences within 
the audience and trying to assert complete incomprehensibility between and amongst sub-
audiences, denying those audiences any ability to identify or effectively communicate with 
those unlike themselves (Philo 2008). 
There are two ways in which the material realities of life must be brought back in to 
this discussion of media power on the third-dimensional level.  The first is how to not lose 
sight of or diminish material inequities between groups of people when analyzing the 
discursive layers of culture -its language, images, and symbols. It has been too easy to get lost 
in the fascination of the possibilities of discourse and neglect the sharp and often brutal 
curtailing of those possibilities by the material conditions of lived realities (Laclau & Mouffe 
1985; Nelson & Grossberg 1988; for discussion see Amariglio 1991). It is crucial that the 
analytical world of discourse be brought in with all of its complexities to avoid the naiveté 
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exhibited when analysis sticks to the first two dimensions of power. But to pretend power of 
interpretation is equal to the power to provide material security for oneself and one’s family or 
the power to interact meaningfully in the political sphere is its own kind of naiveté. Second, 
texts which deal with material reality must be brought in. The third-dimension of power, with 
its focus on the building of images and construction of possibilities that prevent the likelihood 
of disagreement is more readily applied to the texts of popular culture and to the entertainment 
which continually builds appealing/cautionary worlds and attaches them to characters 
embodying specific beliefs, actions, and appearances. Much less easy is the application of this 
third-dimension to the news, where we go to learn about current events. Surely the power of 
the news does not stop at setting the agenda, but how do we theoretically tackle the third-
dimensional power of the news?  
MEDIA’S THIRD FACE  
 
Lukes’ (1974) radical theory of power points us to power that lies beneath the surface 
of daily life, where struggle is largely suppressed without comment or notice. But to truly tie 
the discursive with the material in the news, we need the roadmap provided by Gramsci’s 
theory of cultural hegemony. Though both Lukes and Gramsci are essentially speaking about 
the same phenomenon of power, Lukes’ language tends to get stuck on the idea of 
“repression” of conflict. Gramsci, on the other hand, manages to describe the continual 
process of building consent among the dominated classes of society. Artz and Murphy (2000) 
describe the reality of how hegemony works, as conceived by Gramsci;   
 
Subordinate groups willingly participate in practices that are not necessarily in 
their best interests because they perceive some tangible benefit. The mass 
media, educational institutions, the family, government agencies, industry, 
religious groups, and other social institutions elicit support for such hegemonic 
relations through patterns of communication and material reward. (p.3) 
 
 
For those who find themselves in a subordinated class, their consent typically hinges 
on two things: an acceptable degree of material benefit provided to them by their society, and 
an understanding of their life as an optimal or near-optimal possibility within that society.  To 
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maintain their power, the dominating class(es) must hold control of three fundamental 
properties of society – material resources, political power, and the ability to define culture. At 
each property, the dominating class(es) must continually concede just enough to the desires 
and needs of the subordinate class(es) without actually losing control of the property in order 
to maintain their cultural hegemony over that society. The result is a continual churn of 
negotiation around the edges of the issues surrounding these properties, but the fundamental 
structure - who dominates and who is dominated - is only very rarely directly challenged (and 
even more rarely overturned).  In the U.S., the dominant system is capitalism, and the 
dominating class is the capitalists – that group which holds the material resources to build 
capitalist ventures and hire wage-earners to run them. The U.S. subordinate class, in its most 
inclusive form, is made up of those who lack the capital to compete in this process, and 
therefore exist by selling their labor on the marketplace. To break this down:  
 
U.S. capitalist classes meet important material needs through the production 
and distribution of commodities; politically organize laws, institutions, and 
relations that defend commodity production and property rights; and through 
the media culturally direct the daily lives of most Americans as consumers. 
(Artz & Murphy 2000, p.235)  
 
If we see the media as a hegemonic apparatus, we may be able to get closer to describing an 
appropriately analyzing media power in contemporary society, as “hegemony requires 
communication systems and lived ideological practices that connect dominant interpretations 
to subordinate conditions" (Artz & Murphy 2000, p.66). 
 
LIVED MEDIA PRACTICES  
 
This idea of ideology and hegemony as lived practice is important, and there are 
theoretical paradigms in media research that move away from conflicts and into the “lived 
practices” surrounding the media. George Gerbner’s (1994) cultivation theory, as one 
example, suggests that the media, particularly television, has a cumulative effect on an 
audience’s belief systems. To the extent that television dominates their sources of 
entertainment and information, “continued exposure to its messages is likely to reiterate, 
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confirm, and nourish - that is, cultivate - its own values and perspectives" (Gerbner et al. 
1994, p.24). Like cultural studies, cultivation theory made the important and necessary break 
away from looking for short term change in opinion as a response to media stimulus. Instead, 
it looked at the “big picture,” long-term associations and values that lie within the media, and 
investigated to see if these had an impact on how audiences viewed their world. Cultivation 
research tried to empirically demonstrate this by separating audiences into “light” vs. “heavy” 
viewers and then examine if there were any correlating differences based on the average 
amount of time they spent watching television. One of the most intriguing findings of 
cultivation research was the emergence of an apparent “mainstreaming” effect of heavy media 
viewing. “Among light users, people who differ in terms of background factors such as age, 
education, social class, political orientations, and regions of residence tend to have sharply 
different conceptions of social reality....among heavy viewers across those differences tend to 
be much smaller or even to disappear entirely”(Morgan et al. 2012, p.8).  
It is important to note here that this finding, termed the “cultivation differential,” has 
been difficult to replicate (Johnson-Cartee 2005). Additionally cultivation research has been 
criticized for being vague in their interpretation of content (such as overly-broad definitions of 
“violent imagery”), and in missing potentially critical connections in the effort to satisfy their 
positivistic need for variable isolation (Lewis 2001; Morgan et al. 2012).  However, 
cultivation theory gets closer to the arena of influence the media likely occupies by pointing to 
the issues of repeated exposure to the same messages, and to the apparent impact of opinion 
“mainstreaming.” As it is typically put forward, the repeated exposure to media messages 
have a psychological learning impact on individuals. As this phenomenon expands to more 
individuals you have enough to form a group and thus it becomes a social phenomenon. While 
the psychological process of learning is clearly present in everything we as humans do, and 
particularly in the event of watching news programs, approaching the process of the media as 
primarily a psychological one tends to mask the broader forces of social power. The 
responsibility of accepting or rejecting media information and images thus becomes primarily 
the burden of individuals – either as viewers or perhaps as journalists if the end result is a call 
to “journalistic integrity.” Doing this brings us no closer to actually understanding broader 
social power as it is enacted by or through the media.   
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If we were to approach the findings of cultivation theory under the lens of cultural 
hegemony, as a sort of sociological thought-experiment, where ideology is understood as 
attached to lived practices we get a slightly different picture that de-centers the psychological 
processes and re-centers the processes of social power.  Consider this reinterpretation of 
cultivation research: as people’s practices become that of the “viewer,” we would predict that 
their understanding of the world would come to resemble that of other viewers. The issue can 
then be seen as one that is less of “dosage” than of relationship between people and the world 
around them, and how the media is inserting itself in the place of this relationship.  
This point becomes clearer when used to examine another theory centered on media 
“practices”:  the media consumption paradigm, which is a more anthropological approach to 
the social role of media and brings the focus of the researcher to the “routine consumption 
practice embedded in a range of other routines, some social, some individual” (Couldry et al. 
2007). 
 
Ethnographic approaches …. are interested in what audiences do with media 
messages. An extensive body of scholarship has developed around the idea of 
the "active audience," showing how readers make their own meanings from 
texts, inflected through the life experiences, personal identity and so on. (Bird 
2010, p.417) 
 
In this methodological and theoretical approach, the argument is that the media is 
being used by the audience as a way to become connected to each other. The audience is seen 
as emotional, social, and affectively attached to media as both a habit and a ritual. Couldry et 
al. (2007) took a media consumption approach to investigating the concept of “public 
connection” in Britain using a combination of audience diaries, interviews, and focus groups. 
The group found an apparent contradiction in their participants’ perception and their reality. 
Media audiences were making the media central to their sense of public connection, not 
because it actually seemed to connect them to others, but because they simply believed it to be 
central. The media in this sense, the news media particularly, is a symbolic stand-in for “the 
public,” even if it is demonstrably not a public. Actual connection with others appeared to be 
hindered by a lack of “communities of practice through which [audience members] could act 
together in a public world” which made it difficult to “link citizenship to the rest of everyday 
life” (p.188). The audience were attempting to satiate their yearning to connect to a public 
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through media, yet lacking the communal practices to actually engage as one. The media 
consumption approach tends to focus on the emotional, affective experiences of the audience 
and through this approach has found people are often reliant on media for a sense of stability 
and security in their everyday lives (Couldry et al. 2007; Madianou 2010; Bird & Dardenne 
1997). The researchers concluded that the audience is affectively “glued” to each other 
through the media, and thus the media has a centering, but not central, role in everyday life.  
However, this revelation does not seem to lead many in the media consumption 
approach to substantive discussion about media power. Some even argue that because of the 
self-reported importance individuals place on the habitual, ritualized engagement with media, 
the conclusion becomes that it is the ritual which is the most important aspect to media in 
society:  
 
The study of news reading as a "habit" or a "practice" is one way to approach 
the role of news in everyday life. From this perspective, the content of the news 
itself is less important than the sense of connectedness and social participation 
that comes with attention to the news. (Bird 2010, p.6) 
 
If there is an affective, ritual place for the media that is embedded in life and a concept of the 
public, it is unclear how it is concluded (even in relative terms) that the actual content is 
unimportant. The conclusion appears to be that media power is merely a result of projection of 
that power by the audience. While cultivation theory recognizes the importance of practice 
and the media consumption approach recognizes the importance of audiences’ desires and 
rituals, rarely do either honestly engage with how practice and desire are connected. Also 
rarely is the question asked where these desires and practices come from, or what they result 
in.  
Again, the approach of cultural hegemony highlights the underlying issues of power 
that are not being addressed. Media, as a hegemonic apparatus, will naturally present itself as 
society. Defined as society, people will feel compelled to “keep in touch” with it. As a 
corollary, members of their actual community are experienced as a lesser private arena rather 
than as an arena of shared interest or political status. Thus media is continually allowed to 
define and be defined as the both the political and social public sphere, and the daily lives of 
people are experienced as being outside of that sphere. Media keeps people attached to itself 
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and viewers are rewarded by “feeling” attached socially to the world around them. This exact 
relationship hides the fact that people increasingly lack the time and ability to form actual 
communities with the people they share common interest with.  Meanwhile the media, 
continually legitimized as the window into public society, is controlled almost exclusively in 
the United States by the capitalist class (McChesney 1997; McChesney & Nichols 2010; 
McChesney 2015; Schudson 2006).  Finally, while the bringing in of media-as-practice for 
audiences gets us closer to a full story of media power in contemporary society, it often 
neglects the information and messages about that information that the media provides for the 
audience.  
There are three concepts currently within communication and media studies which 
lend themselves to a constructing a hegemonic lens of the media, and therefore allow us to ask 
more direct questions of media power. First, framing theory allows us to map out transmitted 
hegemonic ideologies and disassemble them into their respective discursive devices. Second, 
the concept of Information environments allows us to see the “raw material” that builds and 
supports these ideologies, and understand information collection as a lived hegemonic 
practice.  Finally, “collective action frames” are a specific framing device which can allow us 
to question whether or not we see the presence of emerging counter-hegemonies in a given 
text, story, or conversation. In the following sections, all three will be introduced and their 
separate and collective usefulness to examining the media’s role in a system of hegemony will 
be argued.  
FRAMING: DISASSEMBLING THE IDEOLOGICAL ENGINE 
 
Framing has ascended to one of the most frequently utilized theories within the field of 
communication (Bryant & Miron 2006). Frames are “powerful units of discourse” (D’Angelo 
2002) that can be found in any and all communication methods. They are a key part of how 
the media operates – both in how they communicate and in what they communicate. The 
process of framing, which lies behind all framing theory, is defined classically by Entman 
(2010):  
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[Framing is] the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and 
assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a 
particular interpretation. (p.336)  
 
 
This process happens at every stage of media production and reception – both in encoding and 
decoding, to use Stuart Hall’s terminology.  Journalists must take facts and weave them into a 
narrative to make them comprehensible and to make them interesting. Audiences will take 
these frames and mingle them with their own pre-existing narratives, and then use those new, 
altered frames when communicating with others.  Creating and sharing frames are a basic 
function of effective communication and they are capable of transmitting an impressive 
amount of information in a very efficient way, as “fully developed frames typically perform 
four functions: problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy 
promotion” (Entman 2010, p.336, emphasis mine). 
Communication frames shape, form, and persuade every problem solving attempt, 
every moral and ethical dilemma, and any and every effort to understand the broader world 
outside of ourselves. Because of this, framing theory can be utilized as a powerful tool in the 
investigation of cultural hegemony. The authority to define problems, to determine cause and 
effect, to pass moral judgment, and to suggest problem remedies are all under the purview of 
any given cultural hegemony.  
The relationship between framing and cultural hegemony is more clearly seen when 
there is contention at the margins of hegemony.  Cultural hegemony as a concept 
acknowledges that because any dominant economic and social system never fully satisfies the 
needs of all subordinate groups, counter-hegemonies are always forming and they frequently 
bubble up to the surface of social consciousness to challenge the prevailing hegemony. 
Frames are useful for revealing the mechanics of this process because they are, for their part, 
world views writ small: 
Each…issue has a relevant public discourse - a particular set of ideas and 
symbols that are used in various public forums to construct meaning about it. 
This discourse evolves over time, providing interpretations and meanings for 
newly occurring events. An archivist might catalogue the metaphors, catch 
phrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices that 
characterize it. The catalog would be organized of course, since the elements 
are clustered and held together by a central organizing frame. (Gamson 1992, 
p.24) 
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 Any given frame is the result of an event being wrestled into cultural coherence, and 
the linking and shifting of problem definitions, causal analysis, moral judgments, and remedy 
promotions can allow us to watch the flux of cultural hegemony in real time. To take the issue 
of affirmative action as one example: opponents of affirmative action policies often argue 
these policies are a form of “unfair advantage,” creating a situation of racial “reverse 
discrimination” (Gamson & Modigliani 1987). This anti-affirmative action frame supports the 
current cultural hegemony where the world is understood as equitable, and the business of 
obtaining material security and political representation are the responsibility of individuals. 
This is deemed fair due to a major assumption this hegemony relies on; all individuals have 
more or less equal access to the same resources with which to build prosperous careers and 
participate in political activity.  
Proponents of affirmative action, on the other hand, will frame these exact same 
policies as fair remedial action designed to rectify centuries of oppression and discrimination. 
This dichotomy is an example of a frame revealing a counter-hegemony, which points to 
material inequality pre-existing individuals, and thus holds them back from obtaining their full 
potential as members of an oppressed group (in this case, women and racial minorities). This 
frame not only supports affirmative action, it challenges an important assumption that 
underpins the consent of modern capitalist hegemony, that access to meaningful work and 
public status is more or less equally available to everyone and inequality is the result of 
individual choices and failures.   
To take another example of a very similar frame and counter-frame, gay rights 
activists have presented their desired reforms as promoting “equal rights” alongside 
heterosexual individuals, while proponents will argue that these constitute “special rights” 
which will undermine the traditional social structure (Brewer 2003). These framing wars 
surround any active social movement, and the mirrors of frame and counter-frame make it 
easier to understand the underlying hegemonic system. However, much of any hegemony 
exists uncontested at any given time, and therefore frames also exist for issues that are not 
under direct contention. Note how, in the example of affirmative action, there is a central 
assumption that goes unchallenged: the legitimate way to material security is the obtainment 
of a job.  When frames are not subjected to constant oppositional re-framing, they can be more 
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difficult to define and are easily disguised as simple truths or a “common sense” 
understanding shared by most of society. It is in this arena of uncontested issues where 
framing theory becomes a more mercurial project, and it is more difficult to define the frames 
of an issue or investigate their impact on the larger discourse.  This is the same for cultural 
hegemony - the more uncontested it is the more easily and frequently it is lived by members of 
that society, and thus it becomes more difficult for members within that hegemony to see or 
understand their lives as a system of power and hierarchy. If an uncontested frame is 
“common sense,” then the unchallenged hegemony is “the way we do things” (Artz and 
Murphy 2000).  
However, framing theory provides a mechanism for the uncontested hegemony to be 
revealed upon the deconstruction of a communication frame. The operationalization of 
framing is the breakdown of various communication devices into the various metaphors, 
moral appeals, archetypes, and so on. Because framing analysis draws out the pieces of our 
communication and asks how they are connected one way and not another, it can reveal those 
connections that are otherwise taken for granted.  It allows us to investigate directly the 
process of articulation, which has probably best described by Stuart Hall (1980).  
When Stuart Hall spoke of articulation, he often meant it as a practice of 
empowerment.  In the cultural studies tradition, articulation was often studied as a resistance 
practice, as a form of activism in relation to the text:   
  
Articulation is the production of identity on top of differences, of unities out of 
fragments, of structures across practices. Articulation links this practice to that 
effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to that reality, and this experience 
to those politics. And these links are themselves articulated into larger 
structures, etc. (Grossman, in Hall 1996)  
 
The articulation that many cultural studies scholars were interested in were the active, 
resistant articulations made by the socially marginalized (Hall & Jefferson 1976; Hall & 
Grossberg 1986; Slack 1996). However, Stuart Hall made clear that articulations followed all 
kinds of power hierarchies and that articulations could and would form between many 
subjects. If we return to Entman’s definition of a complete frame as providing “problem 
definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion” (2010, p.336), you can 
see where the frame is the end product of this articulation work, and how it can be utilized 
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along all social planes. Justin Lewis points to how articulation can be the activity of the 
powerful, and thus the construction of cultural hegemony:   
 
The appearance of ideas like free enterprise, deregulation, and individual 
initiative tend, in most mainstream media discourse, to be articulated with 
positive terms like “freedom,” “efficiency,” “dynamism,” “America” and, more 
specifically, the “American Dream.” For many respondents to an opinion 
survey, these articulations are likely to come to mind in response to a question 
that uses such abstractions. (Lewis 2001) 
 
 
Frame theory, with its acknowledgement of the marriage of fact and story, can let us get to 
this question of conceptual articulation and see how it works in the favor of power – as a 
continual project of cultural hegemony.  
Stuart Hall’s presented his concept of articulation as a more flexible alternative to 
Gramsci’s cultural hegemony (Hall 1996a). However, Gramsci’s hegemony is already quite 
flexible and already accounts for the constant negotiation and re-negotiation of itself, and 
given the readiness of those using Hall’s concepts to drop the type of power based on material 
inequalities in their work, it may be best to wrap Hall’s articulation back into how we analyze 
the process of building and maintaining hegemony rather than seeing it as an alternative to it 
(see Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Nelson & Grossberg 1988; Kellner 1995, and others).  Thus, in 
this thesis articulation is not seen as an alternative to hegemony, rather that hegemony relies 
on an articulation process that “connect(s) positive meanings to existing social practices” 
(Artz and Murphy 2000, p.66).  
FRAMING, HEGEMONY, AND MEDIA PRODUCTION 
 
Framing functions to gain insight into the hegemonic processes on both sides of the 
“encoding/decoding” media model. For media producers, particularly producers of the news, 
framing is integral to daily work - it is simply impossible to do the work of journalism without 
highlighting some information over others and forming some type of narrative (Bennett & 
Edelman 1985; Bird & Dardenne 1997; Lule 2001; Coman 2005). Putting stories into 
recognizable frames is a constant task of journalists, but not all frames are created equal. 
Framing studies on the production and content of the news have revealed patterns in the types 
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of frames that journalists typically reach for while building their stories.  Research has found 
that journalists often favor frames for certain topics.  For example, journalists frequently adopt 
a “horse race” frame when covering political issues (Fallows 1997; Lawrence 2000; Cappella 
& Jamieson 1997b). Exemplars can be found in the coverage of healthcare and welfare 
reform, where stories "emphasized political maneuvering by self-interested politicians" 
(Brewer & Gross 2010, p.160), rather than the pros and cons of policy proposals (Cappella & 
Jamieson 1997a; Fallows 1997; Lawrence 2000). This type of frame is so frequent in political 
coverage that it has received its own name – the “game frame,” or the “strategy frame” 
(Buchanan 1991). This type of frame has become dominant in the coverage of American 
political elections:  
 
Recent analyses have centered on the effects of "horse race" reporting in the 
making and unmaking of American presidential candidates. These news stories, 
which have become a staple of campaign coverage, detail the candidates' 
electoral prospects - their poll standings, delegate counts, fund-raising efforts, 
and related campaign indicators - rather than the candidates' policy positions or 
personal characteristics. (Iyengar 1991a, p.134)  
 
Research has also shown that the frames journalists choose to shape stories often 
change over time, sometimes even seasonally. Van Gorp et al. (2005) found within a 
collection of local coverage that “homeless people were less blamed for poverty during the 
cold winter months than in summer time when they may bother tourists" (p.86). Preferred 
frames have also been found to change over longer periods of time based on the ascendency 
and decline of oppositional framing within coverage of the same issue (Brewer 2003; Chong 
& Druckman 2007).  Importantly, this body of research suggests that when a battle of frames 
commences, those frames sponsored by members of the elite classes are the frames more 
likely to be taken up by journalists and given air and screen time (Gamson & Modigliani 
1989; Druckman 2001; Nelson & Willey 2001; Entman 2004; Entman 2010; Kuypers 2002). 
Further, journalists are most likely to utilize the frames of economic and political elites when 
they are covering stories about topics that they are most unfamiliar with (Van Gorp 2005). In 
another paper Van Gorp (2007) suggests that the reason for these patterns in journalists’ 
choices of frames are simply the result of journalists’ participation as individuals in wider 
culture. The pattern we see is a result of journalists habitually reaching for “culturally 
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embedded frames” or frames that are frequent and recognizable from our everyday culture. He 
argues:  
Culturally embedded frames are appealing for journalists because they are 
ready for use. On the basis of their narrative ingredients it is possible to assign 
roles to the principal actors of an issue (e.g. good-bad, advocate-opponent), 
specify what the problem is and who is responsible, and so forth, all of which 
contributes to the dramatization and the emotional appeal of the news. (Van 
Gorp 2007, p.87)  
 
This is no doubt part of the equation, but if we take a hegemonic perspective on the existing 
framing literature there may be an additional story.   
In his research for Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues 
(1991), Iyengar found an important difference in the opinions of his participants when 
exposed to what he termed “thematic” or “episodic” news frames. An episodic news frame is 
a story centered on a single incident; the classic example is a news story on poverty where the 
narrative revolves around the personal struggles of a poor family. A thematic news frame lies 
on the other side of the spectrum, and draws upon historic and policy context.  A thematic 
treatment of poverty would discuss trends in overall levels of poverty, a policy underpinning 
or addressing the condition, and the history of poverty within the area or group in question. 
Iyengar found that framing an issue in an episodic or thematic manner had a measurable short-
term impact on participants’ opinions. In Iyengar’s own words, he found “individuals’ 
attributions of responsibility for political issues show significant short-term flux, depending 
upon the particular mix of thematic and episodic news frames in the everyday flow of 
information” (1991, p.130). Because the attribution of responsibility shifted as a result of the 
frame, ultimately whether a news story was episodic or thematically framed had influence 
over the policy preferences of news audiences. His findings indicate that “policy preferences, 
assessments of presidential performance, and evaluations of public institutions are all 
powerfully influenced by attributions of causal and treatment responsibility” (p.127). Even 
more suggestive is the more fundamental framing effect Iyengar attributed to the “episodic” 
nature of news coverage which was mentioned earlier. Iyengar’s experiments found public 
opinions were discordant across political topics and lacked grounding in broader informational 
or historical contexts, which led him to conclude:  
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Americans' failure to see interconnections between issues may be a side effect of 
episodic news coverage. ... [This] tendency may obscure the "big picture" and 
impede the process of generalization (p.136).  
 
FRAMES AS COGNITIVE STRUCTURES: PRIMING THEORY 
 
Some have suggested that the phenomenon above is a product of frames’ property as 
fundamental cognitive structures. Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) research on American racial 
politics argues that frames lead a “double life;” one residing in rhetoric and the other as a 
cognitive structure which individuals tap into when presented with an image or issue around a 
given topic. Frames may come from external sources - from the media or politicians, or even 
entertainment or fiction - but once learned, frames live on inside the mind as “interpretive 
structures” that can be generalized onto other topics.  Bishop and Fisher (1995) had similar 
conclusions when they found that the words used to indicate the economically needy, “poor” 
people versus “people on welfare” would evoke expressions of empathy or condemnation, 
respectively. Their explanation for this caprice of compassion for the poor was that different 
suites of words would stimulate different “conceptual frameworks” (or interpretive structures) 
in the mind, which in turn triggered different attributions for the responsibility of the problem 
of poverty.  
These discoveries and others like them have led to a subfield within framing theory 
called “priming theory.” Priming theory (typically, there is still definitional work happening in 
the literature at large) refers specifically to this cognitive processing model of framing effects, 
or “the way in which choices are presented to people [by the news media and other social 
actors] – the way the choices are framed – will affect the likelihood that particular options will 
be selected” (Price & Tewksbury 1997, p.182). Narrowly understood, this priming or 
“accessibility effects” phenomenon can be seen as a type of media effect. This is not a return 
to the passive audience conceptualization which lay behind the original media effects 
tradition. Rather, it places media alongside a number of places or sources from which people 
learn. If you can teach, via a news story or any other media product, a conceptual frame work, 
this framework can later be generalized by that same individual to understand new and similar 
issues (Slovic et al. 1980; Wyer 1986; Zaller & Feldman 1988).  
30 
 
Returning to the example of Bishop et al. (1982), two conceptual frameworks had been 
previously learned by their survey participants. One framework said that those who lived in 
poverty were in need of care by the more fortunate and lived difficult lives. The other 
framework said that the welfare system was wasteful and often aided those who were 
otherwise capable of taking care of themselves. Presenting the terms “welfare” or “poor” was 
the key variable as to which of these two frameworks would be utilized in a participant’s 
attempt at understanding the set of questions before them. The media is a player in multiple 
stages in this process. First, it can be involved by introducing the initial conceptual 
frameworks. Then, it returns by triggering these conceptual frameworks later through imagery 
or word choice. A third stage is possible as this re-exposure to the conceptual framework 
serves to shift the original framework, perhaps including or excluding some subject or aspect, 
or simply by reasserting its explanatory usefulness, thus making it easier to trigger the next 
time (Wyer 1986; Iyengar 1991b).  
Priming theory is useful and addresses the legitimate questions of psychological 
processing of information. However, like other perspectives that focus on individual 
psychological processes, it is difficult to investigate them as processes of power once we are 
locked into the lens of cognition. The concept of framing is useful for the investigation of 
media power because it highlights conceptual articulations rather than treating them as an 
opaque psychological process or naturalized opinion positions. Framing allows us to ask the 
question of articulation directly and thus see the negotiation, the rearranging, and - most 
importantly - that which is habitually left on the cutting room floor. 
FRAMING AND THE AUDIENCE 
 
Iyengar’s (1991a) research suggested that not only do news frames influence the 
audience’s position on specific issues, but the repeated exposure to episodic frames on a range 
of issues potentially creates a larger frame by which Americans are reassured that none of 
these issues were influencing, causing, or caused by any of the others (as in the issues of 
poverty and violence, for example). If we approach episodic framing as a hegemonic practice 
we can see them in news production as, in part, the result of a profit maximizing logic in the 
production of news. The investigative and narrative work that thematic frames require takes 
significantly more time and money than the production of episodic frames, which do not 
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demand the same deep understanding or investigation into an issue (Iyengar 1991, Price & 
Tewksbury 1997, Lawrence 2000). On the reception end, as Iyengar points out, social issues 
are continually presented as aberrations and individual failings. For the audience, core 
questions fail to be asked as to the nature of issues like endemic poverty, economic 
inequalities, or race relations. To phrase this more pointedly, because the attention of the 
media is aligned with the concerns of the capitalist class - both because they are capitalist 
ventures themselves and because they are owned by members of the capitalist class - the 
world they reflect through the television becomes a series of disconnected problems that can 
be rapidly transformed into stories that the capitalist class finds largely unthreatening.  
While Iyengar’s research shows how a lack of context and constant disarticulation can 
serve the cultural hegemony Martin Gilens (1999) work is a good example of how specific 
articulations can form out of news content that also serve the cultural hegemony. While not 
using the concept of framing directly, Gilens’ work still demonstrates how news can frame 
issues over long expanses of time, having a deep impact upon public understanding of 
political and economic issues that extend well beyond a particular event or election. 
 Gilens’ work traces the American debate around welfare and poverty-related policies. 
He argues that since the late 1960s and early 1970s the issue of poverty has been increasingly 
and persistently “racialized” in the United States. Focusing on pictures within major 
newsmagazines and television news, Gilens demonstrates how pictures of the “poor” became 
increasingly pictures of a Black, urban poor. Over time this has contributed to Black 
Americans and poverty becoming representative of each other in the news media. In turn, 
Black Americans and poverty have both been linked to willful unemployment and finally to 
welfare. Thus, when referring to one of these concepts, you are inevitably invoking (whether 
intended or not) the other three. Gilens refers to this phenomenon as a “discursive cluster,” 
which we can also approach, as Justin Lewis did above, as the process of articulation. Over 
the course of a couple of decade’s worth of media coverage of current events, race became 
articulated with poverty and with moral failing.  
Gilens argues that this discursive cluster is what ultimately lies behind the perplexing, 
contradictory attitudes we find amongst Americans towards alleviating the impact of poverty. 
When asked in abstract terms, Americans tend to indicate that they are against tax money 
being spent on “welfare.” However, when broken down into specific programs that directly 
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aid and support the poor, Americans tend to be in favor of their implementation in 
overwhelming majorities. “Welfare” has been so tightly tied to a fictional image of Black, 
able-bodied, willfully unemployed/unemployable poor that to get Americans behind aid for 
the impoverished the word “welfare” must be removed from the conversation. This has led to 
the issue of poverty being approached obliquely in American political rhetoric by those 
wishing to ameliorate its effects (Gilens 1999).  
By breaking down the discursive cluster into its articulated pieces we can suddenly see 
how, in this case, the plight of the poor gets obscured as it is reduced to a function of race 
rather than capitalist class relations. Similarly, the plight of Black Americans is obscured as 
their marginalization is reduced to a function of simple poverty and individual failing. These 
inequalities are discursively reconstructed away from the systems and practices that produce 
them, rendering the issue largely incomprehensible and providing a distracting alternative 
story of the failure of Black Americans to “break” their “cycle of poverty.”    
The strategy for any counter-hegemony would be to do the work of connecting 
positive meaning to desired social patterns, or negative meanings to existing ones. This is 
crucial, as one of the important insights of cultural hegemony is how any hegemony must take 
up the beliefs and grievances of enough of the subordinate classes to maintain consent (Artz & 
Murphy 2000). The real work of hegemony is in absorbing emerging counter-hegemonies into 
the dominant worldview without threatening the underlying power structure. There is already 
evidence that on aggregate, framing in the media and the news aligns with the interests of the 
economic and political elite - that is to say that those frames most likely to be presented, 
presented most frequently, and taken up by audiences are those that tend to be favored by and 
in the best interests of the economic and political elite (Edelman 1995; Green et al. 1988). 
This is not necessarily limited to the ideological or informational content of frames, as we see 
in Iyengar’s (1991) original finding on the impact of episodic framing suggests that even the 
repetition of one style of frame can serve to buttress the current power structure:  
  
Rather than providing a "marketplace of ideas," television provides only a 
passing parade of specific events, a "context of no context." Because reasoning 
about responsibility is influenced by news frames, and because the episodic 
frame predominates, the upshot is that instead of serving as a restraining force 
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on political elites, television further legitimizes their pronouncements and 
actions" (Iyengar 1991b, p.140) 
 
We can see framing theory as an operationalization of ideology as it functions in relation to 
cultural hegemony: 
 
Hegemony and ideology are united like bricks and mortar. Hegemonic 
apparatuses build consent by establishing accepted practices through sheer 
repetition ('this is the way we do things here'), then legitimizing them as 
valuable and natural ('this must be the best way to do things'). (Artz and 
Murphy 2000, p.40) 
 
The media in this case is the apparatus, and it produces, reproduces, and legitimizes its 
ideologies in the shape of and through frames. It is not enough to simply point this out, of 
course. We should be able to pick these frames apart as they appear in any given event, 
thereby revealing the underlying ideological logic and hegemonic structure.  
 To focus only on ideology, however, risks the mistake of collapsing hegemony into 
ideology and thereby losing one of the greatest insights of Gramsci. Cultural hegemony is 
lived in everyday life. There are practices that everyday people come to rely on and draw real 
material benefit from and therein lies the other half of continual consent to the larger system. 
In regard to news media, the practice and material benefit of watching the news is in large part 
the obtainment, the processing, and the enjoyment of information. In the next section, the 
concept of Information environments will be introduced as a way to operationalize the 
function of information in media as a hegemonic apparatus. 
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INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS  
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE QUEST FOR THE RATIONAL CITIZEN 
 
The concern many share for the state of public knowledge seems fairly common sense. 
If a democracy hinges upon citizens taking part in making public decisions, one would hope 
those decisions would be informed. One way this concern has manifested in research has been 
a question of whether or not citizens who are given information will make rational civic 
choices based on that information.  
Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro’s The Rational Public (1992) is one of the major 
works along this vein.  Using data from public surveys from 1935 to 1990 Page and Shapiro 
argued despite the fault lines and fractions of demographic differences in the American public, 
there was a surprising amount of stability in opinion. For the most part, the opinions of 
Americans on key issues changed very little over time. Page and Shapiro found that when 
opinions did change, they were in response to three predictable things: changes in economic 
conditions, large events, and information. Even those groups that were mutually defined by a 
difference of opinion, like liberals and conservatives, would change their opinions at the same 
time - what Page and Shapiro assumed could only be in reaction to the same event or new 
information. This led them to conclude that the public was fundamentally rational. When 
presented with new input from their environment, whether in material conditions or new 
information, the public on aggregate can be relied upon to change their opinion based on this 
external input.  
Page and Shapiro admit that this rational public has from time to time been led astray – 
particularly in regard to a history of nationalist and racist “biases.” These biases they attribute 
to an imperfect information system. While the vast majority of American individuals have 
access to a public education through the age of 18, participation in formal education drops off 
rapidly after this point (US Census Bureau 2004). The public then relies on a complex, 
unregulated network of sources to get the critical information needed to participate in a 
democracy - or, the media system (McChesney 1997). Page and Shapiro argue that these 
“biases” are ultimately a problem of information quality, not that they are the evidence of an 
irrational public.  
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Many of these “rational public” studies have set about aggregating the extensive 
polling data that is collected from the American public every year, cataloging 
“inconsistencies” and “biases.”  Of course, for anyone who cares about the quality of public 
knowledge, many of these results are worrying. The persistent inability for much of the public 
to answer basic factual questions about major national and International events have been 
understood as frustrating “knowledge gaps” (Kinder & Sears 1985; Lewis et al. 1991; 
Kuklinski & Quirk 1997). While polling methods have revealed the size and shape of these 
“gaps,” most of these studies have had limited success in explaining the nature of them. In 
Bartels’ (1996) words "political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best-
documented features of contemporary politics…. [but the] political significance of this 
political ignorance is far from clear” (Bartels 1996, p.194).  
Popkin (1991) presented these knowledge gaps in a rosier light, and suggests that the 
evidence actually supports the presence of a low-information rationality  among members of 
the public (see also Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). This line of argument presents the 
idea that in spite of their gaps in knowledge individuals utilized “information shortcuts” 
allowing them to make rational decisions anyway. This idea is related to a psychological 
concept of the mind’s utilization of  “reference states,” where individuals use conceptual 
containers to shorten the amount of information processing they have to do when making 
decisions, and may well be a fundamental method of human brain functioning around all 
topics, including politics (Kahneman & Tversky 1984). Other research suggests a 
vulnerability to the quality of the information environment may be mitigated by other factors. 
The so called sociotrophic phenomenon identified by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) speaks to 
this, and they found voters will weigh their perception of the national economy as a whole 
when choosing a presidential candidate more than their own personal financial circumstances. 
This clued political scientists and others into the idea that there is a complexity in the way 
individuals build decisions and make choices as public citizens. 
 The sociotrophic phenomenon does not hold across all political issues, however.  
Lang and Lang (1981) found people were less likely to take on media interpretations of 
political issues if the issue was something they dealt with on a daily basis. Public opinion 
converged with media accounts on issues that were less accessible and with which they had 
less experience, particularly those around international events. Lang and Lang termed these 
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“low” and “high” threshold issues. The public was happy to replace media interpretations with 
the knowledge gained from their own personal experiences when the threshold to knowledge 
was lower - when they were able to build their own sense of experience with that issue. But, 
the public became dependent upon media interpretations and narratives when they did not 
have personal experiences. 
Rationality in this tradition is defined by the ability to use information to make 
decisions – presumably in opposition to only using emotion or animus towards rival groups to 
make their choices. Those decisions that are deemed distasteful, like those that perpetuate 
racist practices for example, are labeled “biases” brought about by erroneous information 
(Page & Shapiro 1992). The solution in many of these cases (excluding the low-information 
rationality thesis) is presumed to be more information. That needs to be demonstrated, and the 
additional question should be asked whether or not the decisions that were not deemed to be 
full of “bias” were still in the real interest of those who made the decision.  
In regards to elections, this question - whether citizens make political decisions in 
accordance with their own real interests - has risen to the level of popular debate, as seen in 
the popularity of Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? (2004). Delli Carpini and 
Keeter’s (1996) exploration on the topic throws this question into serious doubt. Contrary to 
Popkin’s (1991) idea of low-information rationality, Delli Carpini and Keeter found 
significant difference in policy preferences between those who were more informed and those 
who were less informed. For example, those who were suffering economic hardship and well 
informed were more likely to be in favor of the expansion of welfare programs which would 
impact them favorably than those who were suffering economic hardship and less informed. 
This finding was repeated along a number of interest group/policy lines (including gender and 
feminism, and race and affirmative action). This would suggest that lacking information does 
actually hinder individuals from making decisions in their own interest:  
 
Political equality of all citizens depends fundamentally on the ability of citizens 
to discern their individual and collective interests and to act effectively upon 
them…. But inequalities in political knowledge that corresponds with those of 
more tangible resources can result in corresponding inequalities in the 
effectiveness of even relatively simple or easy means of participation." (M. X. 
Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, pp.137–138) 
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The likeliness to support a policy that would be in one’s own interest if in possession 
of more information is not the only tendency Delli Carpini and Keeter uncovered. Among 
those who were low information respondents who also did not support the policy direction of 
their personal real interest, the preferences were not random. Instead, among the low-
information respondents preferences consistently conformed to the preferences of the cultural 
and political elite, policies that favored lower commitment to welfare spending, more 
interventionist foreign policy, and decreased environmental and financial regulation on 
industry (M. X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Lewis 2001). This suggests there is a process 
less akin to the one proposed by Popkin (1991) and more like the one suggested by Page and 
Shapiro (1992), which is that imperfect information systems create distortions and “biases.” 
Page and Shapiro had also pointed to elites with agendas as the source for these “biases” being 
present in the informational system. However, the underlying process at work here may be 
better illuminated with the use of another term.   
O’Gorman’s (1986) concept of the “information environment,” also utilized by Justin 
Lewis (2001), can be used like framing to bring questions of power closer to the center of 
analysis. O’Gorman blamed “errors” in the public’s judgment on bad “information 
environments.” The term environment in relation to information highlights the complex 
relationship information has with everyday life. Environments vary – they can be rich or arid, 
diverse or monoculture. They sustain some types of species and not others. Additionally, 
every plant and creature of a given biome has a complex, branching relationship with every 
other plant and creature which makes this variability not just possible but guaranteed. To think 
of information as an environment encourages us to pay attention to the presence, absence, and 
interaction of facts. Environments are also homes for those that live in them, they are all-
encompassing. A species will have a hard time moving from one type of environment to the 
other. Similarly, the information environment an individual or group lives in will be built from 
their daily habits and the tools and resources made available to them. 
 Thought of this way, we can see how someone living in an informational desert will 
have to do a significant amount of work in order to build themselves an informational oasis. 
They would have to muster unique tools and resources and build habits that their community 
doesn’t share. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1997) indicate that more information correlates with 
an individual’s ability to recognize their own real interest. One way this could work is those 
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who spend less time actively seeking information will likely be exposed only to that 
information which is most readily available – which is also that information which is most 
likely to be in line with cultural hegemony. O’Gorman pointed out that our information 
environments are now dominated by media and particularly by the television (see also 
Bensman and Lilienfeld 1973, Shamir and Shamir 1997). Those who actively seek 
information will be more likely to find information that does not suit the current hegemony, 
thus illuminating their own real interests. Another possibility is that we could see active 
information seeking as a counter-hegemonic practice, because the seeker will need to seek out 
that additional information from less and less central sources. Information seekers may 
already hold a counter-hegemonic position in society (either ideologically, practically, or 
both), and thus are able to recognize their own real interest regardless of the actual specific 
information gained.  
To properly utilize the potential of the information environment concept, it is 
important to also adjust the way we conceptually approach one of our biggest methods of 
measuring these climates, which are opinions and opinion polls. By approaching the concept 
of information as merely a question of dosage (more or less) and opinion as a question of 
rational or irrational (or even functionally irrational) we are stuck on a two-dimensional plane 
of observation. By doing this we end up with conclusions like Kinder and Sears’ (1985) 
assertion that there is a general lack of any kind of “ideological reasoning” among members of 
the public. Each opinion - on taxation and on progressive individual liberties, or the role of 
law enforcement in society - appeared to exist without any underlying ideological coherence. 
That is to say that each belief appeared discreetly held, seemingly unrelated to every other 
preferred policy position. Most perplexing to this study and others like it is how these 
opinions actually seemed to contradict one another as often as not. 
  The “lack of ideological reasoning” among everyday citizens is a similar observation 
to the one made decades earlier when Converse (1964) argued that a "realistic picture of 
political belief systems in the mass public…[is] one that captures with some fidelity the 
fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of these demands” (p.247). However, we should 
consider that the reliance on conceptualizing citizens as rational individual actors may be 
masking a more fundamental interaction between our information systems and public 
knowledge. Lewis (2001) provides the pathway out of this endless fragmentation of opinion 
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by pointing out that there is an important distinction between being uninformed, which means 
not knowing anything, and being misinformed, which is to know something incorrectly. 
Cataloguing “biases” in opinion and “imperfections” in the information environment 
inevitably leads to the Kinders and Sears (1985) type conclusion – that there is no direction to 
public opinion and public knowledge and that their relationship is unpredictable and 
contradictory. But if we consider opinions as evidence rather than answers, we may be able to 
see an underlying structure: 
 
To use a somewhat clumsy metaphor, an opinion is, in this sense, like the tip of 
an iceberg. The tip can be distinguished from the mass of ice below sea level, 
but it is nonetheless part of that mass. Opinions are moments of discourse that 
can be distinguished but not separated from knowledge claims or assumptions. 
If we are to make sense of these moments, we need to understand the 
assumptions that make opinions plausible or likely. In trying to understand 
the responses to public opinion polls - and the influence of the media on those 
responses - we therefore need to dip below the surface to examine the 
broader discursive mass below." (Lewis 2001, p.108 emphasis mine)  
 
If we approach opinions, especially as measured by opinion polls, as points of 
evidence to the underlying information environment a new world of questions appears. The 
results of opinion polls should not be seen as the answer to our question “what does the public 
know,” but as a signpost which tells us which questions to ask next. The questions become; 
what opinions are more or less likely given the information environment, and what does that 
then tell us about the structure and function of a given information environment? (Lewis 2001: 
108; see also Hall 1996; Slack 1996). In this way, Lewis’ iceberg metaphor can be another 
way of speaking about hegemony. The quiet mass that sits unexamined under the “moments of 
discourse” that form the tip can be those same ideological underpinning of the current cultural 
system of power and consent that form our daily lives. If we see the media as a hegemonic 
apparatus, it will naturally see fit to offer some information while not disseminating other 
information. The question for Lewis, with this change in perspective, becomes “not how do 
media influence public opinion, but how do media influence those assumptions about the 
world that inform public discourse” (Lewis 2001, p.115). 
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RECONSTRUCTING THE MOMENT OF CONSENT 
 
Frames are the way that events and issues are packaged to tell a moral, causal story 
which is coherent with broader culture, and thereby coherent with the cultural hegemony. 
Frame theory and analysis is a lens that foregrounds the particular articulations that appear in 
any given discursive moment (or the accumulation of many moments), thereby giving us a 
window into hegemony as it is continually negotiated at the edges, and allows us to see what 
remains uncontested. Information environments are the bi-products of hegemonic activity – 
the habits and practices of both information producers and distributors (largely the media) and 
of individuals and groups who collect, seek, and absorb that information. Like framing, the 
concept of the information environment calls attention to discrete pieces – to their presences, 
absence, and articulations. Taken together, we may be able to investigate the role of media in 
society in a way that centralizes the issue of power while avoiding the tendency of critical 
theory to descend into reductive analysis and instead preserve the insight of precision and 
particularity that other paradigms in social science have given us (Hall & Walton 1972; Hall 
1996b). 
Frames and information environments, because of these same qualities, will also allow 
us to ask questions regarding the construction of counter-hegemonies. New and oppositional 
articulations in frames are the forging of new ideological positioning, and the use of 
information in a new way or the introduction of new information is the raw material from 
which a counter-hegemony can be built. But again, it is not enough to apply these concepts 
broadly; we must look for and demonstrate the activity as it happens within daily life. This is 
where Gamson’s concept of the collective action frame becomes useful.  
RECONSTRUCTING EMERGING RESISTANCE  
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME 
 
In his book Talking Politics (1992), William Gamson focuses on what he calls “a 
particular type of political consciousness,” and went searching for a political understanding 
which “supports mobilization for collective action” (p.7).  To do this, Gamson made use of the 
insights of social construction theory and framing theory. “Collective action frames” are a 
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particular type of frame which can be found in text and reconstructed from normal 
conversation. These are “action oriented sets of beliefs that inspire and legitimate social 
movement activities and campaigns” (Benford & Snow 2000, p.612). Another way to look at 
this concept is as a type of counter-hegemony. It had long been theorized that there can be no 
social change without action (Lukács 1923/1971). Gamson (1992) additionally argued that 
there can be no action without a deliberate discourse of action and understanding of oneself 
and ones group as possessing the agency to act. A collective action frame is formed of three 
crucial components:  
1.) Injustice: That is to say the frame, whether from a news source or from an individual 
in conversation, must convey a sense of “moral indignation” (Gamson 1992. p.7), 
against a particular human actor or actors which are responsible for causing the 
suffering or plight of others. The desperation or rage experienced in the face of an act 
of nature like a hurricane or an earthquake is not moral indignation. Further, the moral 
indignation of the injustice frame is “not merely a cognitive intellectual judgment 
about what is equitable but also what cognitive psychologists call a ‘hot cognition’ - 
one that is laden with emotion (Gamson 1992, p.7; see also Zajonc 1980). 
2.) Agency: The frame must also indicate that the situation of injustice can be altered 
through collective action. The type of collective action, whether it is through direct 
action, organizing, or simply voting, is not particularly important so long as the frame 
“impl[ies] some sense of collective efficacy and den[ies] the immutability of some 
undesirable situation” (p.7). Even more importantly, it is not merely that “someone” 
can or should do something, but that “I” and “we” are capable of impacting the 
situation. 
3.) Identity: This element of the collective action frame is closely related with agency. A 
collective action frame, when fully articulated, will have a concept of a “we,” which is 
often in ideological opposition to some “they.” The “they” in this component is 
important as “without an adversarial component, the potential target of collective 
action is likely to remain an abstraction – hunger, disease, poverty, or war, for 
example.” (p.7-8) 
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Social movements and the people that sustain them have highly developed collective action 
frames at their disposal. These frames can easily be found in their literature, in their 
organizational activities and in their conversations with others both inside and outside the 
movement. Gamson’s focus was on the presence of the elements of collective action frames in 
the general culture and in how we understand public affairs. Hegemony is constantly 
contested and in flux, so the presence of these frames would not be a surprise, however they 
would typically be expected to be present in a way that usually maintains the overall structure 
of hegemonic relations, in our case, capitalist relations. That is, of course, until they don’t: 
 
To what extent do the dominant media frames emphasize injustice?...To what 
extent do the frames constructed in conversations emphasize [injustice, agency, 
and identity]?....The answers to these questions tell us both about the 
mobilization potential in popular understanding of these issues and about the 
contribution of media discourse in nurturing or stifling it. (Gamson 1992, p. 8)  
 
Adding the dimension of an active relationship to politics and policy expands the realm of 
what we consider possible as researchers, beyond the realm of opinions and voting. This 
expansion of our research imagination becomes important when the issues in question are 
larger than a presidential election. To investigate the formation of collective action frames is a 
way of peering into the function of hegemonic negotiation. Or, to put it back in the terms of 
Lukes, into the function of the third dimension of power – into the successful or unsuccessful 
manufacturing of consent.  
It is important to understand that opinions expressed by the public are the “tip of the 
iceberg” of hegemonic ideological reasoning, but this is only part of the story. Just as the 
opinion poll tends to ignore the realm of the social and individual complexities inherent to 
belief, imagining civic action as simply casting a vote is too restrictive and misses entire 
realms of potential civic activity. The failure of collective action frames to develop in 
discourse, or the complication of a collective action frame which removes one or more 
essential components, is the triumph of that third dimension of power. It is the moment when 
hegemony is maintained, in the suppression of the idea of an alternative to the way we live 
now.  
43 
 
In the following section, the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 will be introduced. First 
it will be explained as an event and then it will be discussed as an event where the role of the 
media in maintaining cultural hegemony can be explored.  
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS  
 
In early 2008 the numbers on the board of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
began to get smaller. In financial papers a few articles warned against something called a 
“sub-prime mortgage crisis.” Throughout the following summer, the housing market across 
the United States, which had softened continually for the last two years, was unable to shift 
homes at an expected pace and residential developers began to get nervous. There was a sense 
among some financial elites that something was wrong. However, day-to-day life for most 
Americans continued on with little awareness of these foreshocks beginning to zip through the 
financial markets. Public attention was instead consumed by the Presidential race between 
Senators Barack Obama and John McCain.  
 On September 15th of that same year the investment firm Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy. They cited $619 billion in debt with just $639 billion in assets – and the 
floodgates opened.  The chain reaction begun by the disappearance of Lehman Bros caused 
the Dow Jones Industrial Index to plunge, taking many Americans’ retirement savings with it. 
Over 100 mortgage banks would file for bankruptcy before the year was out, and the world 
wide credit markets froze solid. With the sudden illiquidity in the world market, the entire 
global economy suffered a massive slowdown – businesses could no longer secure the short 
lines of credit that they relied on for normal operation. Money could no longer be secured for 
building, for repairs, or investments of any kind. In turn this reduced demand for goods across 
the board, reaching down to even raw materials like lumber and oil. These material industries, 
which are normally secure and in high-demand, suffered massive loss. The world economy 
shrank almost overnight. For people who did not own a business but relied instead on wages 
and employment, this meant massive layoffs, a constricted job market, and the loss of their 
personal savings and investments – often in the form of their mortgaged home.  
 The financial crisis, narrowly defined, was caused by banks utilizing a new and highly 
unstable method of making profit (Foster & Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2011; Robb 2013). For the 
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past decade preceding the crisis, when banks went about making loans, particularly in the 
modestly priced mortgage market, “rather than simply lending money prudently and deriving 
profit from the interest paid, they would write as many mortgages as they could and sell them 
off as fast as they could” (Calhoun 2011, p.4). Many of these mortgages were sold to people 
who had no real ability to pay them off. The loans were either simply too expensive for these 
families, or they were sold with variable interest rates which, when they inevitably rose, 
would suddenly make an affordable monthly payment into an impossible one. These ‘bad’ 
mortgages, unlikely to be paid off, were bundled together with more secure low-risk 
mortgages into a type of financial product called a security, and then these bundles were sold 
off to other financial institutions (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011; Foster & Magdoff 
2009; Robb 2013). The ability to sell off a mortgage to another financial institution as a 
security, bundled in such a way that the quality (the likelihood that it would be repaid) was 
obscured, un-tethered the traditional set of interests between bank and mortgage holder. A 
new, perverse set of incentives were created instead – banks could now make more money by 
selling more mortgages to more people, regardless of their ability to pay, and then selling 
them on to other financial institutions. The original bank held the money, and the purchaser of 
the security held the risk. These financial institutions which purchased these securities often 
had very little to do with the mortgage industry, and were instead involved in nearly every 
other major economic industry. These institutions were international and multi-national. 
Compounding the exposure to risk posed by bad mortgage-backed securities, these same 
financial institutions used the securities as collateral, turning around to borrow more money 
against them as assets. 
 This process had been facilitated by government policies, which over the last few 
decades had systemically deregulated the banks and allowed them to borrow more money with 
less collateral. The result was “like a private, but government-sanctioned, mechanism for 
printing new money” (Calhoun 2011, p.4). Thus, many financial institutions became tied to 
the fate of both the American housing market and to each other in a nightmare recursive loop. 
In addition, the liquidity offered by these securities was used to make speculative investments 
aided by “creative” use of derivatives, a set of financial tools which are used to make 
speculative investments.  These ‘tools’ were often so obscure that even traders specializing in 
derivatives did not fully understand them (Robb 2013). All of this activity, while showing 
45 
 
massive amounts of paper wealth, actually produced very little in real, material, value (Foster 
& Magdoff 2009). When the bad mortgages inevitably started to default by the millions, the 
whole financial world realized they had far less money than they thought they had. The debt 
of the mortgage holders would never be collected, and that debt had been used to inflate 
companies’ values by magnitudes beyond what they could ever deliver. As a result, they could 
no longer continue to finance loans, thus causing the credit markets to freeze.  
 Though, in truth, the crisis broadly defined starts much earlier and branches out to far 
more than the financial sector. In Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial 
Meltdown (2011) Calhoun summarizes a longer, deeper trend that lies underneath the collapse 
of this particular bubble:   
[Financialization] was encouraged [from as early as the 1970’s] by politicians 
preaching the virtues of marketing almost everything and thus turning public 
property into private  assets, often leveraged by massive credit. This, in turn, 
rejected deeper ideological work seeking to discredit regulation and public 
enterprise, to reduce business corporations to commodities themselves bought 
and sold; and to encourage the nation that all human needs could be met on the 
basis of private-property transaction. (p.47)  
 
The trend of American families over-leveraging themselves with mortgage debt was 
due to a combination of economic trends. One was stagnating wages for middle and working 
class jobs. This trend was driven in part by a demand for ever increasing short-term profit 
from business firms as well as the destruction of organized labour (Crouch 2011; Harvey 
2005; Peck 2010).  It was also driven by an encouragement towards speculative investment - 
to buy on the hope that a product can be sold at a significantly higher price in the future - 
which went all the way down to the average family.  This encouragement to speculation held 
the same flawed logic of endless liquidity that was programmed into Wall Street trading 
algorithms which compounded the 2008 crisis.  
Just as financial firms passed mortgage-backed securities back and forth to each other, 
using them as a way to pretend they could access far more money than they actually had, 
families were encouraged to view the price of their home as an asset that could be endlessly 
traded (Foster & Magdoff 2009; Calhoun 2011). Ignoring the realities of work, communities, 
child-bearing, care-giving, aging, and eventual death which govern human existence, 
increasingly overpriced homes were trumpeted as an increase in wealth instead of debt. New 
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homes, on this same logic, were being built ever larger, in higher and higher price brackets. 
Modest homes were increasingly priced into immodest brackets, and new affordable housing 
was progressively scarce. When the inevitable disaster hit, these overleveraged families faced 
the prospect of owing more on a home than it was now “worth,” in a market that could not sell 
a home anyway. These same families faced the likely prospect of losing one, both, or its only 
source of income as people lost their jobs by the millions. Many of those shuffled off by the 
labour market now found themselves “underwater” on a home they now could not sell, yet 
needing to move away from their home for the chance to find new employment. In addition to 
all of this, the rolling foreclosures disrupted entire communities. In this study there are stories 
of teachers whose students live in cars, grandmothers who now feed and clothe their adult 
children and grandchildren, and a transformed community landscape of empty bank-owned 
houses and vacant local businesses.  
 Finally, the transition from a secure and stable pension system into a system of mutual 
funds traded by third parties meant that those increasingly few Americans who had managed 
to save for retirement lost those savings in late 2008. In short, the financial crisis and 
recession did not create the current malaise of the U.S. working and middle classes, rather it 
laid bare the results of a social system that had been wholly handed over “in the name of 
neoliberal freedom from regulation and constraint” (Calhoun 2011, p.49).  
  The response to the crisis has largely been a continuation of this trend, not a reversal. 
The first, and largest, response by the U.S. government was the creation of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), a federal fund which bought up a significant portion of the toxic 
mortgage-backed securities with taxpayer money in order to relieve financial firms of their 
debts in an attempt to inject liquidity into the world credit markets (The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report 2011). This saved a number of financial institutions, and may have halted a 
further slide into economic depression. However, to date no correspondingly direct program 
was offered to average citizens to relieve them of their toxic assets. Instead they were allowed 
to founder in the collapsed economy, holding the entire burden of the financial products they 
were, often aggressively, sold.  
 So what can the financial crisis teach us about cultural hegemony? Even more 
specifically, what can it teach us about the media’s role in maintaining cultural hegemony? 
There are two reasons why the financial crisis is of particular interest to these questions. The 
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first is that hegemony relies on an acceptable degree of material security amongst the 
dominated classes in order for consent to the ruling order to hold (Gramsci 1971; Pozzolini 
1990; Artz & Murphy 2000). A big part of the reason why the capitalist hegemony of the 
American Dream has been so successful in the United States is “because Uncle Sam has 
delivered.... overall, American history is a record of recurring race and class conflicts 
surmounted by an increase in the standard of living for the subordinate majority of workers 
and farmers" (Artz and Murphy 2000, p.35). This relationship between comfort and 
complacency is what Tocqueville had begun to observe in his quote placed at the top of this 
chapter. In this sense, the cultural hegemony of the United States has not faced such a threat 
since the Great Depression. Too many people faced a sudden drop in material security and 
with that a reduction in their future prospects. These are precisely the moments hegemony is 
in the most danger.  
 Reason number two is closely related to the first reason; when material conditions turn 
sharply for the worse, ideology often follows. These are times that Gamson termed “critical 
discourse moments:”  
 
Critical discourse moments are especially appropriate for studying media 
discourse. With continuing issues, journalists look for 'pegs' - that is, topical 
events that provide an opportunity for broader, more long-term coverage and 
commentary. These pegs provide us with a way of identifying those time 
periods in which efforts at framing issues are especially likely to appear 
(Gamson 1992, p.26) 
 
These critical discourse moments are where new frames form within cultural discourse. They 
are also the moments when old, dormant frames can re-emerge from our collective history and 
live again. Taken together, the financial crisis is both a material and an ideological shock 
which occurred right at the heart of the American capitalist hegemony and its ideological 
construction of the American Dream. Research from the Pew Research Institute shows that 
opinion about the cause of the crisis breaks down around class lines (as measured by income).  
Below are the results to the question “How much do you think each of the following has 
contributed to the current problems with financial institutions and markets?” 
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People in all income levels cite people taking on too much debt and banks 
making risky loans as significant factors in the financial problems. Yet 
wealthier people take a different view of causes of the crisis than do people 
with low annual incomes. For instance, 86% of those with an annual family 
income of $75,000 or more cite risky loans made by banks as having a lot 
to do with the recent financial problems; that compares with 60% of those 
making less than $30,000 annually. More than half (52%) of those in the 
high income category say weak regulation contributed a lot to current 
problems, compared with 40% for those earning less than $30,000. (The 
Pew Research Center News Report, October 15, 2008 emphasis mine). 
 
Since the crisis there have been notable collective action responses to this event and its 
underlying causes, the most successful being the Occupy Wall Street movement. And yet, 
their impact has been heavily mitigated. Even the most timid of legislation attempting to 
prevent only the most direct causes of the crisis by placing certain restrictions on bank 
investment activity has failed to pass (Sherman 2009; Harvey 2011; Murphy 2015). 
 Was Tocqueville right? Are there no more revolutions in America? And is the reason 
due to the presence of the middle class? Tocqueville made an observation that has so far held 
correct, but Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony may help us ask why it has held correct. 
This financial crisis event gives us an opportunity to see hegemony working hard to maintain 
control, and to see just how big a role the media plays in that process. 
 In the next chapter on this study’s methodology, it will be explained how framing 
theory, information environments, and collective action frames are operationalized in the 
analysis of news coverage and civic discussions among middle/working class Americans in an 
attempt to find the flux and construction of hegemony and counter-hegemony in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study attempts to answer the following questions:  
1. Did the news media act as a hegemonic apparatus and function to absorb the 
contradictions of the United States’ capitalist hegemony exposed by the financial crisis 
and frame them in such a way to protect or re-form hegemonic ideology?  If so, how? 
 
2. Were middle/working-class, non-activist participants engaged in civic discussions able 
to form partial or whole counter-hegemonies out of their understanding of the financial 
crisis and their available information environment? And, were they able to use them 
during persuasive conversation with their peers? 
 
3. Did middle/working-class, non-activist participants utilize, mobilize, and rely on news 
media frames to form and communicate their understandings and beliefs about the 
financial crisis? 
The following chapter describes the methods by which these questions are addressed. The 
methods used to approach question one, a qualitative frame analysis, are justified and 
described in the first part of this chapter. Next, the methods used to approach the second and 
third questions, a series of peer group discussions, are also justified and described. Next, this 
chapter offers a demographic profile for each discussion group, which also details their 
political beliefs and media use habits. Finally, this chapter ends on a note on how the rest of 
this paper is organized and how it should be read. 
Framing Analysis   
 
This study aims for a richer understanding of how the interaction between news 
content and news audiences supports or resists the cultural hegemony in the United States. As 
such, both sides of this interaction had to be investigated. The first side discussed here and in 
each subsequent chapter is the content of the news. Content, the finished broadcasts audiences 
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encounter when they watch the news, is the outcome of the productive activity of journalists. 
However, content should not be conflated with the practices of journalists.  Regardless of the 
structures, pressures, and practices that ultimately result in news content, at the end of the day 
the resulting news content becomes a part of the culture it is released into. It is a product that 
stands as official record of events which all other cultural and political actors must contend 
with. The study of production cannot conjure a complete understanding of content, nor can 
one assume that all thoughts, beliefs, and ideas held by an audience come from media content. 
Likewise, the study of content cannot substitute for the direct investigation of production or 
reception. Content is bound up in the practices and interpretations of both producers and 
audiences, but remains distinct from both and its properties cannot be assumed from what is 
found in the other two.  
The first half of this project is aimed at uncovering the prominent frames used by U.S.  
news media to present and explain the financial crisis and subsequent events pertaining to it. 
Once identified, the analysis of those frames then asks how they may or may not support the 
prevailing cultural hegemony. Additional questions are asked of these frames regarding the 
type of information climate they support, and whether they contain the elements of a 
collective action frame.  
Television News  
 
 
 
This project was designed to investigate the frames and information which emerged 
out of television news. Ideally, all forms of information media through this period would be 
studied, but a project of that scope is cost and time prohibitive for a single researcher. In lieu 
of an analysis on the entire media landscape, television news was chosen for three major 
reasons. The first is television news is a form of journalism that is too often neglected by 
media researchers. The widespread availability of digitally accessible, chronologically 
Whether at election times, in moments of tragedy or joy, as a matter of routine, 
most of the time television is where people will turn to first to make sense of what 
is happening in the world. Major national bulletins both nationally and 
internationally are watched by many millions each day. Network and cable 
evening news in the United States [US] is watched by over 24 million viewers 
[Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism 2010]. (Cushion 2012) 
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organized newspaper articles has meant that printed press is simply easier to sample in a 
methodologically sound manner. This combines with a longstanding assumption that U.S. 
television news “merely” takes their cues from the major newspapers, and thus to study one is 
to study both (Cushion 2012). With the collapse of many American newspapers and the 
massive restructuring of the remaining newspapers, including the New York Times, as well as 
the increasing reliance of newspaper reporting on less formal sourcing, like social media,  it 
can no longer be assumed that this relationship still exists in the same way (Schudson 2008, 
Cusion 2012). The second reason television news is the focus of this study is the simple fact 
that major television networks still retain a privileged place of access into major events and 
elite institutions, in spite of the growing role of the internet and internet-based “citizen 
journalism” (Schudson 2011, Cushion 2012).  This means much of the communication 
happening about current events via peer-to-peer networks like Twitter and Facebook is usually 
formed around information which has already been provided, validated, and pre-framed by 
traditional news media.  Due to this, it is impossible to investigate the financial crisis in the 
media without investigating the understandings provided by and through these traditional 
journalism outlets. The last and most important reason for the focus on television news is that 
it remains the prominent source of news for most Americans: 
 
Content Sampling  
 
The financial crisis as an event is long, diffuse, and continuing. This presents a 
challenge for sampling content, because this project was interested in those frames which 
feature most prominently in television news content, the aim was to investigate important 
moments within the crisis as sites where frames may have originally emerged from, became 
most widely circulated, and to which any competing understandings from the public, political 
leaders, or other forms of media would likely have felt compelled to address.  Four major 
moments of the financial crisis and resulting recession were chosen as windows into the over-
all treatment of the financial crisis by television news. These are the four “high-water marks” 
of the financial crisis as it was experienced in the United States, which serve as “critical 
discourse moments” within the financial crisis, as discussed in Chapter 1 (Gamson 1992). The 
television news coverage of these four time periods served as the population from which 
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samples were drawn for a qualitative frame analysis, described later in this chapter (Patton 
2001; Corbin & Strauss 2007).  
The first sampling period is during the initial outbreak of heavy television coverage of 
the financial crisis during September and October of 2008. This was the point where major 
investment firms, including Lehman Brothers and AIG, collapsed and stock market values 
plummeted as a combined result of the accumulation of toxic assets and the resulting credit 
freeze between financial institutions (“Global recession timeline,” BBC 2014). The collapse of 
these lending bodies and the stock market were highly visible to the public in a way that other 
events in the crisis had not been. This is the moment when the financial crisis became a crisis 
in the sense that it was recognized as a crisis by journalists and news outlets, and therefore 
also by the public. It was also during this time that the first major pieces of legislation were 
passed by the U.S. government in an attempt to get the crisis under control, including the 
massive Toxic Asset Relief Program, or T.A.R.P. (Murphy 2015; Anon 2014).  
The second period of interest is January through February of 2009. It was at this point 
where politicians revived the phrases and imagery used to pass T.A.R.P. were revived as 
American automakers, a historically significant part of America’s export economy and 
important site in the negotiation of American labor rights, came to Congress asking for 
financial aid (Anon 2014; Robb 2013; Harvey 2011). This occurred simultaneously with 
President Barack Obama taking his political office for the first time, and when the American 
economy began to haemorrhage jobs, leading to the highest levels of unemployment in 
decades from which the economy is currently only just recovering now in the year 2016 
(Anon 2014; Casselman 2016).  
The third sampling period identified for this research is September of 2009. This 
month saw the first major march of the “Tea Party,” an ideologically conservative movement 
that in its early days pointed to the financial crisis as a marker of a broken governance system. 
The Tea Party was a deliberate attempt to shape the general discourse around the U.S. 
economy, and the financial crisis, and therefore became of interest to this study (Boykoff & 
Laschever 2011; Guardino & Snyder 2014).  
The fourth and final sampling period comes from recognition that 2008 and 2009 are 
now recent history and public discussion has potentially evolved from how the event was 
originally understood.  Because of this, mainstream coverage of August and September of 
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2011 were brought into the sample population. Two major events occurred in the United 
States at this time which, while not part of the crisis in the way the fall of Lehman Brothers 
was, are still a result of the event and therefore inextricable from it in the context of its social 
and political history. This was the period of the “debt ceiling” standoff in the U.S. Congress, 
which was an attempt by the political right wing in the American legislature to establish 
economic austerity measures as a cure for the continuing fallout of the financial crisis 
(Appelbaum & Dash 2011). This was also the period where the social movement Occupy Wall 
Street took form and attempted to inject new narratives of economic justice and equality into 
the national discourse. This movement pressured the government to prosecute members of the 
financial elite for their actions that contributed to the initial collapse, and to instate 
preventative reform. Occupy Wall Street is of interest here as a sort of parallel movement to 
the Tea Party. While the solutions proposed by the Tea Party were nearly the exact opposite of 
those proposed by the later Occupy Wall Street movement, both movements emphasized the 
failure of the U.S. government to help the American middle class. 
The goal for this stage of the project was to find the major frames repeated within 
these coverage periods. The above events were sampled from transcripts of the three major 
broadcast networks of ABC, CBS, and NBC and all three cable news channels, MSNBC, 
CNN, and Fox News. All of the transcripts were available on the NEXIS online database.  
Sampling for the three major broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC was straightforward, 
as their news programs are scheduled regularly, typically one hour at the end of each 
weekday. All shows from these three networks within the above sampling time periods 
containing the key words “financial crisis,” “economy” OR “recession” were downloaded and 
collected from the database. The sampling strategy for the cable news channels MSNBC, 
CNN, and Fox News were slightly more complicated, as these are 24-hour channels with 
programming that lasts most or all of every day. However, all three channels have peak hours 
of news viewership, so sampling was focused upon the programs that aired during these hours. 
The shows sampled were Anderson Cooper 360 for CNN, and The O’Reilly Factor for Fox 
News. MSNBC had a major switch in the dominant show of their network between the chosen 
sampling periods. For the earlier sampling periods, this was Countdown with Keith 
Olbermann. This show was cancelled in early 2011, so the final sampling period was collected 
from the top-ranked show of this time, The Rachel Maddow Show.  These cable channels were 
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of particular interest for this study. Viewership of these channels tend to go up significantly 
relative to broadcast channels during major news events, and this is particularly the case with 
CNN (Cushion 2012). CNN is also of particular interest in regards to framing, as they make a 
concerted effort to brand themselves as “professional” and neutral in their treatment of news 
items. Fox News and MSNBC are of particular interest, as they tend to be more openly 
partisan, and thus will have markedly different interpretations of some news items, and 
because they have uniquely loyal viewer bases that do not overlap (Cushion 2012). Just as 
with the broadcast news channels, all shows during the four sampling periods containing the 
key words “financial crisis,” “economy” OR “recession” were downloaded from the database, 
and together these formed the entirety of the sampling.  
Once the sampling population was collected each individual newscast was given a 
number. A browser-based randomizing tool was used to reorder these numbers, and the first 
ten newscasts were chosen for every channel, for each sampling period. This resulted in 240 
newscasts to be analyzed across news channels and sampling period population (see Tables 1, 
2, and 3 for clarification and reference). These newscasts were then uploaded onto the 
qualitative software tool, NVivo for the next phase of analysis.  
News Frame Analysis  
 
To analyze these samples, this project utilized a qualitative method of framing analysis 
set out by Baldwin Van Gorp (Van Os et al. 2008; Van Gorp 2010). This method is explicitly 
located in an understanding of media frames as social constructions and is designed to find 
frames that are most culturally resonant for their intended audiences.  This analysis started 
with an initial “inductive phase,” which is an iterative combination of open, axial, and 
selective coding. 
 The unit of analysis for this portion of the thesis was a single newscast, which was 
marked by a title of the report, an opening by a journalist or anchor, and a formal sign-off or 
topic switch by a journalist or anchor. This decision allowed the inductive analysis, described 
in more detail below, to utilize pre-existing and medium-based boundaries to delineate the 
“start” and “end” to any given narrative. Because the initial analysis was inductive, which by 
design does not presume the presence or structure of a frame within the newscast text, 
utilizing these boundaries to define the unit of analysis made it possible to investigate the 
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arrangement of framing and reasoning devices relative to the start of a newscast, the end of the 
newscast, and to finally relative to each other. This relative positioning of framing and 
reasoning devices is, in and of itself, an important clue to the underlying narrative logic of the 
information being presented in a newscast.  
Using NVivo, each unit sample was assigned their respective attributes of “channel” 
indicating which channel the newscast was from, and “event” indicating which sampling 
period the sample was from. This allowed an analysis of the prominence of framing devices 
and frames that may be associated with particular channels or events. Then, each channel was 
read closely for available framing devices. The aim was to reconstruct what Van Gorp (2010) 
called a “framing package,” which draws from the “notion of culture as a tool kit of symbols 
from which people may select to devise communication strategies and solve problems” (p.85). 
Each frame package is the “integrated structure of framing devices and a logical chain of 
reasoning devices that functions to represent a certain issue” (p.91). Framing devices can 
include themes, word use, catchphrases, types of actors and actions, settings, numerical 
representations, emotional or moral appeals, and metaphors. For the analysis of these 
newscasts in NVivo, each framing device was coded as an un-nested node. 
 Newscasts were also coded for various reasoning devices. Reasoning devices are 
rhetorical tools that “indicate the cause of the problem, what has to be done, who is 
responsible for causes, consequences, and solutions, and to convey moral judgements” (Van 
Gorp 2010, p.92; Entman 1993). The intent was to “identify the framing and reasoning 
devices and to relate them to a condensing symbol, which is part of a shared culture” (Van 
Gorp 2010, p. 92). Another coding nested these base framing and reasoning devices under 
broader themes. These themes, using Van Gorp’s (2010) method, are tied to recognizable 
cultural themes. This is also a phase where important connections between reasoning devices 
are found that take the frame from problem definition through to proposed solution (Van Gorp 
2010).  
It should be noted here that because the newscasts which form the sample were 
collected as transcripts, a wealth of information was lost due to the stripping of these 
newscasts from their original visual form. Television conveys enormous amounts of 
information and narrative logic through the use of visuals. In the case of newscasts, this comes 
in the form of everything from facial expressions to screen text and background stock reels 
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(Cushion 2012). The exclusion of visuals in this thesis should not be read as an assertion that 
it is unimportant and its absence from the analysis is an unfortunate shortcoming. This was 
merely due to the difficulty of obtaining newscasts in their original visual form, even from 
relatively recent history and this project did not have the resources required to include them in 
the analysis. Ideally, this can be a question for future research on the frames that were 
discovered in the textual transcripts.  
 While going through this initial inductive phase of frame analysis, I originally 
identified nearly a dozen different issue-specific frames. These included frames like “take 
your medicine,” where the efforts of the government to provide very expensive aid to various 
industries was presented as a distasteful-but-necessary medical intervention, and “failure of 
leadership,” where the financial crisis, or the failure to fix the financial crisis, rests on the 
leadership abilities (the confidence or communication style) of a single political actor. The 
metaphors and imagery of these frames are both evocative and informative, but it became 
clear that there was a larger picture being missed. This study intended to find the very broad, 
major themes in media coverage, those themes that even light and sporadic news watchers 
would have encountered and been able to utilize in conversation. At this level of analysis 
“take your medicine” and “failure of leadership” were not significantly distinct from one-
another and it seemed unlikely that they would be used naturally in normal conversation. 
However they both fit into a larger, non-issue specific frame that has been long-recognized in 
framing literature: the strategy -game frame. As Entman pointed out, it is likely these top-level 
frames that likely have the most impact on news audiences as: 
 
Ordinary citizens are … susceptible to framing effects in the real world, which 
often involve not one exposure to a slight message variation, but a pattern of 
repeated exposure to resonant words and images...An example from the cast 
discussed later 2008 Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin, was 
framed by repeating positive, culturally resonant tropes like "hockey mom." 
(Entman 2010, p.333) 
 
Thus, the final part of the inductive analysis of the news samples was re-coding the smaller 
issue-specific frames, rich in metaphor and imagery, into their larger explanatory frames that 
belie the underlying logic of the cause, effect, and solution of the financial crisis and 
recession.   
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Figure 1: Nesting to the Causal Frame Level Example 
 
 
In this way, the reasoning devices were given a higher importance over the framings devices 
and the final frames were built from the fundamental logic that underpinned any given story, 
as built through these reasoning devices. This allowed me to work with the causal, 
explanatory frames of the financial crisis. A causal frame is:  
 
A central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding 
strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what 
the controversy is about, the essence of the issue. (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, 
p.143) 
 
A similar decision had to be made on the occasion that a single newscast “drifted” from one 
frame to another over the course of its duration. While this was infrequent in the overall 
sample, it did occur that a newscast would start in one causal frame only to have a guest or 
another anchor present a second. Because this thesis was primarily interested in those frames 
which were most dominant in a narrative and thus the most readily received by an audience 
member, the decision was made to classify these “drifting” newscasts with the frame that was 
presented by the title and in the opening. This decision ultimately impacted the total counts of 
each causal frame, which can be found in tables 1-3. However, the intended focus of this 
thesis is upon the articulation of information and ideology as presented within these frames. It 
is not designed as, nor should it stand in for, a formal content analysis. The need for a future 
Strategy-Game 
Frame
Strategy Frame
Failure of 
Leadership
Take Your 
Medicine
Begging for a 
Bailout
Game Frame 
Crisis as 
Campaign issue
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content analysis of these frames, having thus been discovered and the ideological impact 
investigated, is discussed at the end of the thesis.  
Once the initial 240 samples were coded and organized into their major causal 
container frames, another 5 samples were taken from each news show for a total of another 30 
samples in order to validate the presence of the frames and confirm their frequency in the 
overall coverage (Van Gorp 2010; Patton 2001). This small check allowed me to move on to 
the next stage of research. Had I found entirely new causal frames within this randomly 
selected 30 newscasts across channels, it would have been a sign that significant frames had 
been missed and the population should be sampled again. However, as all of the newscasts in 
this validation sample fit into the existing frame types, I determined I had likely achieved a 
reasonable level of saturation and could thus move on (Bauer & Gaskell 2000; Patton 2001; 
Corbin & Strauss 2007).   
In total, 270 frames were analyzed, and a total of seven big-picture frames were 
identified: strategy-game frame, survivor stories, bootstraps frame, opportunity in disaster, 
populism, moral decay and international threat. Two of these frames, moral decay and 
international threat, showed up very infrequently in the samples, and the international threat 
frame was never mentioned in the peer group discussions. These will be discussed briefly 
later, but do not constitute their own chapter. The other five major frames were identified as 
being ubiquitous in coverage and yet distinct enough from one another as to be analytically 
unique. Three of these frames, the survivor stories, bootstraps frame, and opportunity in 
disaster frame share a similar human-interest perspective, and are discussed together in 
chapter four. Chapter three discusses the strategy-game frame, and chapter five discusses the 
media’s populism frame. 
 The examples used in the chapter discussions were chosen for their illustrative merit 
to the framing and reasoning devices. This usually means that these devices are both 
particularly simple and close together, which facilitates easier demonstration. It should be kept 
in mind that they do not always appear in this way within all newscasts. Just as often the 
framing or reasoning devices are farther apart, repetitious, or separated by significant amounts 
of otherwise dry facts, though the underlying logic of the frame remains intact.   
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Table 1: Broadcast Channel Sample Frames 
*International Threat and Moral Decay Frames 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling Period  
 
 
CHANNEL 
 
FRAME 
 
Sept/ 
Oct 2008 Feb 2009 
 
Sept 2009 
 
Aug/Sept 2011 
 
TOTAL 
 
Validation 
Sample 
 
ABC 
 
Strategy 3 7 6 8 24 
 
2 
 
 
Bootstraps Cluster 5 3 2 0 10 
 
1 
 
 
Populism 1 0 2 2 5 
 
2 
 
 
Int. Threat/MD* 1 0 0 0 1 
 
0 
 
ABC 
TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
 
45 
  
CBS Strategy 4 3 6 5 18 
 
4 
 Bootstraps Cluster 3 3 1 0 7 
 
0 
 Populism 3 4 3 4 14 
 
1 
 Int.Threat/MD* 0 0 0 1 1 
 
0 
CBS 
TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
45 
  
NBC Strategy 4 6 8 3 21 
 
3 
 Bootstraps Cluster 3 1 0 3 7 
 
0 
 Populism 3 2 2 3 10 
 
2 
 Int. Threat/MD* 0 1 0 1 2 
 
0 
NBC 
TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
45 
  
Broadcast Channel TOTAL 30 30 30 30 120 135 
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Table 2: Cable Channel Sample Frames 
*International Threat and Moral Decay Frames 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling Period  
 
 
CHANNEL 
 
FRAME 
 
Sept/ 
Oct 2008 Feb 2009 
 
Sept 2009 
 
Aug/Sept 2011 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
Validation 
Sample 
 
CNN 
 
Strategy 5 6 4 5 20 
 
4 
 
 
Bootstraps Cluster 4 2 0 2 8 
 
0 
 
 
Populism 1 2 6 3 12 
 
1 
 
 
Int. Threat/MD* 0 0 0 0 1 
 
0 
 
CNN TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
45 
  
MSNBC Strategy 4 7 8 6 25 
 
5 
 Bootstraps Cluster 2 1 0 0 3 
 
0 
 Populism 4 2 2 4 12 
 
0 
 Int.Threat/MD* 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 
MSNBC TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
45 
  
FOX News Strategy 2 3 4 4 13 
 
2 
 Bootstraps Cluster 3 1 1 1 6 
 
0 
 Populism 3 5 3 4 15 
 
1 
 Int. Threat/MD* 2 1 2 1 6 
 
                    2 
FOX  News 
TOTAL  10 10 10 10 40 
 
45 
  
Cable Channel TOTAL 30 30 30 30 120 
 
135 
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Table 3: All Frame Totals 
*International Threat and Moral Decay Frames 
 
The point of this initial phase in the project was to identify those frames that were 
broadly, frequently, and easily accessible to TV news audiences, and to investigate how those 
frames create particular ways of understanding the financial crisis, the recession, and the 
economy in general. They are discussed in the following chapters as to how these then relate 
to hegemonic ideology, practices, and information environments. Additionally, once these 
frames were identified, I was prepared to respond to them if they arose in conversation during 
the peer group discussions.  
In the next part of this chapter I describe the methods used to answer the second and 
third research questions, a qualitative series of peer group discussions.  
Peer Group Discussions 
 
The classic work of framing theory by Shanto Iyengar (1991) investigated the power 
of frames in the media using experiments and short surveys, linking the audience directly to 
what they had watched. The work of Martin Gilens and Justin Lewis has, up to this point, 
consisted of investigating an apparent interaction between what is shown in news media and 
what the public “thinks” through opinion polling (Gilens 1999; Lewis 2001; Lewis et al. 
2005). Both map discrepancies in popular political beliefs onto larger discursive patterns that 
can be found in news media, thus demonstrating that how people understand an issue and their 
 
 
Sampling Period 
 
 
 
FRAME 
 
Sept/ 
Oct 2008 Feb 2009 
 
Sept 2009 
 
Aug/Sept 
2011 
 
Validation 
Sample 
 
FRAME TOTAL 
 
Strategy 22 32 36 31 20 141 
 
Bootstraps Cluster 20 11 4 6 1 42 
 
Populism 15 15 18 20 7 75 
 
Int. Threat/MD* 3 2 2 3 2 12 
 SAMPLING PERIOD TOTAL 60 60 60 60 30 270 
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opinions around it are often linked to media discourse rather than to their own experiences or 
interests. This approach has produced evidence of a type of media impact on social-political 
life while simultaneously demonstrating that it occurs on a grand scale. However, relying on 
only these methods of large surveys, opinion polls, and election results will, by default if not 
intention, continually define the site of media impact as the individual. Surveys and polls 
reproduce the same individualist definition of citizenship that occurs when civic activity is 
relegated only to voting (Lewis et al. 2005). What the individual thinks and feels when alone 
with the survey or the ballot becomes the only phenomenon measured. Social groups, whether 
composed of families, workplaces, or communities, are largely ignored – which means we 
miss an important part of everyday people’s political lives. When conversation and 
deliberation among citizens is mentioned, it’s often as a process that is in opposition to the 
process of the media.  Social interaction outside of the media becomes an element of chaos 
that deductively accounts for the incompleteness of media impact upon individual opinion, 
and is rarely studied directly (Gamson 1992; Eliasoph 1998).  
 However, Johnson-Cartee reminds us that “when people engage in public discourse 
about political, economic, or social issues, they are engaging in public deliberation or the very 
essence of democracy....they are of necessity engaged in issue framing” (2005, p.25). 
Gamson’s Talking Politics (1992) directly utilized social conversation to demonstrate that the 
media is very much entwined within social processes of political consciousness and learning, 
rather than an opposition to them. This study shares a similar focus on social conversation and 
that complex nature of the media and conversation as sites of learning and political 
consciousness. When the major media frames had been reconstructed out of the content, the 
frames informed the next stage of the project which was a series of peer group discussions. As 
Philo and Berry (2004) argue:  
 
Research which rests on content analysis alone leaves the researchers in the 
position of having to assert what the audience would be likely to understand 
from the news. There are in fact wide variations between people in terms of 
how well they understand news items. (p.179) 
 
The explanatory frames identified in the content analysis described above will not, and 
cannot, give direct insight into how the crisis is understood by the American public, but this 
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insight is crucial to have if we are to be able to say anything about the impact media has on 
U.S. social-political life.  As discussed in the previous chapter, much of the work on public 
knowledge and public opinion relies on surveys and public opinion polls and experiments, and 
"the more serious critiques [of public opinion polling] are precisely those that acknowledge 
the discursive nature of the process, that turning words into number is not only a 
transformation but one that makes assumptions about the world of words" (Lewis 200, p.11). 
The qualitative approach of this study hopes to provide depth to the picture already provided 
by the existing body of work, to bring actual words into the center of the analysis to check 
some of our conclusions that have been based on these word-number transformations. 
 This could have been done through interviews or viewer diaries, or any other number 
of interesting and fruitful qualitative approaches, but focus groups were chosen for their 
ability to illuminate the process of conversation. In this case, what is of interest here are civic 
conversations - conversations between individuals speaking as citizens about matters of policy 
and the public. When people speak as part of a group, to each other, they are not simply 
sharing their opinions to a researcher, they are forced to explain themselves to their peers in 
terms that their peers will understand (Gamson 1992). They are often forced to defend their 
positions, and disagreement has a chance to be made visible in real time rather than relying on 
comparison after the fact. This has particular utility when investigating frames. Van Gorp 
(2010) explained the interaction of individuals, frames, and conversations:  
 
On the one hand, frames are part of a culture and not purely individual, and on 
the other hand, individuals are needed as an agent to make a connection 
between a text and the cultural stock of frames. Thus, the cultural stock of 
frames is not above people but among them, because culture originates through 
communication and it’s articulated in the mass media and in 
discourse….Individuals can mediate the persuasive power of frames by using 
them: by articulating cultural themes in socially situated conversations 
individuals can indeed reconfigure these themes. Talking with frames (not 
about them per se) integrates these frames with personal experiences and 
associations, not all of which are consistent with the external manifestations of 
the cultural theme [(fc. Edy & Meirick, 2007)]. (Van Gorp 2010, p.89-90) 
 
Focus group methodology allows a chance to see how individuals use frames to 
understand their world and to share that understanding with others. By using this method, the 
intent was to gain insight into how people mobilize, reject, and manipulate media frames 
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when trying to persuade or communicate with each other. Focus groups, as explained by 
Gamson (1992), are “especially likely to provide insight into the process of constructing 
meaning” (p.192), because: 
 
Through challenges and alternative ways of framing an issue, participants are 
forced to become more consciously aware of their perspective…. Differences 
inevitably arise and frames become elaborated in either reconciling these 
difference or explicitly recognizing disagreement. (1992, p.192) 
 
When investigating these sorts of negotiations and elaborations, personal comfort and 
mutual comprehensibility are extremely important. Thus, this study opted to make focus 
groups out of pre-existing peer groups where participants would be less concerned about 
negotiating major social differences in addition to expressing their views on potentially 
contentious and political topics. These discussion groups were formed from small groups of 
people who knew each other well as friends or coworkers, and who had regular friendly 
contact with one-another, a type of focus group known as peer group discussions (Bauer & 
Gaskell 2000).  
Middle Americans 
 
For the human portion of this study, I was interested in speaking with “Middle 
Americans,” for a number of reasons. The population I had organic access to and cultural 
savvy within was my home-region of Northern Colorado, in the United States (Patton 2001). 
Returning to my own community has the benefits of being able to speak with people using 
their natural words, knowing how to find people willing to speak with me, and being able to 
understand symbolic/metaphorical/colloquial speech without much difficulty on my part. 
Additionally, this area and its inhabitants fit closely within the journalism trope and 
popular imaginary of “Middle Americans.” This colloquial term is used to describe an 
influential shared social imaginary for American political and cultural life, representing the 
white, the suburban/semi-rural, and the politically “moderate” or perhaps right-of-center. This 
social imaginary has a lot of power in both political and media rhetoric, and can be found 
evoked on the campaign trail by both the left and the right. People who fit into this social 
trope which maps on to both geographic and demographic regions tend to be more reliant on 
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traditional mass media and less reliant upon social/Internet media and are thus increasingly 
understudied due to the move into internet research (Cushion 2012). This group is also often 
assumed to be understood by both politicians and journalists, and are frequently evoked for 
their presumed “center-right” opinions on policies and issues, often without any real evidence 
to support such assertions (Michael X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Lewis 2001; Lewis et al. 
2004; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland 1997; Johnson-Cartee 2005). This population is unlikely to 
define itself as anything other than a broadly defined “middle class,” but in terms of “life-
chances” they are generally typified by having most of their property on lease or mortgaged, 
they send their children to free public schools, and most of their children who attend higher 
education do so on federal student loans. Wages in this region are within the national average, 
and thus due to the increasing costs of basic necessities have been functionally decreasing 
steadily in recent decades (Foster & Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2011). 
Middle America can also describe a real social and economic demographic within 
American society. Middle Americans are, first and foremost, people who must work for a 
living. They live outside of the country’s cosmopolitan centers, and usually in predominantly 
white and culturally homogenous communities. Politically they fare better than most – they 
are more culturally aligned with the interests of their politicians, as a large group their vote is 
catered to, and they have enjoyed a long history of enfranchisement. But while Middle 
Americans are not politically set adrift in comparison to, say, poor urban Black America, they 
are not known to be particularly involved either (Michael X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; 
Boykoff & Laschever 2011; Skocpol & Williamson 2012; Guardino & Snyder 2014). 
 The vast swath of those who could be called “Middle Americans” are alternatively 
single-issue voters or low-information voters. They do not spend a lot of time tending to local 
or national politics outside of major elections, nor are they known for being active news 
seekers. Economically, again, they have historically done better than most (though their 
chances to rise into the cultural/economic elite are miniscule). They tend to be able to 
mortgage a home, find jobs, and have children that have decent schools and go to college 
(Guardino & Snyder 2014).  
The other reason was my interest in the tension described above, of a powerful social 
imaginary that is invoked by politicians and journalists alike and the very same demographic 
that experienced the financial crisis as an otherwise unprecedented sharp drop in economic 
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and social stability. This demographic of white middle and working-class Americans have 
acted historically as an important part of the dominant historic bloc. In Gramsci’s theory of 
cultural hegemony, historic blocs are strategic alliances between disparate social classes 
which align under a common ideology. In America, the capitalist classes have largely enjoyed 
the long-term support of Middle Americans, who generally support capitalist practices and 
institutions (Michael X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Lewis 2001; Kaelber 2016). In return, 
the concerns of Middle Americans are often the first to be absorbed into the dominant 
hegemony, and in good times they enjoy relative material security and cultural representation 
(Gilens 1999; McCortney & Engels 2003). In Gramsci’s formulation, dominant classes lead 
with these historic blocs, and are able to use the support of a significant portion of the 
dominated classes to continue domination over other sub-sections of society whose needs are 
less attended to by the dominant system. However, in spite of this bloc’s historic cooperation, 
“consensus cannot withstand chronic, severe material shortages” (Artz and Murphy 2000, 
p.39), and the shock of the financial crisis and economic recession had the potential to 
produce a fracture at the heart of this crucial alliance between classes.  
Peer Group Design 
 
These peer-discussion groups were formed of non-elite and non-activist citizens of 
American middle and working classes. These are the classes that are experiencing the drift 
downward in social inequality, and many have experienced a rapid decline in overall quality 
of life since the economic recession took hold (Harvey 2010). The interest in talking to non-
activist citizens was twofold. The first reason for this choice was an interest in investigating 
the beliefs of those who do not openly identify with oppositional frames and thereby are 
already practiced at discussing them in a social context. Typically, activists by their very 
nature spend time cultivating oppositional frames and understandings of political issues. 
 The other reason for including non-activists is the recognition that, upon the sudden 
re-arrival of large protest movements like those of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street in 
2011, there is a healthy amount of focus upon activists amongst researchers currently 
underway and there is a danger for researchers that "attending only to 'informed opinions' 
might simply reinforce other inequalities in the political system" (M. X. Delli Carpini & 
Keeter 1996, p.21). A deeper understanding of the social-political lives of those who do not 
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identify or act as activists should provide important context about those who are, particularly 
when both groups often share the same neighborhoods, workplaces, and even families. 
Five peer-discussion groups were conducted, each with five to nine members (see 
profiles later in this chapter). Following the experiences of Gamson (1992) in Talking 
Politics, recruitment was conducted via establishing an initial contact that then assisted me in 
assembling a group through their own social networks (Gamson 1992; Patton 2001). These 
initial participant contacts were made through a combination of cold contacting through the 
community and inquiring through personal extended social networks. The resulting groups 
were formed by people who were already in regular social contact with each other in order to 
facilitate comfortable conversation. As Gamson (1992) explains: 
 
As participants bring their everyday knowledge to bear on…issues, we are able 
to observe the commonsense conceptions and taken-for-granted assumptions 
they share….their intersubjectivity. This process rests….on the assumption that 
others see the world in the same way and, hence, is defined socially, not 
individually. The key variables in the degree of intersubjectivity are personal 
contact and similarity of socialization….hence, the closer the focus groups 
come to natural peer groups, the more easily will this world of everyday 
knowledge emerge. (p.192) 
 
Another advantage to this approach is that it can be a way to avoid discussions 
dominated by a cynical chic stance, which "is more common among familiar acquaintances 
than among close friends and intimates...and is most likely to be present in sociable public 
discourse, where there is a risk of being taken in and of looking foolish in front of a gallery" 
(Gamson 1992, p.21). To ensure comfort and convenience as much as possible, the peer 
groups met for discussion in the same space they work or typically meet (Bauer & Gaskell 
2000). 
Discussion Design 
 
The peer-discussion activities and topic guide were designed to reconstruct the 
explanatory frames that participants had at their disposal. Each discussion started with a series 
of association exercises. The first exercise had participants offer words they associated with 
the financial crisis and recession to “warm-up” the conversation and to get access to top-level 
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memories and references. Participants were then asked to make two more lists; one for 
“causes” of the financial crisis and recession, and one their “victims.” Participants were 
instructed at this stage to include ideas they did not necessarily agree with or understood but 
had heard of. The end result was a list of framing devices which the participants both agreed 
and disagreed with, but ultimately remembered and associated with the event.  
From this point, the discussion could turn to constructing what they felt were plausible 
explanatory frames as a group in an effort to explore the knowledge claims that lay behind 
these associations, as:  
 
The relationship between media and public opinion consists less in telling 
people what to think than in sometimes providing them with a lopsided 
informational climate. Testing knowledge claims, in this context, is not a 
simple question of seeing whether citizens are informed, uninformed, or 
misinformed; it is a way of probing into ideology, discourse, and media power. 
(Lewis 2001, p.117) 
 
  Each group was asked to take the “causes” list and “victims” list and rank the first five 
of each in order of importance. This forced individual participants to offer their own 
understanding and provide their own persuasive evidence. It also allowed space for moments 
of agreement without discussion or explanation, which happened frequently. The second half 
of the discussion consisted of more specific questions about their opinions regarding the 
financial crisis, the recession, and finally the source of their information.  
This research was designed to get access to the understandings of the economy and 
financial crisis that participants had at their disposal with minimal prompting. Because of this, 
the frames found in the media analysis were not brought into the discussion unless brought in 
naturally by a participant. Additionally, this research was less interested in participants’ 
beliefs around the media itself than on how they used information they gathered from the 
media and other sources as they went about their daily lives. Because of this, participants were 
only told of the study’s interest in the media after the discussion had ended. To gather more 
specific information on participants’ media habits, they were handed a questionnaire asking 
where they normally gathered news information, their political affiliation, and how 
consistently they vote in political elections. These informed the overall analysis of the 
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discussions, and were coded as attributes within NVivo to watch for patterns between these 
characteristics and preferred explanatory frames.  
The following is a brief detailing of each peer discussion group, the information is 
compiled through both what came up in discussion and through their answers to the 
questionnaire filled out after the discussion. 
Peer Group Profiles 
 
 The discussion groups shared several characteristics with each other by design. I aimed 
to construct the groups of participants who were 1) non-activists 2) middle/working class and 
3) at or above the age of 35.  The reason for the age limit was an attempt to limit significant 
generational differences in how participants approached politics and sources of information. 
Older Americans are less likely to seek out information on the Internet than younger 
Americans (Cushion 2012). Because of this, there was worry that allowing a significant range 
in age would bring in a significantly wider range of participant practices and knowledge. 
While this is obviously desired in research generally, the constraints of time and resources for 
this project made this prohibitive. Thus, to increase chances of reaching a reasonable level of 
thematic saturation to allow for analysis, an age limit was chosen (Patton 2001; Corbin & 
Strauss 2007). 
There was a risk that my initial contact participant may invite people along that did not 
fit the above criteria but, thankfully nearly all of the participants met all of these measures. 
The one exception was in the rock climbing group, detailed below, where two participants 
were just under the age of 35. 
 There were a couple of other shared characteristics which were not planned but 
happened anyway. The first is that nearly every participant was white. While this wasn’t 
something that was directly selected for, it was largely expected. The racial diversity of the 
Front Range region of Colorado is minimal, and the make-up of the peer discussion groups 
largely reflects this. This was likely exacerbated by the fact that my point-of-contact 
participants were all white themselves. Race relations being what they are in contemporary 
America, it is also not surprising that their social groups were also largely white. There was 
one exception, as one woman identified herself in conversation as Native American.  Two 
other participants had names that indicated a Hispanic origin. This accounts for the entirety of 
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the racial and ethnic diversity in these groups. This should be understood as a potential 
limitation in this study. If Black, Hispanic, Asian or Native Americans have particular 
understandings about the financial crisis and recession that fall along racial lines, it will not be 
found here. This should be kept in mind, and the study should be understood as most 
accurately depicting what is happening in the conversations of white middle-class Americans 
of this Western region – and only merely suggestive or informative as to what might be going 
on in the rest of the nation. Such are the limitations of any qualitative research.  
 The second and more surprising shared characteristic of nearly every participant across 
the peer groups was that they reported voting consistently in every election. I did not select for 
participants that would-be voters, and had expected this number to be lower given that I 
excluded highly politically active people. It’s unclear why the participants had such diligent 
voters. This may simply be a result of self-selection, those interested in participating in a two 
hour talk on the economy were those already those more attuned to civic matters. This may 
also reflect their demographic. Middle class people are more likely to vote than the poor, and 
older people are far more likely to vote than the young (Michael X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 
1996; Irwin & Van Holstyn 2008). Whatever the case, for the most part these participants 
were engaged enough to vote regularly, as reported on their questionnaire filled out at the end 
of the discussion.  
 The third shared characteristic among participants was their primary sources of news 
were television broadcast or cable channels. When asked to list their source of news, the most 
frequent answers were “TV,” and “NBC,” “CBS,” “ABC,” and “CNN.”   It was less common 
to find “MSNBC” or “Fox News,” though they were present. Notably, the participants on the 
whole were not getting their news from The New York Times, The Washington Post, or any 
other major newspaper or magazine. Several participants, all 60 years or older, reported 
reading the local paper regularly – though it should be noted that this paper had infrequent 
coverage of national level news, particularly economic news.   
 The following are more detailed descriptions of each peer group. Note that all 
participants were assigned a pseudonym for the sake of their anonymity. All names and 
locations have been altered to ensure privacy.  
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Nurses 
Participant “Name” Age Gender 
Top Information 
Source 
Did they discuss 
these topics 
normally? 
Deborah 51 Female “TV News” “Occasionally” 
Linda 60 Female “TV News” No 
Susan 55 Female CNN, FOX News No 
Nancy 59 Female FOX News, CNN No 
Angela 40 Female 
PBS, “News 
documentaries,” CNN, 
“Financial News 
Channels,” “Books” 
“Yes…not sure. 
Occasionally” 
 
 Group one was a group of nurses working for the local hospital. They all worked in the 
same unit, and saw each other nearly every day. This was a group of five women, four of 
whom were in the ages of 50-60, and one who was 40.  By their profession, we can assume 
that they had some level of post-secondary education, due to the standard requirements for 
doing this type of work. Four of the women identified themselves politically as either 
“unaffiliated” or “unidentified” – one elaborating that she “found it very difficult to identify 
with a political party these days.” One woman identified herself as “Republican/Independent.” 
Four of the women said they voted, and the one who did not vote was due to the fact that she 
was still Canadian by nationality.  
 Four of the five women listed TV news as their major source of news. 60 Minutes 
(CBS News) was a very prominent show that was listed regularly, but all news channels were 
mentioned at least once. The two more politically “conservative” participants reported 
watching Fox News.  
 The fifth participant, a 40-year-old Canadian mother of four who will be called 
“Angela” throughout this report, was an active information seeker, and was able to introduce 
to the conversation specific information and different frames of understanding. She reported 
watching the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), CNN, “financial news channels,” “news 
documentaries,” and reading “journal/research articles.” She knew she had seen several 
documentaries, but could not remember the names of most except for House of Cards. This 
was a CNBC documentary on the financial crisis. She also reported reading articles that were 
linked by friends and family on her Facebook page.    
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 Aside from Angela, most of the nurses did not make regular use of web-based 
resources. Those who did reported simply clicking links on the front page of their preferred 
search engine, answers like “Yahoo,” “first top stories on MSN.com,” and “AOL.”   
Bible Study Group 
Participant “Name” Age Gender 
Top Information 
Source 
Did they discuss 
these topics 
normally? 
Janet 53 Female “TV News” 
“Don’t feel informed so 
don’t discuss much” 
Terry 67 Male CBS, FOX News, NBC No 
Mary 61 Female “Brian Williams” (NBC) No 
Stephanie 44 Female “Twitter,” NPR No 
Theresa 60 Female CNN No 
Gary 66 Male CNN, “TV” Yes 
Richard 70 Male 
NPR, CBS, PBS, TIME 
Magazine 
“Occasionally” 
Judith 69 Female 
“TV News,” BBC, Face 
the Nation (CBS) 
“My husband (Richard) 
and I often discuss this 
topic” 
 
 Group two was a bible study that met weekly to discuss Christian scripture and to 
support each other in their day-to-day lives. The group consisted of five women and three 
men, most between the ages of 60 and 70, though one woman was 44, and another woman 
was 53.  
Politically this group was mixed. Two participants defined themselves as wholly 
unaffiliated or uninterested in identification. Two others described themselves as 
“Independent,” though one admitted that she “leaned more to the Democratic Party.” 
Interestingly, two identified themselves as formerly Republican, but they now considered 
themselves politically independent. One man specified that he was a “Teddy Roosevelt 
Republican.” Finally, one woman stated herself to be a Democrat because she was “basically 
more interested in common field, education, and health.” Six out of the seven participants 
reported voting consistently in elections.  
 Again, television news was the predominant source of information for all of the 
participants. Only Stephanie cited “Twitter” as an Internet based source of information. The 
broadcast channels; ABC, NBC, and CBS, were the consistently preferred channels across the 
group members. Stephanie and Richard said they had watched documentaries and 
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investigative reporting from public broadcasting channels, both PBS and the National Public 
Radio (NPR). In addition, the group frequently cited watching local news channels, which 
focus more upon the day-to-day news of Colorado than national or global events.  
Richard was an active information seeker, and frequently added new information and 
competing frames to the conversation. He reported seeking information widely, including 
public news sources and books on the subject of the economy and the financial crisis.  
 Only Stephanie used the Internet to find information, citing simply “Twitter” as a 
source she regularly used for news.   
Teachers 
Participant “Name” Age Gender 
Top Information 
Source 
Did they discuss 
these topics 
normally? 
Chris 43 Male CBS, ABC “A little” 
Tammy 48 Female CNN, “Local,”MSNBC No 
Nicole 34 Female 
NPR, NBC,                     
The Economist 
No 
Mark 41 Male 
Rolling Stone, The 
Atlantic 
No 
Gunther 49 Male 
NBC, CNN, Deutsche 
Welle 
No 
Steven  50 Male CNN, BBC World Report Yes 
David 43 Male CNN Yes 
 
 Group three were all teachers at a local high school, consisting of two women and five 
men. Most were between the ages of 40 and 50, but one participant was only 34. 
 Five participants recorded voting regularly in political elections, while one did not.  A 
final participant could not vote as they were still a German citizen. Politically, four 
participants identified as Democrats, one as “moderate-to-liberal,” and two declared 
themselves “unaffiliated.”  This group was largely from the social science department of the 
high school, including one economics teacher. This was not terribly surprising, as it could be 
expected that these would be the teachers who would find the opportunity to discuss the 
financial crisis and participate in research interesting. This also gave an opportunity in the 
research to see if there was a significant difference in the quality or type of conversation 
among those who presumably find these topics interesting and who engage in discussion on 
them regularly as part of their profession (albeit at a high school level).  
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 Unlike the other groups, this group reported discussing these topics semi-regularly 
amongst themselves. There were also some differences in the places they sought their news. 
NPR becomes a more prominent source, and The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The 
Colbert Report were listed in their questionnaires. However, the most frequent news source 
were television news channels. One exception to this was FOX News, which nobody reported 
watching. They reported using the internet to seek news, but only through “front page” 
services like MSN.com or yahoo.com aggregators, or through the websites of major television 
news channels.  
One particularly interesting thing to note about this group is that, based upon their own 
reports of who they spoke to about current events generally and the economy specifically, this 
was a closed conversation circuit. They agreed that they only really discussed these issues 
with each other, and never got information from other individuals who were not official news 
sources.  
Book club  
Participant “Name” Age Gender 
Top Information 
Source 
Did they discuss 
these topics 
normally? 
Barbarah 68 Female 
FOX News, “Brian 
Williams”(NBC) 
No 
Karen 61 Female 
“Brian Williams,” 
(NBC) 60 Minutes 
No 
Sharon 60 Female 
“MSNBC-
Rachel”(Rachel 
Maddow Show) 
No 
Patty 60 Female NBC, ABC, CBS No 
Betty 68 Female 
CBS,                                
“Brian Williams” (NBC) 
No 
 
 This group of five women, all in their 60’s, met regularly to discuss books of fiction 
and non-fiction as friends.  
All stated that they regularly voted in political elections. One listed themselves as 
“Conservative,” another as “Independent,” while the others labelled themselves Democrats. 
All reported being tuned in to the local and community news via local newspapers and 
television stations. One exception is one participant who did not watch TV and only listened 
to NPR. The other four relied heavily on the television broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, and 
NBC for news outside of their town. The conservative member of the book club watched FOX 
News as her main source of news. The participant who labelled herself a Democrat watched 
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The Rachel Maddow Show on MSNBC, as well as CNN. The broadcast Sunday current events 
show 60 Minutes is listed on several of their questionnaires, and seemed to be their main 
source of any investigative or in-depth reporting on the economy or the financial crisis.  Only 
one member used the Internet as a source of news.  
 They reported speaking only occasionally about these topics, and usually only with 
friends and family who shared their opinions. It was not a regular discussion topic for 
themselves as a group.  
Rock Climbers 
Participant “Name” Age Gender 
Top Information 
Source 
Did they discuss 
these topics 
normally? 
Jason 38 Male “The Web” No 
Todd 33 Male 
The Rachel Maddow 
Show, Bill O’Reilly 
No 
Kevin 37 Male 
Web News Sites, Colbert 
Report 
No 
Charles 51 Male 
“The Internet,” BBC 
America 
Yes 
Dawn 55 Female “TV News” No 
Ron 47 Male 
The Daily Show, 
Huffington Post 
No 
 
 The final group met as rock climbing enthusiasts, and regularly went out to rock climb 
together. This group consisted of one woman and five men. This group was on average a bit 
younger than the other groups, ranging from early 32 to 55 in ages.  
They also ranged much more widely in their political affiliation.  On the post-
discussion questionnaire Dawn answered the prompt “Do you identify with a political party or 
philosophy? If so, what is it?” simply “No.”  The others listed themselves as such: 
 “No party. Civil libertarian. Not a large L-libertarian or affiliated with that 
party.”  
 “Not exactly, but I wish I could vote for a Republican. That would require 
them to know the facts, though.”  
 “Independent”  
 “Liberal Dem” 
 “Green…Demosocialists” 
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Save for “Independent,” none of the above are American parties, nor are they 
particularly common political affiliations. This group as a whole displayed an ambivalent 
attitude towards current events and politics, but most voted regularly in elections.  
This group was also far more active in their search for information and relied more 
heavily on Internet sources relative to the other peer groups, though they did not have 
particular sites they trusted more than others. They also cited alternative television sources 
like The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report.  
In spite of the apparent thought that was put into their political identities, this group 
also reported that they only occasionally discussed the economy or the financial crisis with 
anyone, whether in the group or amongst other friends and family.  
Peer Groups Discussion Analysis 
 
The transcripts of the peer group discussions were uploaded into NVivo to aid in a 
thematic analysis (Patton 2001; Corbin & Strauss 2007). A traditional thematic analysis was 
conducted of the peer group discussions in their entirety. In the first stage of open coding 
metaphors, beliefs, key phrases, and types of supporting evidence or logic were approached as 
framing devices in a similar way to the content frame analysis described above and turned into 
analytical nodes. These nodes were then axially coded for common associations with one 
another and for common logical underpinnings. The nodes that arose out of the axial coding 
became the containers for the nodes that resulted from the open coding.  
All nodes were then compared with the association lists created by the respective peer-
discussion groups to reconstruct the major explanatory frames which governed the 
discussions. Originally, it was anticipated that these peer group discussions would contain 
multiple competing frames which would be consistently sponsored by particular individuals. It 
was also anticipated that the major analytical question would be which of these frames 
managed to dominate the conversation while others receded to the background. Instead, there 
were multiple competing explanatory frames which were presented inconsistently by the same 
individuals, and agreement by the rest of the group would be granted, rescinded, and granted 
again over the course of the discussion. Due of this tendency, moments of agreement and 
disagreement were also coded for to try and account for patterns of what participants found 
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plausible and what they found implausible. The importance of this is discussed in the body of 
this thesis. 
Finally, nodes were cross-referenced with participant and discussion group attributes 
to check for patterns within or across sources of information, political affiliation, or voting 
behavior. Perhaps due to the relative homogeneity between and within the discussion groups, 
nothing of significance was found at this stage of the analysis.  
 Finally, the reconstructed conversation frames and themes were detailed by their 
cause, effect, solution logic, their supporting evidence, and their framing devices (metaphors, 
etc.), based upon Lewis’ argument that "since few people will express opinions on a 
completely random basis - an opinion is usually based upon some kind of knowledge claim - 
the question is more a matter of what perceptions of the political world are available and how 
they operate in opinion formation." (Lewis 2001, p.106).  The conversation frames were then 
compared with those that could be found within the media discourse to see which paralleled 
closely, and where the peer discussions added their own logic, explanatory frames or 
otherwise resisted the frames found in the media.   
LIMITATIONS 
 
 The limitations of this study are the same that can be found with most qualitative 
methodologies. The price for the richness of context and meaning is that these findings cannot 
be generalized outright (Bauer & Gaskell 2000; Patton 2001; Corbin & Strauss 2007). The 
hope is, however, that these findings can inform survey and opinion poll design to check for 
their general applicability. Along that same vein, it must be understood that the population the 
peer-groups were drawn from, while deliberate, is analytically limited. It will remain entirely 
unclear how other American demographic groups speak about the financial crisis and 
recession. It should be expected that there will be significant differences along class, race, and 
generational lines should these peer group discussions ever be repeated with other groups.  
However, this study might serve as a “jumping-off” point for any similar research with 
other Americans who are not white and middle/working class. Similarly, it was impossible to 
sample from all forms of news media in the context of this study, and there may be completely 
different frames at work amongst other news outlets, like internet magazine articles or current-
events podcasts for example. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRATEGY-GAME FRAME  
 
If the public perceives politics as a game played by insiders based on self-
interest, the result will be a mass disengagement from political participation. 
 
(Blumler & Coleman 2010, p.142) 
 
  
From the start of the inductive frame analysis, it was clear that the news media seemed 
to struggle to understand the financial crisis and recession as crises of the economic system.  
Instead, the news frequently went about the business it is more familiar with and suited for – 
the reporting of the internal machinations of politicians. This chapter explores the strategy-
game frame in the television news coverage of the financial crisis. This frame is commonly 
used in the news and puts politicians and political maneuvering at the center of a story. The 
following discussion demonstrates how this frame was used to cover the financial crisis and 
how the use of the strategy-game frame re-narrates the financial crisis as an issue for electoral 
politics, and denies the information environment of facts that would indicate otherwise. 
Additionally, a corresponding theme from the peer group discussions, the belief in a 
dysfunctional government, is described and analyzed in relation to the wider system of 
hegemony and counter-hegemonies.  
The Strategy-Game Frame and Modern Journalism  
 
 A strategy-game frame is “the framing of politics as a strategic game [with a] focus on 
questions related to who is winning and losing, the performances of politicians and parties, 
and on campaign strategies and tactics” (Aalberg et al. 2012, p.163). This frame is well known 
in the communications field and there is a relative wealth of information on how the strategy-
game frame is produced in the newsroom and audiences then relate to it. Strategy-game frame 
is known to dominate the American news landscape (Jamieson & Waldeman 2002; Fallows 
1997; Cappella & Jamieson 1997b; Farnsworth & Lichter 2011)  and it has been used by 
newsrooms more frequently over time (Patterson 1993). Research on the strategy-game frame 
79 
 
generally treats these trends as problematic for several reasons, one of which is the tendency 
of the strategy- game frame to de-emphasize factual information. Another reason is their 
tendency to narrate the process of politics through a cynical lens of politicians’ self-interest: 
Strategic news frames do not merely draw attention to motivations; they imply 
or even state explicitly that political motives are directed at giving the actor or 
her constituents an advantage with voters. In short, the motives are self-
interested and they thereby imply attributions that are negative – manipulative, 
dishonest, self-centered, deceitful, pandering – rather than positive. (Cappella 
& Jamieson 1997a, p.167) 
 
Research on news production offers several reasons for the dominance of strategy-
game frame in modern journalism. One group of research suggests the professionalization of 
political communication and public relations in politics has inspired an adversarial reaction in 
journalists. When given highly polished and “spun” communication releases by public 
relations professionals employed by politicians, journalists came to consider it part of their 
work to challenge and expose their rhetoric. As this battle increased attention was drawn away 
from the implications and analysis of public policy (Fallows 1997; Patterson 2000).   
Additionally, the tension of profit and economic viability for news organizations 
seems to play a significant role in the rise and reign of the strategy game frame. Creating 
substantive coverage of policy is expensive. Weighing the pros and cons of competing policy 
programs requires knowledge experts from expansive fields of work and it takes significant 
time to put together. Alternatively, strategy game frame is cheap for journalists to chase and 
will slot conveniently into the news cycle (Fallows 1997). These frames also have a market 
advantage in that they readily provide narrative tension and a daily source of quotes and 
sound-bites (Skewes 2007). Others argue the strategy game frame is a continuation of the 
journalistic tendency to make the news “personal” (Van Aelst et al. 2012), and that 
celebritized politicians - their movements, their home lives, their personal motivations and 
achievements - simply make for better story-telling and therefore draw larger audiences 
(Iyengar et al. 2004). Viewed from the perspective of Gramsci’s cultural hegemony, the 
strategy-game frame can be seen as the product of journalist practices being organized around 
the demands of capitalism. The media, particularly in the United States where television news 
is an entirely private venture, must justify itself through the generation of profit.  This 
produces practices and norms that emphasize efficiency, low labor costs, and the attraction of 
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large audiences to attract advertisers. News frames that can fit into these demands will become 
favored, and over time those frames will be the ones that journalists are most proficient at 
using and the most likely to “see” in a story.  
 The impact of this organization of journalist practices resulting in the creation and 
domination of strategy-game frame is less understood and more controversial. Cappella and 
Jamieson (1997) theorized that a dominance of the strategy-game frame would lead to 
widespread cynicism in the public and increase the levels of distrust in political institutions. 
Some experimental studies seem to bear this anxiety out (Rhee 1997; Valentino et al 2001a; 
2001b; DeVreese 2004). These studies show when individuals are given a story framed as a 
political strategy-game, politicians’ self-interest becomes more salient in the minds of 
audiences relative to all other issues. The end result is a feeling of resentment towards 
politicians and little knowledge retention of actual policy issues (Jamieson 1992; Patterson 
1993; Cappella & Jamieson 1997b). Typically, the reason the audience retains little 
knowledge of policy is because these articles contain very little information in the first place. 
Coverage is instead dominated by counter quotes from other politicians and “analysis” of how 
elections and approval ratings may be impacted. 
  However, it has also been found that even when substantive policy information is 
presented within the context of strategy-game frame viewers are far less likely to absorb it 
(Valentino 2001, 2001a). Some have argued that the strategy game frame may actually have a 
positive impact on viewers because it increases their interest in politics (Meyer & Potter 1998; 
Zhao & Bleske 1998; Norris 2000; Iyengar et al. 2004; Newton 2006). Irwin and Van 
Holsteyn (2008) argue that strategy game frames actually drive journalists to include more 
information than they otherwise would, as they are incentivized to closely follow even the 
smallest political movements. Additionally, DeVreese and Semetko (2002) argue that the 
results of their research suggest that exposure to the strategy game frame does not actually 
depress political participation. Aalberg et al. (2012) argue that the strategy game frame can be 
broken up into two sub-frames and the differences between the two may account for the 
differing impact on audiences. The two sub-frames are the game frame and the strategy frame. 
A game frame is characterized by reliance upon opinion polls and the heavy use of war-related 
language and imagery. The focus is upon the movements of politicians along political opinion 
‘fronts’ - Candidate Y ‘moves in’ on Candidate X on this week’s opinion poll, Candidate X’s 
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election victory is now in danger, etc. This sub-frame may be the one that drives audience 
attention and increases overall interest in politics to those that are exposed, while the more 
typical strategy frame drives people away (Valentino et al. 2001; De Vreese & Semetko 2002; 
Vreese 2005). In a strategy frame the focus revolves around a candidate’s or party’s motives 
for taking a stand on legislation or policy. The language is centered on communication 
“styles,” their political ambitions, and instrumental choices (Valentino et al. 2001). It is 
potentially this frame that drives cynicism and suppresses policy related knowledge.  
However, there are two issues that still need to be adequately addressed. First, the 
ability of the strategy-game frame (or just game frame) to drive additional interest in politics 
needs to reconcile with the quality and type of the information gathered due to that additional 
interest. More information about the movement of politicians without a corresponding 
proficiency in the policies these politicians aim to enact does not mean individuals 
participating in these experiments are able to identify their real interests amongst the realm of 
politics. Second, there is a question regarding the ideological impact of the continual direction 
of civic attention towards the movements of electoral politics and voting to the exclusion of 
any other issue or group.  In the following section, the strategy game frame will be analyzed 
as it relates to its presence in the coverage of the financial crisis.  
A Crisis of Capitalism becomes a Crisis of Politics 
  
The strategy-game frame was well represented in all sampling periods.  The methods 
employed for the framing analysis in this study cannot say anything firm about trends across 
time and channels, but there was an apparent tendency for the strategy-game frame to be more 
frequent the farther coverage got from the start of the crisis, and more common in cable news 
channels than the network broadcast channels.  
The sampling periods of the financial crisis/recession for this study converged with 
major political (and legislative) events.  For the first sampling period, in September and 
October of 2008, this is entirely coincidental. The failure of Lehman Bros and subsequent 
credit market freeze and stock market crash arrived during the last two months of the 2008 
Presidential election between John McCain and Barack Obama. As a direct result of the crisis 
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during this period, congress fought and eventually passed the “bail-out” bill to unfreeze credit 
markets (Robb 2013; BBC 2014).  
The four other sampling periods coincide deliberately with political events because 
they created critical discourse moments when discussion of the crisis and recession spiked in 
news coverage. The financial crisis and recession are indelibly entwined with politics on the 
American information landscape for obvious reasons. Given this, there was no expectation 
going in to the analysis that the crisis and recession would be covered in a way that did not 
include a discussion of politics or legislative battles. However, the definition of the strategy-
game frame requires that all information passes through a political strategy lens. What one 
would expect in a strategy-game frame is that all framing devices and information will bend to 
the gravity of political “success” or “failure.”  In this aspect, the financial crisis was no 
exception. 
 Many news stories in the sample focused like a laser on the personality and leadership 
styles of politicians, parties, and political institutions and most of these samples put President 
Barack Obama at their center. Here is a typical example of this frame in the context of the 
financial crisis. In this piece on NBC Nightly News, the story describes a newly elected 
President Obama meeting with the opposing party to start a process of writing and passing a 
very significant economic stimulus bill, in the hopes of slowing the economic free-fall started 
by the International credit freeze.  
NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams 
January 27th, 2009 
“Obama Seeks Republican Approval on Stimulus Package.” 
  
Chuck Todd: ... “President Obama used his fight to pass the  economic 
stimulus plan as a way to showcase another campaign promise, and 
that is changing the tone in Washington. So anxious…”   
 
Within the world presented by this frame, the President’s “fight” for the government stimulus 
plan is a personal career goal intended to “showcase” a “campaign promise,” rather than a 
policy goal of trying to stimulate the economy.  His motive for meeting with Republican 
legislators is not to get the bill passed; instead it is presented as a desire to ease his own 
personal anxiety to appear bipartisan. Even the topic of fostering bipartisanship, which is 
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strategically relevant for passing legislation in congress, becomes a strategy for personal 
career advancement. Republican actions are under similar interpretations a few lines farther in 
the story:  
Todd: “House Republicans used their time with the president to 
complain about how they’ve been treated by House Democrats.”  
The story ends with;  
Todd: “OK, Brian, here’s where things stand. Number one, the House 
will pass Obama’s stimulus plan tomorrow, probably with not a lot of 
Republican support. The Senate then takes it up where Republicans will 
probably get a few amendments in there that’ll make it more palatable 
to some Republicans...”  
This is precisely the type of coverage where strategy-game frame earns its title. Here, the 
economic stimulus plan is not a proposed policy solution to a pressing real-world problem, but 
simply “Obama’s stimulus;” a personal ambition being moved through obstacles 
(Republicans) to get to a goal. The goal in this case is framed as the fulfillment of President 
Obama’s ambition. This story provides no discussion about what is in the stimulus bill. There 
are no experts discussing the relative merits of any of the propositions in the nearly $900 
billion of allotted government expenditures. What’s more, the changes to the bill expected 
from the Senate are presented as a political strategy to make the bill “more palatable to some 
Republicans,” not more functional in its intended purpose. The frame takes a complex policy 
of passing influential policy and turns it into a story about the political strategy of the bill. The 
personal ambitions and movements of politicians are elevated in this frame, while the policy 
fades into the background.    
Taxpayers, stock markets, and greedy banks  
 
The framing devices found in the financial crisis strategy-game frame were a recurring 
set of important characters and language use which pitched them in a constant battle. The 
most important characters in this cast are political figures or political parties. Around them are 
three other recurring “characters,” or institutions and social imaginaries that play out 
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consistent roles in strategy-game frame stories.  These three characters are “the taxpayer,” 
“greedy banks,” and the stock market. Taxpayers occur frequently, and typically serve as an 
appeal to the responsibility of the politicians to the public. Usually, this appeal is made using 
references to huge budgetary numbers, as in the phrase “700 billion in taxpayers’ money.” In 
the context of the moral story of strategy-game frames these numbers do not typically convey 
what this money is being used for, but rather implies who “rightfully” owns the money. 
Taxpayers are imbued with a sense of virtuous entitlement through monetary exchange. They 
pay the government money in the form of taxes, and therefore taxpayers deserve that the 
money not be wasted.   
On the other hand, the “greedy banks” character serves as the frame’s antagonist. This 
character shows up more prominently in other frames discussed later, but in strategy-game 
frames the “greedy banks” are presented as “out-of-control” institutions which need to be 
tamed by politicians and political bodies. Why or how the banks and/or financial institutions 
caused the crisis is not dealt with in this frame in any substantial way. Instead they are 
regarded as a sort of naturalized hazard that elected officials need to contain. The containment 
would logically point to some sort of regulatory effort, but the particulars are rarely discussed. 
Indeed, the word “regulation” is rare in these samples. If regulation was mentioned, the most 
frequent type was an enforcement of salary caps of bank CEOs. This is surprising given the 
relevancy of regulation to the causes and potential solutions to the financial crisis (The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011; Murphy 2015). Instead, this subject is brought up in the 
context of “Wall St.” needing to be “reined in” before the frame typically moves on to 
political styles.  
 The big difference for the game frame versus the strategy frame in financial crisis 
coverage is the game frame consistently leaves out a source of blame for the financial crisis. 
There are no “greedy banks” or out-of-control “Wall Street” characters here. Instead, through 
this simple omission, the financial crisis becomes fully naturalized. Within the confines of this 
frame, the financial crisis is an event that was caused less by the actions of people, but an 
inevitable obstacle of a natural world through which politicians must navigate their careers 
through.  
 Characters of the game frame, aside from the relevant politicians and parties, are “The 
American People,” and “The Economy.” “The American People” largely sit in judgment via 
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opinion polls and votes of a given politician’s or party’s performance – not in relation to the 
crisis or recession, but relative to the other politicians and parties. “The Economy,” how 
“good” or “bad” it is, functions similarly. A bad economy is bad for the politician in power, 
and good for the politician vying to get into power. Otherwise, questions about how the 
economy is structured, whom is largely serves, how it is changing, remain almost entirely 
unexamined. Once again, like the strategy frame, policy in the game frame, even the relevant 
policy preference difference between parties as above, receive little to no substantive 
attention. Further, the ‘greedy banks’ character drops out entirely. The financial crisis and 
recession become causeless and unexamined.  
The stock market is not a character in the same way that the taxpayer and greedy banks 
seem to be. Instead, it is used directly as a measure for political “success” or “failure,” if the 
stock market “drops” after a given political announcement or legislative move, then that 
announcement or move is deemed to be a poor one. Similarly, a “rise” in the stock market is 
used as evidence for a correct political move.   Consistent with previous research, strategy 
frames in financial crisis coverage provide little to no discussion of policy (Cappella & 
Jamieson 1997a). This characteristic of the frame endures even when the subject of the 
coverage is policy, as it is with the “bail-out” of 2008, the “stimulus bill” of 2009, or the “jobs 
plan” of 2011.   
This style of coverage isn’t limited to specific people. Entire political institutions are 
given the same treatment. During this same attempt at passing an economic stimulus bill, 
CNN puts forward this piece on Anderson Cooper 360° titled “Obama Announces Salary Cap 
for Bailed-Out CEOs.” Relevant policy information was shared with the audience in this 
piece, specifically that there would be a salary cap for CEOs of companies that received 
money in the Federal bail-out bill that was passed months earlier. However, this information 
was framed within the strategy-game frame and the story was conveyed through the lens of “a 
campaign from the White House” to “convince the American people.” After a clip of 
President Obama’s speech regarding the new legislation, the anchor summed up: 
 
MALVEAUX: So, Fred, what you're hearing is really this rather 
aggressive campaign from the White House to convince people that that 
$900 billion economic stimulus package is something that is necessary 
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to fix the economy. He wants to see lawmakers move forward on that as 
quickly as possible, so he needs to address the whole issue of 
accountability and responsibility. So that's why you see this 
announcement today. 
 
This piece of legislation is now constructed as a “campaign,” an “aggressive” one, and success 
is defined through its ability to gain the support of legislators rather than its ability to stabilize 
the economy. More specifically, success for this legislation is defined through its ability to 
gain the support of legislators from both American political parties. An in-depth discussion of 
the merits of this particular piece of policy is skipped entirely, even though this story spans a 
significant portion of Anderson Cooper’s show. However, there are several hints within the 
language which imply particular reactions to the policies, even if they don’t really explain 
them.  
 Frames are powerful units of communication in large part because they are so 
efficient. In a short amount of time and with relatively few words or images, a frame can 
convey a massive amount of narrative information that points the listener through narrative 
logic and on to a preferred logical conclusion (Entman 1993; Van Gorp 2007). Consider the 
phrase “convince the American people that this administration is going to be more responsible 
with our dollars.” This implies that the government, or at least the executive branch of the 
government, has been irresponsible with “our dollars” in the past, but it does not say how. 
CNN’s report leaves the phrase open to interpretation, but leaves no question that the phrase 
itself is correct: the government has been irresponsible with tax money. Something similar is 
implied with the use of numbers in this story. Both of the phrases “billions and billions” and 
“$900 billion” are numbers that are difficult to comprehend and completely ungrounded in 
any relevant context. What might be useful for the viewer to know is how much $900 billion 
is relative to the normal government budget, or how much the $900 billion can be expected to 
generate in the economy given that it is intended as economic stimulus. Instead, CNN simply 
gives us the impression that this is a very large purchase being done by a government which 
has been irresponsible with money in the past. The only credit afforded the government by 
CNN is that the government have an admitted incentive to convince us of their responsibility 
as taxpayers. While it is entirely lacking on critical information regarding the policy in 
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question, it implies heavily what that information would eventually lead the audience to 
conclude: that the stimulus proposal is enormous and very likely wasteful. It simultaneously 
creates a vacuum of policy knowledge and then fills it instead with a cynical implication that 
there is nothing to know in the first place save for the personal motivations of career 
politicians.  
 In this way the strategy-game framing of the financial crisis transforms numerical 
information into framing devices. Numbers appear often but lack context, not just relevant 
context but truly any sort of context.  These numbers, most frequently an approximated “cost” 
of a legislative bill, usually serve not to inform the public in any meaningful way but instead 
function to add narrative tension within the frame. Within the confines of the news story these 
bills become something that is not policy but part of a grand political game. This is not just a 
failure to inform the audience, it is a form of misinformation. This use of numbers not as 
information but as a framing device implies that these legislative decisions have no impact on 
the audience, and that the success or failure of any given bill is only of interest to the 
politicians who play the game. Thus, the importance of legislation and policy having been 
negated twice over by failing to give any real information and then by implying through 
ungrounded numbers that policy has no consequence to the audience and the desired 
conclusion of the strategy game frame is left undefined and therefore open to an entirely new 
interpretation.  
 Ideologically, the result of the strategy-game framing of the financial crisis re-narrates 
a crisis within the capitalist economic system into a crisis of politics and a failure of 
government. The news media returned to their normal practice of placing representative 
democracy and voting under the spotlight and subjected this realm to criticism. Under this 
frame important articulations are formed through which the crisis is understood ideologically. 
Viewers become voters and taxpayers, and their role is interpreted through poll numbers and 
expenditure budgets. Politics become politicians and their personal ambitions and displays of 
personality. Their successes are heavily personalized and measured against polls and stock 
market prices. The economy also becomes conflated with the stock market, the growth or 
collapse of which determines the success or failure of politicians. The role left to the viewers 
in this frame is largely passive, with small points of participation left open to them via voting 
or polling. Viewers are called to choose among sets of politicians’ character traits. These 
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politicians, once elected, act largely without input from citizens and citizens are not given 
information on policy by which to judge the politicians by.  
 This frame did offer two “solutions” to the woes of the viewer. One was the return of 
the stock market to pre-crisis prices. This means that political leadership must therefore 
appease the stock market in order to serve everyday people. This serves the interest of a 
neoliberal, financial capitalist system particularly well as the health of the overall economy is 
judged by the health of the part of the economy which serves the capitalist class directly 
(Foster & Magdoff 2009; Harvey 2005). The other solution offered in the strategy-game frame 
of the financial crisis is bipartisanship.   
Bipartisanship and the Greater Good 
 
 When the financial crisis was presented in the form of a strategy-game frame the 
strategic movements of politicians and parties transformed into a problem to be solved. In a 
more classic use of the strategy-game frame, like in an election, the focus of maneuvering is 
typically more neutral (Aalberg et al. 2012; Lawrence 2000). This is how so much election 
news coverage has taken on a “horse race” quality. However, the financial crisis was an 
economic emergency that needed to be solved. When political maneuvers around the crisis 
were framed as motivated by personal ambition, they became an issue of personal 
irresponsibility on the part of the politicians and partisanship was presented as inherently 
baseless. Eventually the maneuvering itself was approached as a problem needing to be 
solved. The corollary to this logic within the frame is that the solution becomes bipartisan 
cooperation. Take this interview with the then-White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on 
ABC News. The interviewing journalist, Diane Sawyer, starts out the entire segment with this 
question:  
 ABC News 
 January 29th, 2009 
 “Robert Gibbs on Bipartisan Support; Lack of Bipartisan Support for the 
 Stimulus”   
 
DIANE SAWYER: So, after all the courtship and all of the persuasion, 
not one of the 177 Republican votes went with you. What went wrong? 
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ROBERT GIBBS (WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY): Well, look, 
Diane, the President's gonna - gonna continue to keep reaching out to 
Republicans. He did so even last night after the vote.  We understand 
how important this piece of legislation is. He spent time on Capitol Hill. 
He invited Republicans down here. He's gonna continue reaching out 
because he understands that Washington isn't gonna change the way it 
works in just a few days. But he'll certainly keep trying because it's what 
the American people deserve the most. 
DIANE SAWYER: But 41 Senate Republicans up ahead. Are you 
saying that the cocktails made the difference last night? How many... 
ROBERT GIBBS: Yeah. 
DIANE SAWYER: How many votes are you expecting from the Senate 
Republicans? 
ROBERT GIBBS: You know, we don't, I don't know what numbers they 
expect right now. We understand this is the very beginning of the 
process. But we're happy to have worked with  Republicans in the 
House to get measures that they thought should be included into this 
legislation. You know, Diane, we've all watched this week while Home 
Depot, and Starbucks, and Boeing have announced layoffs of about 
100,000 workers. So, the situation economically gets more dire each 
and every day. 
In much of the coverage of the financial crisis bipartisanship is the solution proposed by the 
strategy-game frame.  In most legislative battles, a bill without at least a few votes from the 
minority party has little chance of getting passed. However, as we see in the previous 
interview, bipartisanship is elevated beyond a practical necessity into a sort of moral good in 
its own right, with the suggestion that bipartisanship is something that “the American People” 
deserve. Because the strategy-game frame puts politics and politicians at its center, the 
solutions are inevitably solutions of politicians’ character and their willingness to “cooperate.” 
This draws the focus of the frame even further from issues of policy and economic solutions. 
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If the measures mentioned by Robert Gibbs in the interview were to make the bill less 
effective at stimulating the economy (thus providing some solution to the crisis), then why 
should the audience support a bipartisan solution over a hypothetically more effective albeit 
partisan one? Unfortunately, without the relevant information about what is in the bill or in the 
new measures meant to attract Republicans, the audience has no way of judging whether 
either position matches their own best interest. Instead, the frame has created its own logical 
loop: the focus on politicians and parties as a strategy casts politicians’ self-interest and 
partisanship as a problem for the American People, therefore the solution the American 
People deserve must be bipartisanship.  
This situation also occurs when there are factual claims being made in a news story. 
Often in these frames a politician claims the opposite political party is wholly or partially to 
blame for the financial crisis and in response the reporters refuse to investigate that claim. 
Instead, such accusations are ignored from the outset on the grounds that they are partisan. It 
is assumed that because a fact or causal claim is partisan, it must be motivated by the ambition 
of the politician and not a piece of relevant information. In one story, Anderson Cooper 
actually follows this logic all the way through to its end.  Bipartisanship is not only the 
solution, so is a non-partisan admission of direct guilt by all politicians.  
 
 
CNN Anderson Cooper 360° 
October 1st, 2008 
“The Senate Approves the Bailout Bill” 
 
COOPER: Jessica, have any of these folks in Congress, Senate or the 
House, Republicans or Democrats, have any of them taken any 
personal responsibility? Have any of them said, raised their hand, said 
you know what, I played a role in this, I played a role in this shoddy 
oversight that we've had for decades now? 
Has anyone done that? I mean, I asked Barney Frank if he takes any 
personal responsibility. And he said, no, it was all the Republicans' fault. 
Does anybody take any personal responsibility? 
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This refusal to entertain the notion that legislative policy or economic practices may have had 
consequences in the form of the financial crisis was made repeatedly in the coverage samples. 
The viewer is not just getting a lack of information on policy, this placement of bipartisan 
cooperation as the solution to the crisis is actively denying the role of policy or practices and 
continuing to reinforce the understanding that this economic crisis is actually a political one.  
 This is what is particularly interesting about the strategy frame in regard to the 
financial crisis; this frame consistently places the interests of the audiences as inherently 
opposite to any political position. This is not because policy being promoted by either 
candidate or party is ineffective. If any given policy were ineffective or harmful, the audience 
would have no way of knowing because almost no policy related information is conveyed. 
Instead, the machinations of politicians are treated with deep cynicism and the one thing that 
the politicians are presented as not wanting to do become the audience’s definition of 
“success” - to act along bipartisan lines. The narrative consequence of this framing of events 
is that elected government and the audience are placed in direct odds with each other. The 
logic within this frame presents political action as the products of inscrutable personal 
motivations of politicians or the ambitions of political parties. This frame leaves little for the 
average viewer by way of having their own place in politics or even a place where an average 
individual can participate in public affairs. It is important to point out, even what little 
coverage there was of the two major protest movements in this time period, the Tea Party and 
Occupy Wall Street movements were also largely presented within the strategy frame.  
 
CNN Anderson Cooper 360° 
September 14th, 2009    
“Patrick Swayze Dies; Rising Anger in America; Yale Murder Mystery” 
 
COOPER: Let's "Dig Deeper" now into the anger and the backlash 
against President Obama on display of the rally on Saturday but also on 
the House floor and the town halls across the country. 
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Earlier tonight, I spoke with senior political analyst, David Gergen, 
political contributor and Democratic strategist, James Carville and Mark 
Williams, organizer of the Tea Party Express Tour. 
 (BEGIN VIDEOTAPE) 
COOPER: Mark, there was a bigger turnout this weekend -- at this 
weekend's protest than probably a lot of liberals and Democrats 
expected but the people who we saw are not necessarily people who 
voted for President Obama. In fact probably, most of them did not -- 
most of the country however, did vote for president. 
What do you say to those who say, look, this is sour grapes from those 
who weren't happy with the election results? 
WILLIAMS: Well, I have no way of knowing for whom these people 
voted. I know I did speak across the country with quite a few people 
who did vote for Barack Obama and were very disappointed in the 
change that they are getting. It's not they had hope for. 
Sour grapes? These were working stiffs. These are people who pay the 
bills; these are the people who are being called Nazis and mobsters by 
their government. These are people that are being told that there's 
something is wrong with them. Because they embrace the 
Constitutional form of government we have. 
COOPER: But wait Mark, you're actually the one who called President 
Obama Nazi. 
WILLIAMS: I didn't call Barack Obama a Nazi. 
COOPER: Yes, he's on your list, on your Web site of like 21st century 
Nazis. You have his name. 
WILLIAMS: We've got the philosophy of fascism and national socialism 
at work here. Of course we do. 
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COOPER: No, no but you have the president's name, although it's a 
derivation that's not his actually name, it's a name it's kind of a negative. 
WILLIAMS: Mubarak Hussein Obama. 
COOPER: Right, that's what's you call him on your Website. You're the 
one who's using the term Nazi. 
WILLIAMS: Sure. I call him Mubarak Hussein Obama. And he's a man 
who is sitting in the office right now, taking the seeds of socialism 
planted by George W. and fertilizing them and watering them until they 
go into full bloom. 
 
Anderson Cooper strategy-game frames this news segment when he repeatedly analyzes the 
Tea Party movement around how “liberals and Democrats” and President Obama will respond 
and analyzes the movement itself as a personality. The main focus of the story becomes a 
question of whether or not the rhetoric is “appropriate” or “extreme.” This can be an important 
question to ask around social movements, but it is not the only question worth asking. Very 
little is discussed around what the Tea Party movement wanted or why they felt the need to 
take direct action. Occupy Wall Street, while in many ways on the ideological opposite side of 
the spectrum, fared little better at the hands of television journalism.  
International Threat Frame 
 
 The international threat frame was relatively rare in the sampled coverage, but had a 
similar tendency of the strategy-game frame to draw attention away from large financial 
institutions and their practices and onto other targets. Usually these were in the form of 
foreign markets or, in the case below, foreign governments:  
NBC Nightly News  
Sept 5th, 2011 
“World financial markets take a beating” 
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KATE SNOW, anchor: Wall Street was closed on this Labor Day 
holiday, but other financial markets around the world took a beating 
today…Michelle, why such steep drops in Europe today? 
MICHELLE CARUSO-CABRERA reporting: Well, the general concern, 
Kate, is that a lot of governments in Europe for many decades now 
have borrowed a lot of money in order to give very generous benefits to 
their workers and their retirees. They thought that they would grow 
enough to generate enough tax revenue to pay back those debts. That 
hasn't happened. The immediate concern right now, the reason the 
markets sold off today is Italy. It is the most indebted nation in Europe, 
and the situation grew so grave earlier in the summer that investors 
started to treat Italy like a subprime borrower, pushing its interest rates 
up very, very high. Europe's central bank stepped in and said, `We will 
help you, Italy. We'll help you keep your interest rates low, but you've 
got to promise to make changes, like balancing your budget, reducing 
the size of your government which is very bloated, passing a balanced 
budget amendment.' So far Italy has failed to do all those things despite 
getting the help, and over the weekend leaders of the European Central 
Bank made very clear they're unhappy with Italy. The sell-off you see 
comes from the concern that if Italy doesn't keep receiving help, if they 
were to default on their debts, you would see bank failures across 
Europe. And that would be problematic. European banks are the ones 
that have lent Italy all that money. 
SNOW: And bank failures does not sound good for anyone. What does 
that mean for American consumers, for all the rest of us? 
CARUSO-CABRERA: Well, if there were to be bank failures in Europe 
and a banking crisis, you can be sure that the European economy 
would go into a recession. Think about this, when you put all the 
countries in Europe together collectively, their economy is bigger than 
the United States. An economy that big going into recession is 
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problematic overall. And then remember, they buy our products. They 
are one of our biggest trading partners. They buy iPods, they buy cars 
from General Motors. It would hurt us and our economy as well. Plus, 
we can expect our stock market to fall pretty sharply in the morning. 
The “threat” in this case was the potential negative impact on the American stock market, 
which is similar to the threat a “bad leadership” maneuver poses in the classic strategy-game 
frame. The main difference here is that the actor is not of the American government, but 
Italy’s.  
Information Environments:  Politics over Policy  
 
A strategy-game frame is often low in information, regardless of topic (Cappella & 
Jamieson 1997a; De Vreese 2005). This trend held for the strategy-game framing of the 
financial crisis. As mentioned above, information regarding policy was almost wholly absent 
when this frame was present, and certain kinds of information, like numbers, are only used as 
framing devices to further narrative tension. The presence of the strategy-game frame leaves 
the information environment devoid of details on the nature of the financial crisis or potential 
policy reactions. However, the strategy-game frame does leave the information environment 
rich in detail on the political maneuvering of politicians and political parties. The end result is 
an information environment that can support detailed opinions on politicians but not policies. 
This is precisely the situation suggested by the research of Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) 
where individuals will be unable to identify their real policy interests.   
NBC Nightly News 
September 18, 2011 
“Republicans go on attack as Obama gets ready to unveil new plan to 
deal with debt crisis” 
 
LESTER HOLT: In Washington this evening, Republicans are starting to 
pounce as more details trickle out about the president's long-term plan 
to bring down the national debt. The plan will reportedly include higher 
taxes on the wealthiest Americans and many conservatives are calling 
that a nonstarter. We get our report tonight from NBC's Mike Viqueira.  
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While the segment above tells the audience there is difficulty around a proposed new tax on 
the wealthy there is no explanation for the economic reasoning behind the tax. At no point in 
this story are the pros or cons around this tax weighed.  The few details given are driven 
entirely by those policies the Republican Party came out against. If there was no Republican 
statement against a part of the bill, then the audience would not know it existed without 
seeking out a new information source. When the bill is contextualized, it is done through a 
game frame:  
VIQUEIRA: Mr. Obama's new proposal comes as the economy 
continues to struggle and his approval rating drops. Today, one 
Republican came close to predicting a GOP victory next November. 
Senator LINDSEY GRAHAM (Republican, South Carolina): (From 
CNN's "State of the Union") This is our election to lose. President 
Obama's done everything he knows how to do to beat himself. 
VIQUEIRA: The new push comes as the president tries to turn up the 
heat on congressional Republicans, casting them as unwilling to 
compromise on the economy and jobs and indifferent  to the struggles 
of the middle class. 
Mr. CHARLIE COOK (NBC News Political Analyst): The president 
needs a contrast. If this is a referendum on the economy, President 
Obama loses. Right now, if it's a referendum on him, he loses. He 
needs to have it between me and Republicans. 
VIQUEIRA: And, Lester, I'm told by a senior White House official today 
that that overhaul of the tax code that so many experts are calling for 
will, in fact, be endorsed by the president tomorrow. What he won't put 
on the table, any changes to the Social Security program. You 
remember last summer he had been discussing changes to Social 
Security with the speaker in that debt ceiling fight. Lester: 
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HOLT: Mike Viqueira. Thank you. 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, there is a small but compelling body of 
research that suggests that exposure to game frames cause audiences to gain an interest in 
politics. This research was presented optimistically, with the assumption that more attention to 
politics is certainly better than less (Meyer and Potter 1998; Zhao and Bleske 1998; Norris 
2000; Iyengar 2004; Newton 2006). However, if exposure to the game frame does increase 
attention to politics, the question should be asked: what is that attention rewarded with? 
 ABC, NBC, CBS and CNN function quite similarly when the strategy-game frame is 
present, though CNN stands out significantly in that they seem to use the strategy-game frame 
far more frequently. However, at FOX News and MSNBC the story is slightly different. Both 
have strategy-game frame heavily represented in their samples, but each takes a stance that is 
consistently from a U.S. conservative or U.S. liberal perspective, respectively. In the case of 
MSNBC, take this piece from Countdown with Keith Olbermann during the middle of the 
financial crisis:  
 
COUNTDOWN for October 2, 2008 
OLBERMANN: If tonight`s debate, 26 minutes hence, has already given 
the McCain campaign one advantage, it is this: it has taken attention 
from McCain himself today saying that the president should veto the 
Wall Street bailout bill. In our third story tonight, McCain just voted for 
the bill. 
 ....  
McCain voted for the bill, for the bill he now says is putting us on the 
brink of economic disaster. No, he did not correct himself. For the bill he 
now says the president should veto. 
 
The campaigns of candidates John McCain and Barack Obama may have focused on the 
economy that day, but this piece does not. Instead, it is focused upon the political strategies of 
John McCain and what they mean for his chances for getting elected and for his potential 
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effectiveness at running the country. The bill ostensibly under discussion here is the same a 
financial “bail-out” bill intended to re-start the frozen credit markets. Here is part of the 
treatment of this same topic by CNN:  
 
CNN Anderson Cooper 360° 
October 3rd, 2008 
“Done Deal; Examining All the Bailout Angles; Analysis of Vice 
Presidential Debate” 
 
COOPER: And up next, there is more than just bailout money in this bill. 
Fill up the trough because there's a whole lot of pork in this as well. 
Your tax dollars to talk about for rum, for wooden arrows, stock-car 
racetracks. What did any of that have to do with bailing out the 
economy? Joe Johns tonight "Keeping them Honest." 
What McCain and Obama had to say about the bailout today, we'll tell 
you that and what McCain plans to do to now to recapture the 
momentum, can he? Is this campaign about to go all out negative? 
 
In the CNN coverage, they mention large amounts of “pork” - legislative parlance for targeted 
spending on projects local to particular congressional members that are put in the bill in order 
to persuade that congressional member to cast an affirmative vote. In the CNN piece, the term 
“pork” is used vaguely, and contributes directly to the sense of ineffectual and financially 
sloppy government. In the MSNBC piece, the bail-out bill pork gets a more thorough analysis:  
 
RACHEL MADDOW: But what is the economic position here that he 
could take a stand on? Is it for fiscal conservatism? Why is the pork 
helping them pass this bill? That was pork put in to attract House 
Republican votes. They had to make the bill less fiscally responsibility 
[sic] in order to attract fiscally conservative votes. It makes no sense. 
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McCain wanting to campaign for the bill while the Republican Party 
campaigns against it. They are taking every position on the bill possible. 
The only thing I can think is they are looking ahead to an economy that 
is going to stink no matter what happens. This bailout bill is designed 
not to make the economy all better, but to stop it from getting a lot 
worse a lot quickly -- much more quickly than it otherwise would. 
 
Regarding this particular bail-out bill, around the same general time, a viewer who watches 
the MSNBC segment will have more information than a viewer who watched the CNN 
segment: specifically, that the inclusion of legislative pork is being driven by a need to attract 
members of the Republican Party. However, that extra information is strategic information 
relevant to party politics and the legislative process. Either viewer wanting more information 
on the actual bill, the intended impact or the likeliness that the law would actually bring about 
those intended impacts, would have to seek out additional information from another source.  If 
we introduce a third hypothetical viewer, and put them in front of FOX News, they would see 
this.  
FOX News: The O’Reilly Factor 
October 3rd, 2008 
“Analysis of VP Debate; Analysis of Financial Bailout; Interview with 
Kelsey Grammer, Kevin Farley” 
  
O'REILLY: Now, with the bailout passing today, things may calm down 
in America. Let's hope so. But the folks will still be angry come election 
day. With Obama running about 7 points ahead in the polls, it is on John 
McCain now to turn that anger to his advantage if he wants to win. 
McCain has to do that next Tuesday night. He has to say exactly how 
he'll clean up Washington  and Wall Street, and point out that the 
Obama-Biden ticket will just make government bigger. It will be 
interesting to see just how forceful Senator McCain will be on the 
subject. 
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The O’Reilly Factor is very consistent in tying “Wall Street” to “Washington,” by which he 
means the Federal government, broadly. The concern about a “big government” is also a 
frequent theme of this show, which is unique to it and was not found in samples from the other 
channels. While the broadcast channels, CNN, and MSNBC don’t make any explicit call for a 
“big government,” their coverage seems to actually expect a strong, direct intervention by the 
national government on behalf of improving the economy. However, O’Reilly does a strange 
thing with his coverage, particularly through the samples of 2008 and 2009, which declares 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be the explicit cause of the crisis, two semi-public investment 
institutions that have historically handled federally subsidized programs of national interest 
like student loans and home mortgages for the working class. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
like most large lending institutions, were in varying ways involved with and impacted by the 
crisis, but they are not considered a direct or even a leading cause (Lambie 2010; Thompson 
2012; Calhoun 2011; The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011). However, O’Reilly makes 
this very explicit connection over and over again in the sampled coverage. This connection 
includes liberal senator Barney Frank, whom O’Reilly repeatedly accuses of benefitting 
directly from risky lending by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. FOX News is thereby pointing 
the finger of the cause onto the government, liberal legislators, and programs that aid the 
needy, and away from wholly private ventures like Lehman Bros, Washington Mutual, or 
Bank of America.  
Ultimately, if you are partisan enough to watch either MSNBC or FOX News, you 
may have access to more detailed information on party differences, motivations, and strategic 
movements. But, while this information is undoubtedly important, it is still notably lacking in 
real policy debates, though this is slightly more present in MSNBC. FOX News, on the other 
hand, will expose audiences to information that promotes government culpability over private 
institutions, and largely dismisses policy as inherently ineffective, as it comes from the 
government.  
In the following section of this chapter I will discuss how the prominence of the 
strategy-game frame appears to have lent to a persistent belief in a dysfunctional government 
in the peer group discussion in spite of the discussion participants having any specific 
information on how the government may be acting dysfunctional, or any relevant policy that 
may have led to or provided a solution for the financial crisis or economic recession.  
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PEER DISCUSSION GROUPS  
The Persistent Belief in a Dysfunctional Government 
 
Each discussion group began with exercises designed to reconstruct participants’ 
understanding of the financial crisis through the creation of lists of associations. These lists, 
collectively built by each group, reflected their understanding of what the financial crisis was 
as an event, who (or what) caused it, and finally who (or what) they thought it impacted.  
After an initial warm-up question of simple association with the word “financial crisis,” the 
groups were asked to put forward “causes” and “victims” of the financial crisis and the 
recession.  This exercise created a cast of characters and the roles they played, as best as the 
participants understood them.  After the cast was set, the groups were asked to collectively 
rank the top five “causes” and “victims,” via discussion and consensus (they could take this 
exercise further if they wished). Through this stage of the exercise participants were able to 
explain their understanding of the crisis and in the event of a disagreement, individuals or 
small social-coalitions were able to try and persuade others of their reasoning. In the end there 
were five separate lists of “causes” and “victims” along with the conversation that built them, 
recreating the basic suite of framing and reasoning devices that the group had at their disposal 
and giving insight into the participants’ information climates.  
Conversations are not newscasts. There are no editors demanding a cohesive narrative 
and the participants were not professional journalists or anchors. These were everyday people 
who catch glimpses of the larger world as they go along their very busy and often difficult 
lives. What arose out of the analysis of the transcripts, the lists, the notes, and the 
questionnaires were three distinct frames utilized simultaneously by the groups, even by the 
same individual participants. To make matters more complex, these frames do not completely 
align with one another, in a few places they actively conflict. Some “causes” are also listed as 
“victims,” and some proposed solutions point in the opposite direction of implicated bad 
actors. However, these three frames existed in all five peer group discussions. All three can be 
found at some point in every discussion. This could have been explainable if different people 
were lobbying for a particular frame of understanding each time, which would imply there 
were three popular frames of understanding and individuals would attach themselves to one or 
another. However, this is not how it worked, and instead these distinct understandings wove 
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their way in and out of the conversations, and agreement was reached easily for each one. This 
section describes one of these three frames, which I have termed a belief in dysfunctional 
government.    
In all groups there was a widespread belief that the government, particularly at the 
national level, was deeply dysfunctional. This did not take the form of a lack of faith in the 
government’s ability to solve the lingering problems caused by the recession - a sort of “Oh, it 
would be great if we could have X, but I don’t think that can pass our Congress.” The theme 
of dysfunctional government was deeply pervasive throughout the discussion and was 
understood by participants as directly tied to the causes of the financial crisis and the 
recession. This theme of dysfunctional government presented itself as soon as groups began 
the first exercise of presenting associations with the financial crisis and recession. For the first 
exercise, the rock climbing group produced the phrase “congressional gridlock” to which the 
rest of the group agreed. The group of nurses took a less technical approach, and suggested 
“lack of leadership.” When I followed up on what this meant to them, they agreed that it was a 
lack of political leadership that they associated with the financial crisis and recession. The 
social book club threw out the word “complex.” It’s hard to argue with that particular 
assessment, but when I followed up with that word, they stated what they meant was complex 
political maneuvering, and that they found it impossible to follow. Ultimately, when asked to 
identify causes of the financial crisis/recession there were far more references to a 
dysfunctional government amongst every group.  
The book club had a particularly difficult time discussing this issue, because they 
rarely discussed the financial crisis or recession before the focus group. Many of their one-
phrase answers were enigmatic and could only be understood with a thorough discussion of 
what they meant by each. Under “causes” they placed the term “power,” and “the 
government.” “Power” to them meant quite a few things, part of which will be unpacked in a 
later chapter, but part of it was akin to the nurses’ concept of “lack of leadership.” They had 
the sense that those in power had failed them somehow. “The government” had a much 
simpler answer – they meant partisanship, specifically. Later, when asked to rank their list of 
causes of the financial crisis the book club placed partisanship in government as the #5 cause 
of the financial crisis and resulting recession.  
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The bible study group had a similarly broad way of speaking. Often they would 
collapse several discrete issues into a single conceptual phrase. For them, one of the major 
causes of the financial crisis/recession was “irresponsibility.” Like “power,” this word was 
directed at several different targets. The conflation of these targets into one larger “problem” 
will also be discussed in a subsequent chapter - this is part of the mechanism behind the 
tendency to hold logically competing frames simultaneously. However, one key and 
undisputed group of people whose irresponsibility led to the financial crisis and recession 
were political leaders.  
The nurses spoke largely through a concept of leadership, and both “unrealistic 
government leaders,” and “unstable [political] leadership” made it onto their list of financial 
crisis causes. In the end, they agreed that “unstable [political] leadership” was the #4 cause of 
the financial crisis.  
The rock climbers were generally more inclined to seek out information on the 
economy in general, and on the financial crisis in particular. They made regular use of 
internet-based sources and non-fiction books on these topics. Unsurprisingly, they were a bit 
more savvy and technical in their discussion. However, they too listed “congressional 
gridlock” on their list of “causes.” This ended up being disputed in discussion and taken off of 
their list, but it is interesting that even for them, this concept of a dysfunctional government 
(or at least a dysfunctional Legislature) was so intertwined in their images of the crisis and 
recession that they had a difficult time separating it out from cause and effect.  
 When asked the question “who or what do you see as victims of the financial crisis 
and recession?” government falls entirely out of the conversation. Only the social book club 
mentioned government at all, with “government credibility” being collectively ranked as the 
#6 victim of the financial crisis.   
What was particularly interesting, and unique in regards to other topics that the focus 
groups discussed, was that this belief in government dysfunction does not seem to originate 
from, nor be informed by, their personal experiences (Lang & Lang 1981).  They do not, for 
example, reference their experiences with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or 
paying taxes. Frequently during the discussions participants gave detailed and evocative 
stories when pulling from personal experiences or the experiences of those close to them. 
Participants were generally not shy about using themselves or their experiences as examples 
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and they often used stories to demonstrate the experience and logic behind their opinions. 
However, these stories were simply absent when discussing their belief in a dysfunctional 
government. They do not directly reference media, either. However, they do say things like “I 
hear,” which is a direct reference to information coming from somewhere else, and “I feel,” or 
“I think,” which in absence of personal experiences also suggests that these opinions are the 
result of processing information outside of their direct personal experience. These statements 
are often vague, even by the standard of these discussion (through much of which the 
participants struggled to express themselves). Participants also usually did not state where 
their information came from - which, as you will see later, is the case when they remember the 
source of their information.  
 This belief in government dysfunction is the result of a complex mesh of general 
cultural belief, conversations with other people, and the information they get from the news 
(Gamson 1992; Gamson et al. 1992). Participants were pulling from their general information 
environment: an environment that made it quite easy to associate the government and 
politicians with the financial crisis.  From the questionnaires, we know that this informational 
climate is heavily reliant on television news. Participants’ news media diet consisted almost 
entirely of television news and the local newspaper, and television news for most participants 
meant at least one of the major broadcast news channels and CNN, though fewer reported 
watching either FOX News or MSNBC.  
Lack of Leadership and Partisan In-Fighting 
 
 Through the focus groups, the discussions of government dysfunction generally took 
two forms; talk of “leadership” (or lack thereof), and out-of-control partisan fighting. For the 
nursing group, dysfunctional government was discussed through their phrase of “unstable 
leadership.” When asked to rank “unstable leadership” in how important/pivotal it was to 
causing the crisis, they tried to explain themselves:   
Nancy: I guess I feel that, the unstable leadership because... 
 
Angela: Or the unrealistic government later. 
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Susan: Yeah, because that just kind set the ball in motion and it's like, 
to me, it’s like a domino effect, you know one thing goes down, and then 
everything else does.     
 
And later the discussion turned to:  
 
Angela: I think, I think the government let it happen then, they were 
playing the house pricing, playing the stock market. That’s the cause of 
everything and I think it just became kind of out of control.  
 
Even when asked, the nurses could not point to any specific action or any specific leader that 
led to the crisis. Instead they openly admit to not remembering or understanding “the details,” 
but they were quite sure that their impression of a failure in political leadership was the key to 
the economic catastrophe. The thought process here seems to be that good leadership, 
supposedly “stable” leadership would have somehow prevented the financial crisis and 
recession, and therefore because the financial crisis happened, leadership had failed them.  
A similar discussion around political leadership happened in the bible study discussion 
group.  Here it was presented as a loss of leadership: 
 
Terry : ... polarized, exactly.  I don’t remember the key dates and it was 
like 2010 when all this is happening, but where we used to be able to 
look to our government for leadership and I'm not going to talk about     
the president or anybody else ... 
 
Gary: Right. 
 
Terry: ... just Washington DC, look to them for leadership and 
guidance… 
 
These statements never preceded any alternative preference as to how the participants would 
like political leaders to act. I think it would be incorrect to interpret them as statements for a 
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sort of libertarian rejection of the role of government in the market entirely. Rather, these 
statements are consistently associated with expressions of an uncertain future, another very 
consistent theme throughout all of the focus groups. The tendency was to see the government 
leadership as having an important role in fixing the situation, but it had thus far failed to do so.  
Angela, 40 years old and with three children, expressed her cynicism during the nurses 
peer group discussion. She doubted that things would ever get better for herself or her family 
in the future, and ended her statement with:  
 
Angela: And the other thing is, I don't feel like I can believe anybody in 
the leadership role in our government right now. 
 There was one active information seeker in the nursing focus group and one in the 
bible study group:  Angela (above), and Richard, a 70 year old retired city manager. Both 
Angela and Richard were prolific readers, both reported having watched documentaries on the 
topic of the financial crisis, and both regularly tuned in to public news sources (National 
Public Radio [NPR], and the Public Broadcasting Station [PBS]). Richard also pulled from his 
personal experience working in local government to augment his understanding of both the 
crisis and potential solutions to it. Both were pessimistic about the current government’s 
ability to provide resolution. However, the rest of the groups in both cases were equally 
convinced of the same situation, even though they rarely wandered past their habitual TV 
news source and perhaps the local newspaper. These sorts of statements, however endemic to 
the conversation, were universal in spite of appearing to be completely ungrounded in any 
knowledge of either detail of the crisis and recession or of policy options. When asked to give 
specifics, very few individuals could give any real answers. 
 Other focus groups spoke more specifically in terms of partisan fighting taking 
precedence over problem solving. This topic came up frequently in the teachers’ discussion 
group. Steven, a 50-year-old psychology and civics teacher, was also an enthusiastic 
information seeker, even when compared to the rest of his colleagues, most of whom were 
also social studies teachers at the high school. He, like Angela and Richard, reported frequent 
use of NPR, PBS, national newspapers (New York Times [NYT]), and even the BBC. In a 
spontaneous discussion about how much this recession had in common with others, he 
interjected with a comment in favor of seeing it as a novel event:  
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Steven:  There is currently the inability of the government to agree on 
anything and that affects the economy as well even now. I mean, this is 
why we're not getting back [to where we were] when we actually should. 
 
This statement stands out, because while it does not offer details he is able to communicate an 
understanding of the topic that few others are able to match in any peer discussion group. He 
pinpoints exactly where he thinks that government dysfunction is having an impact; that the 
recession would have been over much more quickly had the government been able to agree on 
policy. When the topic came up for the rest of the focus group, their opinions were expressed 
as simple distaste for partisan disagreement. 
David:  Well, I think when people try to blame individuals, you know, 
“Oh, its Obama’s fault there, its Obama’s fault and whatever, I have an 
issue with that.  Because I think it’s too simplistic based on the things 
that people have already said.   
 
Interviewer:  So by simplistic you mean — 
 
David:  Scape-goating. 
   
Interviewer:  Politicians in particular.  Then specific --\ 
 
David:  Specific parties. 
 
Interviewer:  Sure.   
 
David:  You know, these parties pointing fingers, that party and that 
party just pointing fingers, that party and that... 
 
Mark is a 41-year-old English teacher that reported being very passive in his information 
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gathering. He was also one of the few participants in the whole study to report never voting in 
any election, stating “I do not familiarize myself with the issues enough to feel truly informed 
so I do not participate in my right to vote.” In spite of this lack of attention, he expressed 
being deeply concerned by partisanship.  
 
Mark:  Sometimes, I worry that with the finger pointing supposedly by 
the partisans, you know the democrats versus republicans and stuff. I 
don’t know, I just feel like sometimes we can’t have an intellectual 
discussion because people get so entrenched in their ideologies or what 
they think… this talking head versus this talking head, “I am going to 
believe so and so instead of Fox News,” or whatever. And, I think that’s 
some of where the kindness goes away, too. 
It’s a lot more angry. I think when people feel more stressed sometimes 
they get more angry which then decreases the morality and the 
kindness... and things like that, too. 
 
Nicole, 34, who unlike Mark was an active information seeker, was the high school 
Economics teacher. She reported her main source of information being NPR, but also 
frequently read The Economist and watched NBC and ABC news.  
 
Nicole:  Yeah, I thought I was, I thought that we would have learned 
more and more what had been done and just from, like I said, I can’t 
really understand the legislation when I try and read it but, hearing, you 
know, the political ends, the commentators, it, their opinion, as I 
perceive it is that nothing really has changed very much. 
 
The book club expressed a similar concern about partisan fighting, though in this case it 
wasn’t stated as something that was regularly a worry or personally offensive to them. Instead, 
partisan in-fighting was something that they “heard” was a serious problem. Karen, a 61 year 
old retired social worker who mainly watched local television news and the local newspaper, 
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and Patty, a 69 year-old retired non-profit administrator who watched national broadcast 
networks and NPR, had this discussion about things that might “solve” the recession.  
 
Karen: It’s, yeah... digging into it there’s this political rivalry or political 
inequality or something, just a two, two parties just from everything I 
heard the two parties do not seem to cooperate. 
Patty: I’d like to get somehow to better cooperation in politics. I just 
think there is going to be more hope if the parties are spending more 
time and having more comprehensive or agreed upon plans to deal with 
some of the things that are happening. I trust the government, I think for 
the most part people are serving in the government because they want 
to make a difference, but so many of the things that I hear about are just 
really troubling that their just seems this is the same pass people can’t 
accomplish what they want because of their the... partisanship, the in-
fighting, whatever they call it. It’s just so troubling, just wasted time, 
wasted time. I heard that our congress is the most inactive most 
ineffective in something like forty years.  
Interviewer: Has anyone else heard about this? 
[All nod] 
Barbara: Yeah, yeah. 
 
 The rock climbers were very animated on this topic. All but one person used internet 
sources regularly to get the news, and many watched more partisan news sources like MSNBC 
and FOX News. They had the easiest time discussing these topics and reportedly did so 
frequently amongst friends. Because of this, they spoke in quick references and often used 
irony and sarcasm to express points and emotions. This is part of their discussion when trying 
to form a list of causes of the financial crisis and recession, when one member put forward 
“congressional gridlock,” but it was eventually decided that it couldn’t be counted as a cause 
of the crisis.  
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Kevin:  Congressional gridlock. 
Todd:  Oh, yeah, the election.  
Dawn:  Yeah, right, right. 
Todd:  And the party saying, we are going to focus our entire goal on 
not getting Obama re-elected.   
Kevin:  Obstructing everything, yup. 
Charles:  I don’t -- I think that was a cause of the crisis... 
Kevin:  Yeah. But it was -- we’re talking 2008. 
Ron:  Yeah. Well… 
.... [crosstalk] 
Kevin:  But we could easily -- we could easily be working the way out of 
this but instead of -- instead of focusing on anything like jobs, bills or the 
economy, they're focusing on regulating uteruses.  
Charles:  But that’s not a cause. 
Todd:  That’s not the cause for this. 
 
Kevin seems to be trying to make a similar point as Steven brought up in the teachers’ focus 
group, that partisanship and lack of cooperation in the legislature is unnecessarily prolonging 
the recession. But, Kevin was not able to point to specific policy measures that would have 
shortened the recession and was unable to pass due to the political parties being unable to 
cooperate. Instead, he is able to pull up two instances of political strategy. The first is a known 
instance of the Speaker of the House of Representatives where he states shortly after the 
election of Barack Obama that the goal of the Republican Party would be to prevent his re-
election. The other is a common critique of the House of Representatives frequently bringing 
up anti-abortion bills for a vote. Nevertheless, “Congressional gridlock” was put on the un-
ranked list. Later, when trying to rank their causes, this discussion was had:  
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Ron:  How about congressional gridlock? You guys like top ten? 
Charles:  Uhm, actually, uhm, there was disagreement; I don’t believe it 
was congressional gridlock. 
Jason:  Yeah.  
Charles:  It was all controlled -- it was controlled by the Republicans 
and both houses said they were controlled by Republicans when we 
had a Republican president. 
Ron:  When? This is 2000… 
Charles:  In 2007. 
Ron:  In 2007. 
Charles:  And ‘08. 
Kevin:  Yeah. And then -- and after the -- and during… 
Charles:  And then after the election in the 2000 -- there was a election 
2008, it’s when it went over to the congress becoming Democrats and 
being just as bad. 
Kevin:  Well, and… 
Todd:  That and -- and during the -- during the right –right at the very 
beginning of the crisis, like everybody panicked. They were like, “Okay. 
Well, we have to do something.” And this sounds alien to us now but we 
did something like, they were -- we passed a bunch of laws right after 
that happened. And they worked more or less how they were expected 
to or how they were hope to. 
  
Here is the difficulty of memory. The piece of legislation that Todd recalls is presumably the 
so-called “bail-out bill” meant to free up the credit markets, though it was passed in 2008. 
Charles, however, is mistaken in the make-up of the legislature at this particular point. The 
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Congressional session that was in place during late 2008 was the 110th, and was controlled in 
both houses by the Democratic Party. With a Republican President in office, this was 
considered a split government. Additionally, as pointed out by the CNN and MSNBC pieces 
above at the time, Republican legislative votes were needed in order to pass the bill, thus 
partisan wrangling was very much an issue in the passing of the bill. However, Charles isn’t 
arguing that partisanship wasn’t out-of-control or a problem, merely that it wasn’t structurally 
possible as a cause of the crisis, and that both parties were equally useless at solving problems 
related to the financial crisis.  
 The belief in a dysfunctional government isn’t necessarily incorrect - there are quite a 
few legitimate critiques that could be applied to all levels of the U.S. government, many of 
which would involve how it relates to the financial crisis and the economy. What is interesting 
here, however, is that it is so pervasive. It is found in every peer discussion group and among 
both active information seekers and passive information takers.  Additionally, it seems 
ungrounded in specifics. There is no one event, or a handful of events, that keep coming up 
that are associated with a dysfunctional government. Instead, it seems to serve as a sort of 
backdrop to the rest of the discussion – an aspect of reality that everyone can agree with 
before trying to get to details. The belief very much seems to precede details. Active 
information seekers have difficulty explaining them, and passive information takers generally 
do not bother to make the attempt to explain them. Yet, everyone agreed with each other. 
When this topic was brought up by one member, it would be met with enthusiastic nods, and 
“yes!” 
 Bipartisanship is also a strong theme emerging from the focus groups. Like the coverage, 
this was not backed up by policy related concerns. Rarely was policy mentioned at all, and 
never in association with a stated desire for bipartisanship. In fact, bipartisanship or a desire 
for parties to “just get along” was most often paired with a direct statement of not knowing the 
details or being information deficient.  
 
Mark:  Too bad, journalism ethics were mentioned before and you 
talked about you know, what is the business of journalism, is it to inform 
or is it to make money.  And I don’t think we know the answer to that 
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anymore, I mean, ah, maybe we did 30 - 40 years ago or at least 
thought we did, I don’t know.   
Gunther:  People don’t want to be informed.  People want to be told 
they’re right. 
Steven: (In agreement) No. 
Gunther: “I watch Fox News because I agree with everything they say”, 
right?  “I watch MSNBC because I can nod my head the whole time, I 
don’t want to be informed I want to be told I’m right”, and so, I am going 
to cater to that. 
 
In the post-discussion questionnaire, many respondents declined to identify themselves with a 
political party or a political ideology, like “liberal” or “conservative.” Those who did often 
felt the need to clarify that identification, for example:  44-year-old Stephanie in the bible 
study group answered, “Not really – I lean more to the Democratic Party, but I am largely 
independent.”  There were a few participants who indicated a change in their political 
affiliation recently, all former self-identified Republicans.  
Active information seekers generally seemed to share this value, though they expressed it 
in a particular way. They reported habits of deliberately making a point to seek out partisan 
sources of information that they did not agree with in order to “challenge” their world view.  
Here is part of the discussion as it happened amongst the teachers:  
 
David:  I like listening to all kinds of different peoples speak ah...it’s I 
think, sometimes it’s really informative.  If you read an article, I always 
go down and read the comments of the articles because I am fascinated 
on how supposed, you know, just everyday people who had just read 
that same article I read what they’re saying about the article and you 
can see [the] political fault lines develop and, you know, who is making 
the more educated response to that article than you know respondent 
17, versus respondent 8, and it is kind of fun. 
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Steven:  Very old school this, I want to know more than the average 
American knows, so going and getting an expert’s opinion at least....  I 
want to know what the experts know so I’ll Google to see who I just 
read.  What’s this guy’s background or what’s this woman’s 
background, are they more conservative or are they more liberal, what 
did they publish and so, I want to know what they’re, what point of view 
are they coming from and ah, this might be their background, I want to 
hear from it, I don’t want to just be told what I believe, I want to be told 
multiple sides.  That’s just my prosecutors’ background. 
And so then I can, formulate I think is a better overview of what’s going 
on, so, part of what I like from NPR is they often hear from both sides 
coming in.  But, it can’t, not always so that’s why I get my own 
resources of information.   Christian Science Monitor, I have looked to 
the New York Times, and then if I don’t know the author I would Google 
the author and find out and so I can say, “Okay this is the sort of view I 
am getting.” 
If I can’t, obviously sometimes it’s clear that “ok this is liberal” and “okay 
it’s conservative.”  But if I don’t know and this is going to be watched 
then okay, let me just find out who this is.  
 
Again, Steven is stating something that nobody else reports doing - most participants simply 
report watching FOX News if they agree more with MSNBC (though no participant reports 
doing this in the opposite direction). Given the results of the frame analysis contained in this 
chapter, it’s unclear what this habit of seeking out opposing information sources really 
achieves, at least in the case of television. Any extra information participants had related to 
specific details on what caused the crisis, what impact it had, and what options there were to 
fix it came largely from documentaries, books, and investigative journalism specials.  
In the peer discussion groups, bipartisanship and the discomfort with being 
partisanship are, on their surface, ways to promote civility and cooperation. However, there is 
a deeper relationship with levels of held information and how deeply that information is 
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understood. Non-identification with a particular political party could be an entirely rational 
decision if a person decides that neither party actually represents their interests. But, how 
could these participants actually discern who would or would not be acting in their interests 
when they aren’t able to remember or articulate a single piece of policy? When policy is 
unknown the path of least resistance, both intellectually and socially, is to commit the fallacy 
of the golden mean and assume that the solution must lie somewhere in a compromise 
between two unknown policy positions. 
 The strategy-game frame and the belief in a dysfunctional government share two key 
ideological articulations. The first is linking the financial crisis to the behavior and 
responsibility of politicians, and the second is the elevation of political bipartisanship to a 
moral good. The dominance of the strategy-game frame in news coverage means partisan 
fights in the legislature are more easily interpreted as unnecessarily uncivil and merely the 
result of personal career ambitions of individual politicians by those that rely on the news for 
their information. This cynicism does not necessarily originate from the news (though it 
might), but when the participants do get exposed to current events coverage they are unlikely 
to be challenged in their view and more likely to be viewing a story that echoes back that 
same perspective.  
Gary: To phrase in another way it mean, I don't see the end of the 
tunnel. 
 
Terry: Yeah. At all, that one or... 
 
Gary: And that's why we’ve downsized because of at the end of the day 
what I have control over is my own household and I, to the best of my 
knowledge, just do the best as I can and hope that it's not going to be 
affected by everything else, that's what [Richard] said. 
 
Theresa: Yeah, I mean, we're taking care of our family and our kid and 
their kids and that's our life. 
 
Richard:  Yeah, during the recession. 
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Gary: Yeah, and it is but with that said if we can, you know, with our 
jobs or for our church, do something for the world or do some that 
makes a change then you know, obviously we're open to that but our 
priorities are our homes. 
 
Critically, this cynicism did not motivate any participants to either seek more information or 
get more involved with the political realm.  Quite the opposite, many participants reported that 
in the last few years, they had decided to pull away from politics.  
 
Information Seeking Practices 
 
 Cultural hegemony is a process of continual consent built through a combination of 
ideology and practices, and there were a few ways that participants gave evidence to the 
practices which ultimately resulted in their personal information environments.   
 There were two ways that participants related to available information. Most were 
passive information takers. In their questionnaires they listed few sources of information, and 
those they listed were easily accessible. Typically these were standard television news shows, 
or local papers. In conversation, these participants had a difficult time justifying or explaining 
their reasoning for including items on the discussion list, or for why they felt an item should 
be ranked a certain way.  
 The second type of relating to information was displayed by what I have termed 
“active information seekers.” These participants were much rarer. There was never more than 
one in any peer group, and two peer groups (the book club and the rock climbers) did not have 
any active information seekers at all. These active information seekers listed many sources of 
information, some easy to access and others that took more deliberate activity to access and 
process. These active information seekers stood out in conversation, as they had a 
significantly easier time arguing for their listed items and their rankings. Interestingly, though 
it was often clear that these participants had novel information in relation to the rest of their 
group, the group often had a difficult time taking up their arguments or points. When a piece 
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of information was truly new, or required a grasp of knowledge that the group did not share, 
conversation often drifted away from the point that the active information seeker was trying to 
make.  
 This tendency suggests two things. The first is that the role of information - both 
quantity and type - may play a significant role in the formulation of ideological understanding 
for the individual. The second is that information environments may have a significant impact 
on how social groups are able to form collective ideological understandings. Individuals had a 
very difficult time introducing new information into the conversation in a meaningful way – 
meaning that simply relying on social contacts to “fill out” the information environment left 
barren by the media may be wishful thinking for those concerned about the level of general 
public knowledge.  
SUMMARY 
Strategy Game Frame and the Belief in Dysfunctional Government  
  
 The strategy-game frame, by its very nature, highlights the personal interests of 
politicians. To choose a strategy-game frame is to choose to tell a story about legislative 
battles rather than legislation and to tell a story about the president’s leadership style rather 
than tell us where the president is leading us to.  Those stories of the financial crisis told 
through a strategy-game frame were high on information about the political movements within 
the legislature, but very low on information about the crisis; what caused it, what will happen 
as a result, and who may be to blame. Surprisingly, they are even lower on information about 
related policy; policy to fix the crisis, policy to prevent a new crisis from happening again, or 
policy to help those impacted by the recession.  
 While the movements of politicians were put forward in these news stories as 
important – they are the focus of the coverage after all - they are not portrayed as doing “good 
work.” The legislative process is instead implied to be inefficient and unnecessarily partisan. 
The “solution” that comes out of this logic process is then legislative cooperation and 
bipartisanship. While cooperation is certainly nice, cooperation as an end goal without regard 
to policy outcome is facile.   
This frame seems to be reflected in the peer group discussions.  Participants believed, 
consistently and fervently, that the current government was dysfunctional and that politicians 
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were self-serving and out-of-touch. Arguments can easily be made that this is the case, and in 
specific ways. However, the vast majority of participants could not make such an argument 
nor give any specifics. They did not know where the dysfunction occurred. They could not 
indicate, even when prompted, whether this dysfunction was occurring in the congress, or the 
White House, or in the legislative process of committee sponsorship, or any other place. 
Additionally, participants could not point to any specifics as to the actual damage that this 
dysfunction caused, though at least three groups put it forward as a cause of the crisis itself. 
These groups held a clear shared image of a culpable, ineffective government system. The 
image was enthusiastically agreed to by all or most members of a group, and even the slightest 
signaling in conversation would bring the rest of the group to a shared understanding. Yet, 
every time, this image fell apart upon further probing.  
The belief in a dysfunctional government was a clearly formed cultural reference point 
that had not been built by the participants themselves. This was a received concept. 
Participants could not retrace their logic because it was clear that they had never traced it in 
the first place. It is not a surprise that participants’ understanding of national politics around 
an international event would be largely a received one. This region of the country is over 
1,600 miles from Washington, DC. No participant had ever run for an office, or known 
anybody who had. There was no place where they could expect to gain first-hand experience. 
However, it was surprising that this belief in a dysfunctional government was so firmly 
believed with such little skepticism or specifics. Moreover, this belief was so thinly centered 
that it could be applied to nearly any other belief.  Any outcome in policy could be attributed 
to a dysfunctional government, whether it was a failure to prosecute the actors behind the 
financial crisis or the failure to lower taxes on billionaires in an effort to increase their ability 
to invest in new business. 
  Further, participants’ belief in a dysfunctional government seemed to inoculate 
participants from the desire to seek out more specific information. The “answer” to the 
questions “why did this happen” and “why is it so bad for us” was simply that politicians are 
too partisan and refuse to cooperate with one-another. What they would cooperate on was a 
question left unasked.  
 The association of the belief in dysfunctional government with statements about 
withdrawing from civic participation seems to support the findings of Capella and Jamieson 
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(1997) who argued the strategy-game frame promotes cynicism and a withdrawal of the many 
citizens from politics. The participants and the strategy-game frame ultimately utilized the 
same suite of framing elements: self-interested politicians, ineffective legislature, and a 
mandate for bipartisanship. Additionally, an information climate starved of policy discussion 
left participants with little more than ungrounded imagery and few actual points of fact to 
discuss. This combined into a collective discussion frame of the belief in a dysfunctional 
government which shares the exact frame elements of the strategy-game frame. Moreover, 
these discussions were nearly effortless. There were few points of disagreement within the 
group. While this could be attributed to the fact that these groups were all self-selected 
collections of friends, when you look at the content of the discussions one could mix 
individuals in any direction between all other groups and arrive at this same frame. Instead, 
this agreeableness appears to be, in part, a function of having so little information on hand that 
the conversation simply alights on vague, shared imagery. Again, Cappella and Jamieson’s 
(1997a) thesis and findings predict this result: 
Over time, for some, cynicism about people (they’re all crooks) and positions 
(poll-driven pandering) becomes not simply a node but a superordinate node 
with all other political information subordinated to it. The node is highly 
accessible, frequently and recently activated, and carries a negative affective 
tag” (p.167-168) 
 
Agency Denied  
   
The peer discussion groups expressed deep dissatisfaction with politics and political 
leaders. It would be tempting to see this as evidence for a counter-hegemony, or at least a 
counter-ideology, forming in everyday discourse. However, if we examine these beliefs 
against the elements of the collective action frame we can see how this is probably not the 
case.  As introduced in the beginning of this study, Gamson presented three crucial elements 
to a functioning collective action frame – that is, frames that are “action oriented sets of 
beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns” 
(Benford & Snow 2000, p.613). The crucial elements of this frame are injustice, agency, and 
identity. 
120 
 
 A sense of injustice is defined as a sense of “moral indignation” which is “laden with 
emotion.”  Defined this way, injustice was heavily present within the strategy-game framing 
of the financial crisis and within the group discussions. Key to Gamson’s “injustice” element 
is that human actors bear at least some of the responsibility for suffering. For example: losing 
a home to an earthquake may be unfair, but it is not unjust – as this implies a human 
wrongdoing.  The financial crisis strategy-game frames provide a variety of human actors to 
assign responsibility for the suffering of the recession. Such indignation was even expressed 
by the journalists and anchors themselves. Even though much of the visual and aural elements 
of expressing frustration and anger are lost, the language in these news stories is often more 
than enough to pick up the sense of exasperation that anchors and guests were expressing – 
the outburst evident by Anderson Cooper in the examples above was a common sight in the 
samples. The discussion groups were also demonstrative in their sense of injustice.   
However, it is important that in both cases the targets of the moral indignation are not 
the investment banks, or the mortgage-lending industry, or the credit-rating industry. Instead 
the target of this indignation was the government, particularly individual politicians. Even 
though the belief appeared to be largely ungrounded in facts, participants were openly angry at 
their government, and had very little patience for politicians they perceived to be not 
cooperating or for losing themselves in partisan fights.  As citizens, they expressed a feeling 
of betrayal.  The injustice being done was less about the crisis and recession during these 
moments of discussion, but that the government entrusted with the care of the country was 
indifferent to their suffering. Politicians were more focused on their personal careers than in 
“fixing the problem.” However, the sense of injustice without the specifics on the type and 
severity of harm is a poorly armed revolution. Participants were angry, but not entirely sure at 
whom, or why – and they could not fully articulate the injustice that had been done to them. 
They relied entirely on inspiring a shared image with their peers – an image that was equally 
fuzzy for everyone. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, politics and policy did have a direct hand in 
deregulating the banking industry, which allowed investment institutions to over-leverage 
themselves and expose themselves to very high financial risk (The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report  2011; Murphy 2015). However, in the strategy-game frame of the financial crisis this 
is not the crime that politicians committed. Instead, politicians become villains because they 
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are self-interested and partisan. All legislative moves after the crisis are interpreted as 
manipulative power grabs, while relevant legislative moves that created the climate which 
enabled the crisis are never mentioned. 
 The next crucial element of a collective action frame is agency, which is to say “the 
consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action” 
(Gamson 1992, p.7). In media frames this would appear as indications that the audience, or at 
least some part of the audience, would be able to have an impact on their own social-political 
world. The role of the audience here also addresses the third element of the collective action 
frame, identity: who are the “we” who will move to amend the injustice? 
  In the case of the strategy-game frame, the audience appears in two forms, as the 
taxpayer, and as the American People.  As the taxpayer, the power of the audience is largely 
transactional. By dutifully paying their taxes, they hold their government to a certain level of 
responsibility. However, this responsibility is narrowly defined. There is no call to spend the 
money in any specific way, perhaps in prosecuting major players in the crisis, or perhaps in 
creating a program to help homeowners restructure their debt. Instead the frame demands only 
that the money not be “wasted.” Given that there is no discussion of policy or the relative 
effectiveness per dollar spent, “not wasting” money seems to boil down to simply not 
spending it at all. The audience is called upon to be outraged at large numbers of “their” 
money being spent regardless of how it is being spent or how it might actually help them.   
As “The American People,” the audience functions in a very similar manner. This is 
less transactional, as the concern is less about money when “The American People” are 
invoked, and more moral and emotional. “The American People” deserve a functioning 
government, a bipartisan government, and they deserve a strong leader. 
 While the taxpayer and “The American People” seem to “deserve” quite a bit in the 
strategy-game frame, they have little real agency. There is no room for collective action of any 
kind, only the feeling of betrayal and outrage when politicians fail to hold up to the 
requirements of being bipartisan and strong leadership. Even when the coverage is about 
actual collective action movements, as is the case with the Tea Party movement and Occupy 
Wall Street,  the actions of these movements are re-framed into the strategic movements of 
particular politicians, rather than the focus turning to the impact the movement may have 
directly.    
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Agency, the belief that their own collective actions could address the injustice, was not 
at all associated in conversations about dysfunctional government. Instead, participants 
expressed feelings of hopelessness when the topic came up.  As shown earlier, Gary, Theresa, 
and Richard explain how their belief in a dysfunctional government has prompted them to 
withdraw even further from civic life. They felt their responsibility lies with their own 
survival and the maintenance of their home.  
The third element of a collective action frame, identity, fared similarly in the peer 
discussion groups. The sense of a “we” that is in opposition to some different “they,” was 
easily marked out in the dysfunctional government theme. They mirrored the same identity 
dichotomy put forward by the strategy game frame news stories. The citizens, “The American 
People,” are owed the good-faith work of their politicians to better their lives and to protect 
them from the worst ravages of the economy.  However, the self-interested and out-of-touch 
politicians are more focused upon their own careers, and the citizens are thus betrayed. The 
“we,” in this case, the citizens, are formed more by their relationship to the dysfunctional 
government than they are to each other. The “we” is not a point of power that many citizens 
can form around. Instead each person bound through mutual responsibility to the government 
via individualized contracts. 
A Displaced Sense of Injustice 
  
Williams (1977) pointed out that because cultural hegemony is always in flux, there 
will always be some combination of emergent and residual cultural practices. Emergent 
practices are those that arise out of the current contradictions of society, and residual practices 
are those that exist from the previous or existing system of consent. The strategy-game frame 
can be understood both as arising out of a residual practice, and a residual practice in its own 
right. Previous research shows how this frame is a result of the orientation of journalism 
towards the cataloguing of politics and politicians which results in certain stories being told in 
a certain way.   
Emergent and residual practices can have a dominant, alternative, or oppositional 
orientation to the hegemonic system (Williams 1977). The results in this chapter show that in 
the context of the strategy-game framing of the financial processes, this practice is decidedly 
dominant in that it serves to reinforce the status quo. When the financial crisis is narrated 
123 
 
through a strategy-game frame a crisis of the economic system becomes a crisis of the 
political and government systems. This deflection of attention is, at least in part, the result of 
the fact that the practices of journalism as a profession and an industry have lent themselves to 
being a watch-dog of politics in service to voters. Journalism as a capitalist venture is simply 
not attuned to be a watch-dog of most capitalist activity, particularly those activities that are 
deemed legal and normal. This combines with the pressure of a 24-hour news cycle and the 
demands of advertisers for a compact series of high-pressure news moments rather than in-
depth investigations.  
Strategy-game frame is a reflexive, cheap frame that fits the requirements of daily 
journalist work and does not demand that journalism turn its attention to unfamiliar targets. 
This framing is an ideological process which allows the financial practices which caused the 
crisis to remain obscured and the public spotlight is turned instead onto the personal 
motivations of individual politicians and their election activities.  
This attention to the government at a time of market volatility and the failure of the 
capitalist system to provide material security for the majority is very much in keeping with a 
neoliberal capitalist cultural hegemony. Neoliberal hegemony has consistently sought to 
repurpose the role of the state into the maintenance of stable market conditions (Patomäki 
2009; Peck 2010; Crouch 2011; Harvey 2005). The articulations created by this activity result 
in the economy being reduced to the movements of the stock market, viewers become voters, 
and the activity of legislation and politicians become the displays of individual politician’s 
ambitions and personality.  
The impact of the strategy-game frame on the information environment for potential 
viewers of television news is it becomes over-stuffed with minutia regarding the daily 
statements and motivations of politicians but remains devoid of details on policy and the 
potential impacts of that policy. Strategy-game frame also starves the information 
environment of important details regarding the real causes of the financial crisis. Ultimately, 
the strategy-game frame is so good at giving information on the personal career ambitions and 
needs of politicians that it leaves out all discussion of the dependence of the economy on the 
practices of private business, the role of the viewer in the economy as workers, the concept of 
viewers as active citizens, or the purpose of politics as policy. 
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 This process of strategy-game framing a crisis of capitalism resulting in an ideological 
understanding of the failure of markets as a failure of government and an information 
environment bereft of knowledge that might indicate otherwise. This process could be 
understood as a hegemonic process of displacement (Therborn 1983). Therborn demonstrated 
that class antagonisms have historically often been projected onto other social characteristics – 
typically along lines of race, professional rank, ethnicity, or other social stratifications. In this 
case the strategy-game frame supports a neoliberal understanding of the state as responsible 
for maintaining ultimate health of the markets, and thereby displaces enough of the anger and 
dissatisfaction resulting from the crisis onto the government as an institution. The peer 
discussion groups were openly angry about the financial crisis and deeply dissatisfied with 
their precarious condition in the economy, and yet much of this anger was directed at 
politicians and electoral politics.  
This then appeared to lead many of them to Therborn’s second method of preventing 
counter-hegemonies: submission. Feeling locked out of an opaque and distant political system, 
which participants understood as the responsible party, they withdrew even farther from 
political life and resolved to focus on their own personal survival in an economic system they 
believed to be forever inhospitable to their needs.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE HUMAN-IMPACT FRAME CLUSTER 
Survivor Stories and Bootstraps 
 
This next chapter describes not so much a single frame as an ideologically coherent 
cluster of frames. The frames identified are distinct and will be broken down individually, 
however they belong to a common ideological and thematic group. In its most basic sense, 
these frames all relate to each other in their focus upon “everyday” individuals and their 
reactions and responsibilities in relation to the crisis. Like the strategy-game frame discussed 
in the previous chapter, little to no blame for the financial crisis is attributed to any person or 
practice in particular.  Instead, this cluster frames the financial crisis in terms of a natural 
disaster, and the causes of the crisis are rarely, if ever, discussed. The three distinct frames 
that form this conceptual cluster, which will be referred to as the human-impact cluster for 
simplicity, have been termed “survivor stories,” “bootstraps,” and “opportunity in disaster.”  
Each are an attempt to cover the average citizen’s experience of the fall-out of the financial 
crisis and each rely heavily on narratives and concepts of rugged individualism and the 
protestant virtues of “hard work,  lifestyle austerity, and personal humility (McCortney & 
Engels 2003; Kalberg 2016; Kaelber 2016). This frame cluster works to make the financial 
crisis a project of the self, most particularly a project of self-empowerment. However, it will 
be detailed below how this is not an empowerment of the self to resist the current system but 
rather empowerment is defined as a chance to commit oneself more fully with the demands 
and practices of the current economic order (Artz & Murphy 2000; Kalberg 2016).  
In the following chapter, the news frames survivor stories, bootstraps, and opportunity 
in disaster will be described and analyzed through the lens of cultural hegemony and their 
impact on the information climate. Next, the corresponding frames of personal responsibility 
and moral decay from the peer discussion groups will be discussed in regard to how they show 
elements of both hegemony and counter-hegemonies.  
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Survivor Stories 
 
Some broadcasts stood out from the rest of the samples because they lacked common 
narrative elements. In these broadcasts, there were no villains or heroes. These stories had 
very little information pertaining to the economic nature of the crisis, including the usual 
inclusion of stock market activity or bank closures.  While these broadcasts were about the 
financial crisis, they closely resembled the coverage of aftermath of a natural disaster like a 
tornado or an earthquake (Tierney et al. 2006; Fernando 2010; Houston et al. 2012). The 
frame shared by these broadcasts has been named the “survivor story” frame for the purposes 
of this chapter.  
The survivor story frame is a frame that highlights the personal misfortune of the 
financial crisis and the recession faced by ostensibly everyday people. This frame, like the 
strategy-game frame, is like those that have been found in frame analyses on other topics.  The 
reliance on individual stories, or episodic framing, has been long recognized in framing 
research (Iyengar 1991a; Behr & Iyengar 1985).  Experimental evidence suggests that it can 
have an impact in audiences, lessening their broad understandings of political issues (Iyengar 
1991a). The survival story is particularly similar to the “human-impact frame,” for which this 
frame cluster is named after,  identified by Neuman et al.(1992).  The human-impact frame 
“focuses on describing individuals and groups who are likely to be affected by an issue,” and 
while not “explicitly” expressing empathy or compassion, “did employ adjectives, personal 
vignettes, and visuals that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, sympathy, or 
compassion from the audience” (Neuman et al. 1992, p.69; see also Cho & Gower 2006; An 
& Gower 2009).  
The human-impact frame is a generic frame, however, and the aim of this study is to 
pay attention to the particularities of the coverage of the financial crisis. The survivor stories 
frame of the financial crisis has a distinctive narrative arc. This arc starts with a secure, often 
idyllic “before” which transitions to a harrowing “present,” and ends anxiously with a 
statement of “uncertain future.” The “before” is often told through an individual story and 
typically took the form of a stable job, a house, perhaps a retirement fund. The “now” is a 
stark contrast of misery; lost jobs, foreclosed homes, and children that cannot be put through 
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college. Unlike the other two frames in the bootstraps cluster described later, the survivor 
story rarely ends on a positive note and instead ends on a note of anxiety and uncertainty.   
 Here is a typical survival story from ABC News in late 2009, around the same time as 
the first protests of the politically conservative Tea-Party movement.  
 
ABC News  
September 14, 2009 
“Where things stand; the reckoning”  
 
BETSY STOCK (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) When we first met Olimpia Rubino... 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO (UNEMPLOYED) 
This job fair is huge. 
 
BETSY STOCK: (Voiceover) ...she had lost her job as an executive 
assistant at a pharmaceutical company and she was fearful. 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO: You worry what's going to be, will I be able to survive. 
 
BETSY STOCK: (Voiceover) Today, one year later, she is one of 15 
million Americans still looking for full-time work. 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO: See the jobs I posted for. 
 
BETSY STOCK: (Voiceover) She's applied for hundreds of office jobs. But 
the only offers have paid less than what she gets on unemployment. 
 
(Off-camera) You were worried, will I be able to survive? So what's the 
answer to that? 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO: Well what's the answer to that? The answer is, you 
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can survive. You can do things. 
 
BETSY STOCK (Voiceover): She gets by mostly on unemployment. 
Vacations, even discount theater tickets are out. 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO: Now I'm realizing that I was very well paid. 
 
BETSY STOCK: And she fights the blues by volunteering at a local 
nursing home. 
 
BETSY STOCK: (Off-camera) So do you enjoy it when this lady comes to 
visit? 
 
RESIDENT (NURSING HOME): It's wonderful. 
 
BETSY STOCK: (Voiceover) Olimpia now hopes her volunteer job 
becomes a paying one. 
 
OLIMPIA RUBINO: I didn't think I'd get this much out of it. They see you 
their eyes light up. It's very, very good. I wouldn't mind working in a place 
like this.
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In this case, the “before” part of the survivor story frame is not at the beginning of the story, but 
you can see it in the included statement of Rubino, “Now I’m realizing I was very well paid.” 
The story moves on to a second “survivor;”  
 
BETSY STOCK (ABC NEWS): And then there's Jason Poles who 
considers himself one of the lucky ones. After more than a year of life as 
a stay-at-home dad, he's found a new job in banking, but it pays $50,000 
less than his old one. 
 
JASON POLES: One thing that we learned through what happened was, 
we can live with a lot less and still be happy. 
 
The story ends with the characteristic down-note of the survivor story frame, “a difficult lesson. 
One year later, Americans are navigating the job market with a combination of resilience and 
despair.” This is typical for the survivor story frame, which do not end with a sense of hope and 
instead focus on anxiety. In this next case, a story from NBC Nightly News in late 2011, the 
focus of the frame is on a group of homeowners.  
 
NBC Nightly News 
September 16th, 2011 
“Number of home foreclosures filings rises in August”  
 
(Voiceover): Now to the other debt burden hitting home. The number of 
home foreclosure filings in this country soared more than 30 percent in 
August. That means a lot more people are saying goodbye to what they 
thought was their piece of the American dream. NBC's Kerry Sanders 
reports on one of the hardest hit parts of the country, Florida.  
 
Notice here how the plight of foreclosures is largely emotional. While the statistic of 30 percent 
rise in foreclosures for the country implies a broad perspective, there is no discussion of what 
causes the foreclosures in a structural way, what Iyengar (1991) would describe as a thematic 
frame. Nor is there any discussion of potential consequences from this sudden rise in 
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foreclosures for families or for the broader economy. Finally, there is no discussion about 
potential solutions to the foreclosure crisis on a policy level.  The consequences of this narrative 
myopia towards emotional suffering become very clear in this particular story:  
 
SANDERS: These are the foreclosure files in Miami-Dade County, more 
than 100,000 sterile documents, each with a sad story of a lost dream. 
And then there are the officers who deliver these documents who say 
they're increasingly sympathetic. This is becoming so routine in our 
country. 
 
DEPUTY GORDON: Most people, you know, they've lost their jobs, and, 
you know, they--you know, that's the problem. You know, they can't find 
work. So can't find work, you can't pay your bills. 
 
SANDERS: Rick and Teri Fisher... 
 
Mr. RICK FISHER: I just hope things work out. 
 
SANDERS: ...say holding off a foreclosure can be maddening. They 
thought the bank awarded them a loan modification only to find out 
another division of the bank is moving forward with the foreclosure 
anyway. 
 
Ms. TERI FISHER (Homeowner in Foreclosure): I send the paperwork but 
you don't hear from them. So I'm phone calling and phone calling and 
then you get someone different and you, again get different stories. 
 
SANDERS: A personal crisis for the families. And a still growing crisis for 
the nation's hobbled economy. Kerry Sanders, NBC News, Miami. 
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The refusal of the banks to work with people trying to avoid foreclosure, which means the 
seizing of property by the bank that can now benefit from its re-sale, is illegal. In spite of this, 
the practice became widespread during the great recession, and eventually became a point of 
lawsuits1. However, in the above story, these journalists uncovered this important story, and do 
not appear to have followed it up. Instead, the difficulty of contacting the bank attempting to 
foreclose upon the Fishers’ home was left unexamined and treated as dramatic backdrop to the 
focus of the frame: the dramatic suffering of these individuals.   
 The defining feature of this frame is the narrative arc of an individual or small group of 
individuals moving from fiscally “fine” to “destitute,” then ending in uncertainty. The financial 
crisis fades to the background and remains largely unexamined. There is one other characteristic 
of the survivor stories frame which is a tendency to detail these individual victims’ moral 
qualities, particularly in regard to how they manage their financial life. Below is a piece that 
follows the survivor story frame, aired on ABC News a full year after the initial break-out of the 
financial crisis.  The issue at hand is an interesting one: credit card companies are lowering 
credit limits not based on repayment schedules or income levels, but based upon whether a 
customer shops at high-end retail places or low-end retail places. Prior to the following clip, the 
story is placed within the subject of the recession by the anchors who introduce the issue as a 
way to protect your finances and credit scores during the “uncertain economy,” and point out 
that a bad credit score can hurt your chances of being hired for a new job if you find yourself 
laid-off.   
 
ABC News 
February 3rd, 2009 
“GMA Gets Answers; Protecting Your Credit Limit”  
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS) (Voiceover): Yes, now to “GMA Gets 
Answers," and this morning, important information about your credit 
rating. You could be hurting it without even knowing about it, even if you 
                                                             
1 Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices.(April 2011) Federal Reserve System: Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision. Washington D.C. (see also Wang 2010; Murphy 
2015; Robb 2013). 
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pay your bills on time. At issue, where you shop. And Chris, as always, 
watching your money for you. 
  
Notice how the credit card companies, which are generally very large banks, recede to the 
background of the story: it is the audience, “you,” who may be hurting “your” credit limit. 
Again, this story is episodic and uses the story of one victim (survivor) to explore the issue.  
 
CHRIS CUOMO (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) At just 29 years old, Kevin Johnson is the type of customer most 
credit card companies would want. 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON (CREDIT CARD CUSTOMER) 
Hi, Quentin, this is Kevin Johnson with Johnson Media. 
 
CHRIS CUOMO (Voiceover): The CEO of a PR firm in downtown Atlanta, he 
owns his own home and has what most experts consider a stellar credit 
score, a 764. 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: My dad worked in a credit industry, and so talking about 
finances was a common thing in our household. 
 
CHRIS CUOMO (Voiceover): Johnson says his father taught him to manage 
credit wisely, so two years ago he jumped at the chance to get an American 
Express Blue credit card. 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: They have a wonderful rewards program where I can get 
a lot for my money. 
 
CHRIS CUOMO (Voiceover): He says he never paid late. Never went over 
his limit and rarely carried much of a balance. But in October, while he was 
on his honeymoon, American Express sent Johnson this letter, drastically 
reducing his credit line by $7,000.  
 
The reason for this reduction in credit limit was Mr. Johnson had bought something at a store 
that was located in a poor neighborhood of Atlanta, Georgia. The piece goes through great pains 
to describe Mr. Johnson as someone who is financially savvy – a “stellar” credit score, with a 
background that taught him to “manage credit wisely.” On one hand, holding up a clear case 
highlights the unfairness of what happened to Mr. Johnson. It is easy to discern that his 
reduction in credit limit is due exclusively to his innocent shopping patterns. On the other hand, 
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if this practice is to be considered somehow unfair, it would be just as unfair if it happened to 
somebody who also has the occasional missed payment on their credit card. It would also be 
unfair if the person who shopped at the same store and similarly lost the credit limit was not as 
“wise” in managing their credit because they did not have a father who worked in the credit 
industry. The survivor story frame often puts an inordinate amount of time into the construction 
of the “good victim:” people who clearly did “everything right,” even when it was relevant to 
their fortune or misfortune.  
 In the end, the survivor story frame offers just that, a story. There is little useful 
information beyond the knowledge that you may not be alone if you are also suffering from job 
loss or a foreclosure.  These stories do not provide information or examples of where to go if 
someone finds themselves in foreclosure or without a job, as the financial crisis is treated as a 
natural event which must be endured (Houston et al. 2012).  The “Protecting Your Credit Limit” 
ABC News story, which comes very close to actually breaking the frame and assigning blame, 
instead ends with this rather dismal, defeatist piece of advice.  
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) So, should we pay attention if we were using our credit card 
at a gas station, discount store, things like that? 
 
CHRIS CUOMO (ABC NEWS) Unfortunately, yes. Shouldn't have to. You 
should focus on paying your bill on time but now there are other factors.  
 
In these survivor stories, the focus is placed on human suffering. However, blame is rarely 
placed and instead responsibility is thrust back upon everyday individuals to solve problems 
caused by a global economic crisis. Further, in order to emphasize the suffering, these frames 
tended to take pains to construct victims which were morally “good,” and had no questionable 
actions or characteristics which could be attached to them. As mentioned earlier, this creates a 
double-edged sword. Victims who are uncomplicated will (likely) engender the most 
predictable responses of sympathy or empathy. On the other hand, by only seeing images and 
hearing stories of victims who have “done nothing wrong,” those who may have been less than 
financially “virtuous” – those who may have missed the occasional payment on their bills or 
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took on too much debt – will not find themselves represented. This construction of undeserving 
and deserving victims of financial destitution is echoed in the peer group discussions, and its 
impact on how they understand the financial crisis and recession will be discussed later in the 
chapter.  
 The broader ideological implications of the survivor stories frame will be discussed later 
in this chapter. In the next section, the second frame in the human-interest cluster will be 
discussed: the bootstraps frame.  
The Bootstraps Frame 
 
 The up-beat sister frame to survivor stories is the “bootstraps” frame. This frame is 
fundamentally about personal success in times of personal difficulty.  Like survivor stories, the 
bootstraps frame is framed episodically through a single individual, a small group, or the 
presentation of a rapid succession of individuals. This frame has an inspirational tone and relies 
on framing devices that parallel self-help books and motivational speakers, which encourage 
empowerment through individual positivity (Grodin 1991; Woodstock 2005; Cherry 2008). The 
narrative arc typically starts with a person who has “lost everything” due to the crisis, however 
this person “did not lose hope,” and persevered. Next the individual finds themselves in a new 
situation, whether it’s a new job, or living in a new way, and thus “rebuilding” and returning to 
successful lives. The subjects of these frames often insist that they are “happier now” than 
before the crisis because they have learned important moral lessons of simplicity, humility, or 
gratitude.   
 This story from late January 2009, comes at the height of job layoffs and deep recession 
immediately following the initial crisis of late 2008.  
 
ABC News 
January 26th, 2009 
“Recession Rescue; Adapting to Tough Economy” 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS)  
(Voiceover) Greg Perry's fall sounds like something out of the Great 
Depression. Once a highly-paid mortgage banker, he got laid off. Now he 
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shines shoes. For Greg, a former tank commander in Operation Desert 
Storm, it was... 
 
GREG PERRY (SHOE SHINER) 
Shock, dismay, what am I gonna do now? 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (Voiceover): He's discovered a life with less stress. 
He's grown the shoe shine business from three stands to six. And he's 
learned a lesson. 
 
GREG PERRY: You don't stop. Depression, you know, filters in and can 
take, can get the best of you. I just say, just continue to take, put one step 
in front of the other and believe. 
 
Here you can see the full bootstraps frame. The subject is laid off from his highly-paid, 
prestigious job, but through his own actions alone managed to build a new business that 
is now thriving. In the meantime, he has learned an important moral lesson to “put one 
step in front of the other and believe.” The power of the individual to change their 
circumstances is the critical piece to the bootstraps frame, be it through “hard work” or 
some version of emotional positivity.  The same newscast continues on to another 
couple:  
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) For Michael Arcus and his wife Norma, a similar fall. While 
they kept their jobs, they lost their 4,500 square foot dream house to 
foreclosure and now live in what was a storage room in their office. 
 
MICHAEL ARCUS (LIVING IN OFFICE) 
The house that we used to live in, the closet was about this big. You 
know, I had tears and I've gone through all the emotion and the anger 
and everything else. It's just a house. Where do I have my socks? I think I 
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have them over here. Something that we haven't had to do for better than 
25 years is go to a Laundromat. Now we're doing it again. 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (Voiceover): For showers, they joined an athletic club 
where Michael has managed to lose 30 pounds. For food... 
 
MICHAEL ARCUS: Microwaves, microwave dinners. It's, you know, good 
enough for us. We've got a roof over our head. 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (Voiceover): The message? 
 
MICHAEL ARCUS: I'm nobody, and if I can bounce back from this and 
just say, you know what, dust yourself off, get back up, start doing 
whatever it is you do, and whatever you lost, start making it back. 
 
This bootstraps frame does not end in complete victory for the Arcus family, they are still living 
out their own office. However, there is the same insistence that they are “bouncing back,” and 
are done mourning their loss.  
 The bootstraps frame often comes in the form of these sorts of episodic, personal 
examples. However, throughout the financial crisis and the recession, bootstraps frames also 
came in the form of advice given directly to the viewer, usually from a financial, “job-hunting” 
or employment expert. The narrative arc no longer exists in the form of a story with a traditional 
subject, but in a hypothetical scenario that the viewer is either experiencing or vulnerable to.  
Here is a story with advice offered to those who find themselves suddenly unemployed or 
underemployed (working fewer hours than you would like or at a job that is a lower skill level 
than you are qualified for): 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS: All right. So, if you're underemployed, what are some 
creative ways? What are some things you can do to make up for some 
money? 
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TORY JOHNSON: First, think about how you can do what you do now but 
for more people. So, for example, as long as you don't have a non-
compete with your current employer, can you perform the same skills for 
somebody else, or even for private clients? Maybe if you are an 
accountant or a bookkeeper and you're really comfortable with tax prep 
software, now is really a good time to start advertising your willingness 
and availability to help people with their personal returns. And on 
ABCNEWS.com, we actually have a little bit of text to help you send out 
that email to get started. 
 
TORY JOHNSON: A seamstress who's seen her hours cut at a dry 
cleaner still needs to make up the time someplace else, so she could 
create a flier and go to non-competing dry cleaners to offer her services 
on a freelance part-time basis. So the idea is to create a win/win for 
everybody, to help you recoup some of that money. 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS: And also stepping outside of your comfort zone, if you 
will, outside of something that you normally do, saw this in Boston, what 
you saw with people, how do you go about doing that? 
 
TORY JOHNSON: That's right. Registering for temp agencies is a really 
great way. At the Boston event, we had some temp firms that were there 
and I kept hearing them say to everybody that you can earn a paycheck 
while you're working on your career. There was one woman who's signing 
up to be a substitute teacher one day a week because her office has 
mandated a four hour workweek. Also looking at the help wanted ads 
every Sunday. You know, they're thinner than ever before. But even this 
Sunday, in my 'New York Times" there were 300 job postings. 
... 
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(Off-camera) Very thin, very thin, but still over 300 jobs in here that are 
current, fresh, now, that employers are looking to hire for, many are part 
time. 
  
The bootstraps frame insists that power lies with the person who is facing misfortune. If 
one finds themselves unemployed, they should simply embrace the “win/win” situation of free-
lancing their profession, or any profession, on a part-time basis. The audience is advised to step 
outside of their “comfort zone” to find their next opportunity. This piece reminds their national 
audience that there are a full 300 jobs listed “current, fresh jobs” in the New York Times. Here 
is another example, again from ABC News, about “5 Jobs you can get now.”   
ABC News 
February 17th, 2009 
“5 jobs you can get now; Freelance & Part-Time Opportunities”  
 
TORY JOHNSON (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) Outside of the classroom, really fun thing I think are stadium 
staffers. Aramark, for example, the food services company has 10 staffing 
centers throughout the country. Right now they're gearing up for two 
pretty specific things, one is 500 workers for the largest indoor rodeo in 
Houston, that's going to kick off next month, and the other is a thousand 
seasonal workers for Major League Baseball and the pay for those 
positions ranges from $7.50 to $18 an hour, again, depending on 
experience and location. 
 
Stadium staffing is not typically well-paid or steady work, but the bootstraps frame is 
relentlessly optimistic and instead presents this seasonal minimum wage work as “fun.”  
 
TORY JOHNSON (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) Yes, an interesting area also. How about the valet parking 
attendants for health care facilities. There's a company, Health Care 
Parking Systems that focuses exclusively on that. They operate in 200 
cities. I talked yesterday to the president of the company who said that 
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they're looking for 1,000 part-time workers right now and interestingly 
enough he said the job is 20% parking, but 80% hospitality and guest 
services, so that too cool for school jock isn't going to do as well as 
someone who has like a really pleasing personality, because of the 
environment that they're working in and the pay for that ranges from 
minimum wage to about $15 per hour plus tips, again, based on the shift, 
the location and the experience that you bring. 
 
Those who might not conform to the these type of low-paid service positions’ need for 
“pleasing” personalities are disparaged. To be a “too cool for school jock” is to be somebody 
who does not put their own employment at the top of their personal priorities and thus are 
morally suspect. To reject service work because it requires maintaining a pleasant persona for 
customers is presented as a sort of arrogance. 
 
TORY JOHNSON (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) Yeah, when you like the pet better than the owner, Fetch 
Pet Care is hiring 1,500 pet sitters throughout the country. They are 
operating in I think 37 states and you receive half the money that the 
client pays. So you don't have to line up the customers, but you get the 
money from the services you provide to the pets. 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) These are part-time positions giving us something to think 
about in the meantime, when you're looking for that full time job. Thank 
you Tory. Go to our website for more info. We'll be right back. 
 
Hiring a pet-sitting service is a luxury at the best of times, and is normally required when the 
pet-owner has a job. This story is so dedicated to the understanding of the financial crisis as a 
personal misfortune that it presents a scenario that relies on a pre-crisis economy. There is no 
acknowledgement of the scale of the financial crisis or the widespread impact it would have in 
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the coming years (Robb 2013; Foster & Magdoff 2009). These advice-style bootstraps stories 
often look helpful and hopeful.  However, they follow the same logic as the episodic bootstraps 
stories: the onus of survival lies in the ingenuity of the individual.  
This frame also revolves around a moral command of personal humility in the face of 
adversity. In episodic bootstraps frame, the subjects are not “happier now” because their quality 
of life has improved. They are not more secure or have more opportunity for themselves or their 
families. They are “happier now” because they have found acceptance in their new less wealthy 
and more precarious situations. There is a similar concern in the advice-style bootstraps. Being 
“too cool for school” is a recipe for not finding a job. Precarious, minimum wage work is touted 
as “really fun” rather than financially secure or socially mobile.  
 Here is another bootstraps frame centered on a food bank in Portland, Oregon which 
shows just how important this moral element of personal virtue is to the bootstraps frame. 
Individuals and families who use the food bank are required to volunteer for the food bank in 
return, as well as take a home finances class.   
 
COWAN: Barry and his wife, Suzanne, run Birch Community Services. 
Their goal is to help the working poor. But while the food and the clothes 
are all free, there's still a price to pay. 
 
Ms. SUZANNE BIRCH: People step up or step out, it's that simple. 
 
COWAN: That means no free lunch. To shop here, families pay $50 a 
month for a membership, sort of like Costco. They have to volunteer in 
the warehouse twice a month. 
 
Unidentified Man #2: And let's dive right into it. 
 
COWAN: And they have homework. Families are required to attend at 
least one home finance class as well. 
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The story goes on to show users of the food bank describing the relief that the food bank has 
provided to them at the advent of a job loss or reduction in work hours. Many individuals and 
families turned to food banks across the nation during the great recession, and this story could 
have been told at any one of them. However, the story is done on this particular food bank 
because of its requirement of users to “step-up” and “take-control of their situations.” The story 
becomes not one of shared abundance (food banks are generally stocked with excess food from 
retail outlets that would otherwise be discarded), or a story of charity (many other items are also 
donated). The story of the Portland food bank is of interest to NBC because it is framed as a 
success story. One that is mirrored by the personal story of the food bank owner:   
Ms. JOHNSON: It's stepping up and taking accountability and saying, 
`OK, I need help, but I'm not going to just take. I want to give.' 
 
COWAN: And there are 600 other families just like them, getting a hand 
up, not a handout. It is a remarkable story of success, made even more 
remarkable by the fact that it was born of personal failure. 
 
Mr. BIRCH: When I was 40, I lost everything I had. I was actually eating 
out of a dumpster. 
 
COWAN: Years of alcoholism and gambling had taken their toll. A 
handout wouldn't have helped, accountability did. And a business model 
was born. 
 
Mr. BIRCH: Bless you. 
 
This program is probably 90 percent about people and 10 percent about 
food. And most of the other programs are the reverse. 
 
COWAN: It's not for everybody. Tough love hurts sometimes but it can't 
be quite as tough as the times. Lee Cowan, NBC News, Portland. 
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This “accountability” model, born out of a personal experience of alcoholism and 
gambling, is presented here as a parallel to the users’ current situation of the food bank.  There 
are legitimate discussions about the role of society and the power of the individual in the case of 
personal addictions, and Mr. Birch’s experiences around these issues are legitimate. However, 
this is a curious comparison to someone who lost their job due to the fallout of the practices of 
multinational financial institutions which accumulated into an international crisis. But, true to 
the bootstraps frame narrative, the morality play of a fall coming before a lesson learned is 
framed as the real story. As a logical result, it is decided that these laid off families require a 
“tough love” of finance classes and unpaid volunteer work.  
 It is not only the unemployed or the foreclosed upon who get the bootstraps treatment, in 
this CBS Evening News story, at the height of the original crisis, small businesses are the 
subject focus.  
 
CBS Evening News 
October 14, 2008 
“Dollars and Sense; Where to find capital in the current market”  
 
SANDRA HUGHES reporting: 
Opening a new business in these tough economic times is anything but 
child's play, a fact well known to the new owners of this indoor 
playground in Studio City, California. 
 
Ms. JULIET BOYDSTUN (Small Business Owner): We believe in our 
business and choose to believe that kids are the last things parents stop 
spending money on. 
 
HUGHES: They couldn't count on a conventional bank loan, so they 
looked for money elsewhere. 
 
Here is the same narrative arc. The times are “tough,” and a small business perseveres through 
persistence.  
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Ms. ARISTI CONTOS (Small Business Owner): When I got that phone 
call and they said, you know, `You've been approved,' I called my family 
members immediately and said, `We got it.' 
Tomorrow night we have live music. 
 
HUGHES: Aristi Contos and her family got $1.7 million in an SBA loan 
from Excel Bank to expand the restaurants they've owned for 45 years. It 
was a welcome surprise after they'd been turned down by their longtime 
bank despite good credit. 
 
Ms. CONTOS: We have to be as risk taking as we've always been as 
small business owners and search for those loans, expand as much as 
possible, because this is actually our time to shine. 
 
HUGHES: In spite of the stormy financial outlook, well qualified and 
tenacious businesses can find the money they need to flourish. Sandra 
Hughes, CBS News, Studio City, California. 
 
Thus in the end, despite the actual reality of small businesses (and medium and large sized 
businesses) closing everywhere due to losing their access to credit in a catastrophically locked 
up system (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011), the journalist blithely asserts that “well 
qualified and tenacious businesses can find the money they need to flourish.”  
  The bootstraps frame ultimately ties survival in a difficult economic landscape to 
personal virtue. Those who succeed are those who are able to work hard enough, to humble 
themselves to ever-more precarious employment conditions, and those who are able to 
emotionally accept their losses.  The crisis itself largely falls out of the frame, and narrative 
attention is drawn away from the causes of the crisis and becomes naturalized. The potential 
impact of this is discussed later in the chapter. First is an introduction of the third and final 
member of the bootstraps frame cluster: opportunity in disaster.  
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Opportunity in Disaster 
 
 The “opportunity in disaster frame,” like bootstraps, starts from a place of despair and 
disaster, but frames the crisis as an opportunity to get ahead financially. The point of the 
opportunity in disaster frame is just that; you can get a “great deal” and there are opportunities 
to take advantage of thanks to the crisis.  These opportunities are usually major consumer 
products, particularly houses.  
 
ABC News 
February 4th, 2009 
“$6,900 Home?; Home Sales Increase as Prices Drop” 
  
DIANE SAWYER (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) And now, we wanna bring you up to date on housing in 
America, a perspective across the nation. Word this morning that 
Americans have begun to buy houses again for the first time since last 
summer. It's a surge. And by way of comparison, when the market was 
completely healthy three years ago, it took just three months to sell a 
home. And now, it is taking on average about five months to sell a home. 
And what about the price? It has come down. A year ago, the average 
price of a home in America, $207,000. Today, $175,000. But that's the 
average price, which means a lot of prices out there are a whole lot lower. 
In fact, in some cases, so low, it costs you less than a car, as consumer 
correspondent Elisabeth Leamy found out. 
 
ELISABETH LEAMY (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) An amazing 20% of the homes listed for sale on real estate 
website Zillow.com are priced at less than $100,000 right now.  
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AMY BOHUTINSKY (ZILLOW WEBSITE) 
Buyers are really in the driver's seat to negotiate now. 
 
ELISABETH LEAMY (Voiceover): You can now get a Michigan house for 
the same price as one of the cars that's made there. Which would you 
rather have? This beige three bedroom, two bath house in Muskegon, 
Michigan, or this beige 2004 Chevy Impala, with 93,000 miles? Both 
priced at $6,900. 
 
AMY BOHUTINSKY: You really can create your own bargain no matter 
what home you're looking at. 
 
This piece is typical of the opportunity in disaster frame in how it disconnects the cause of 
low prices from the prices themselves. The houses mentioned in this story are in states that are 
particularly hard hit by the recession and in places in those states that are locally extremely hard 
hit (Foster & Magdoff 2009; The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011). In reality, in order to 
“take advantage” of such an opportunity an individual must have a household income, good 
credit, and a significant amount of liquid capital. If a person lives outside the immediate area 
they would have to have the additional ability to move to the area while maintaining all three of 
those other conditions.  
That nobody is able to meet those requirements are cause-and-symptom of the very 
recession as well as the low housing re-sale prices. Those who are still able to “take advantage” 
of this opportunity would most likely be a very fortunate member of the upper middle classes. 
However, as is typical of the opportunity in disaster frame, the audience is casually addressed as 
if this is the normal, typified situation for them and their families. Other times this frame is 
about giving advice about the “opportunities” that lie in other kinds of investment:  
 
ABC News 
October 9th, 2008 
“The Economy in Crisis; Crashing DOW”  
 
TERRY MORAN (ABC NEWS) 
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(Off-camera) Good evening, everyone. I'm Terry Moran. And let's begin 
with the economy, and some advice. Now, exactly one year ago, the Dow 
reached an all-time high topping 14,000 points. Today, well, the stock 
market sank for a seventh straight day, falling nearly 700 points and 
closing well below 9,000 points. That's a 40% drop in the last year. But 
maybe, just maybe, amid all that financial ruin, you could find some 
opportunity. And tonight our Nick Watt offers a survival guide to help you 
weather the storm and maybe even make some money in this economy 
in crisis. 
 
This use of weather and natural disaster metaphors are common framing devices in the 
opportunities in disaster frame. Importantly, there is no actual advice about “weathering the 
storm” of the financial crisis, and instead the story consists of a list of investments that had good 
rates of return prior to the crisis. These investments include rare coins:  
 
NICK WATT (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) I'm an average guy, I've got a job, I've got a mortgage, I've 
got a family. I've got just a little bit of money tucked away in the bank. So 
what should I be doing right now? Well, this is mini me. He looks like me 
but he wears a coat and tie and has an eye for the unusual. He is going 
to take just a little dip into the murky, shark infested waters of 
investments. So what are we looking at here? 
 
GEOFF ANANDAPPA (STANLEY GIBBONS LTD) 
Well, this is the Great Britain 1851 two-penny violet blue and we are 
selling this for around $35,000. 
 
NICK WATT (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) $35,000. Is that a good investment? 
 
GEOFF ANANDAPPA: I think so. Blue chip. 
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NICK WATT: (Voiceover) For 50 years, the value of rare stamps has 
risen by at least 9% a year. Driven by investors' interest and the passion 
of collectors. 
 
NICK WATT: (Off-camera) Is that going to slow down there? 
 
GEOFF ANANDAPPA:On the contrary, I think it's gonna increase 
because at times when the stock markets are volatile, properties are a bit 
shaky, people put their money into hard assets. 
 
Opportunities also lie in the autographs of famous people:  
 
NICK WATT (Voiceover): Geoff is so confident that he will guarantee in 
writing a 25% increase on your investment over five years. He also sells 
autographs and is similarly bullish.  
 
NICK WATT (Off-camera): Generally worth more if the person is dead? 
 
GEOFF ANANDAPPA:Probably, yes. Yeah. You know that there's never 
going to be any more. 
 
As well as high-end wine: 
  
  
NICK WATT: So, Abraham Lincoln, $25,000. Jessica Alba, $80. If you 
want something that might age better than a starlet, fine wine. 
 
NICK WATT (Off-camera): High-end wine always will have a value. 
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PAULA GOLDING (PREMIER CRU, FINE WINE INVESTMENTS): It will 
always have a value. We have never known a bottle of Bordeaux wine to 
be worth nothing. 
 
It is important to notice that the suggested investments cost tens-of-thousands of 
dollar to enter the market, which is atypical for a standard American family or 
individual. Even more atypical is the following suggestion.   
NICK WATT (Voiceover): Too rich for you? Well, then there's the alpaca, 
a symbol of wealth in ancient Peru, a niche investment in today's 
America. A top notch female might cost you $40,000 but she'll live for 25 
years, grow valuable wool and have lots of babies that you can sell.  
 
Raising livestock of any kind requires an investment of not only the capitol to purchase the 
initial animals, but the land, feed, and time to keep them. However all of these investment 
options are presented as broadly attainable and sound for the average viewer.  
Victimhood Transformed to Heroism  
 
 The human-impact frame cluster does not focus on the individual as an entry into a 
larger story. Instead each frame makes the individual the larger story instead of the financial 
crisis or the recession. When individuals are suffering, as in the survivor story frame, they suffer 
from a financial crisis which is naturalized. Suffering is separated from the actions of the 
financial institutions which ultimately caused it and becomes a spectacle (Kellner 2005).  In the 
bootstraps frame survival becomes attached to virtue and a deeper commitment to the capitalist 
system through dedication to finding work whether or not it sustains someone materially. The 
opportunity in disaster frame frames destruction as an arena for creativity and cunning, as a way 
to get ahead financially due to low prices of investment items, though these low prices are never 
explained.  
 The ideological construction within this frame cluster articulates the victimhood of the 
non-capitalist classes to personal heroism. The reality of class relations and the vulnerability of 
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wage earners becomes a story of the pluck, grit, and virtuous humility of the job seeker. The 
crisis, on the other hand, becomes even more articulated with a natural event, and thus 
capitalism itself becomes articulated with nature. The financial crisis is framed as a natural 
event from which the virtuous heroes emerge renewed in their commitment to their roles as 
worker and consumers.  
 Like the strategy-game frame, the human-impact frame cluster also starves the 
information environment of details regarding the causes of the financial crisis or any related 
policy option. Instead viewers are treated to the details of people’s lives. These stories have 
their own impact on the information environment, as the subjects frequently lead economically 
atypical lives. This human-impact frame cluster is the episodic treatment of the financial crisis. 
These frames are the result of news organizations trying to communicate the human cost of the 
financial crisis – a story that absolutely deserves telling. However, because frames by their very 
nature highlight some aspects of reality while relegating others to the background it is important 
to ask the question: what, specifically, is being highlighted in this new reality and what is being 
relegated to the background?  For all three of these human interest sub-frames, “average” people 
are the obvious highlight.  Indeed, the structures and wording of these stories imply heavily that 
these are the stories that are expected to be the most relatable to the news audience itself. And, 
there’s a particular story to be told about these “average” people (who are like the audience):  
1.) They are firmly in the middle or upper-middle class. 
2.) They used to be secure in their material future, but they are now not.  
3.) The stories that get told are for those who “did everything right.”  
Interestingly, there is nothing “average” about this picture of the average person. Those who 
are relegated to the background include the lower-middle, working classes, and those in deep 
poverty. Those who were already not secure in their material future become invisible. Those 
who did not always pay their credit card on time, or perhaps got too large a mortgage (which, 
again, was a large part of the crisis), do not get their stories told. The information environment 
becomes stocked with images of a world that consents, wholly and cheerfully, to the capitalist 
system. Returning to the definition of cultural hegemony as a continual process of consent, we 
can see how the media functions as a hegemonic apparatus at this time of crisis in the ruling 
order. The human-impact frame cluster constructs what are essentially role models of 
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enthusiastic consent and presents them as normal. These consenting every-men’s activities of 
participation in the capitalist system – their search for work, their purchase of commodities and 
investment products – are then heroized and presented as the path to happiness.  
  The peer groups had a more complex relationship with the human-impact frame cluster 
than the strategy-game frame, largely due to the fact that when it came to being victimized by 
the financial crisis participants had plenty of their own experiences to draw from. In the next 
section of this chapter, participants’ own victim stories will be introduced and discussed, along 
with their beliefs in personal responsibility and the moral decay of American culture.  
PEER GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Victim Stories and the Belief in Personal Responsibility and Moral Decay 
 
This next part of the chapter describes three discussion themes and frames which came 
up in all discussion groups, termed “survivor stories,” “the belief in personal responsibility,” 
and “moral decay.” These frames played a very different role in conversation than the belief in 
dysfunctional government. Where the belief in dysfunctional government came out in 
discussion early, often, and had significant passion behind it, these frames weaved in and out of 
discussions without much structure.  In the associations exercises they appeared with vague 
terms like “greed” and “irresponsibility” as the participants attempted to describe something 
akin to an ethical state of being than an institution. The emotions behind these frames were also 
mixed, sometimes stated as simple facts, sometimes with condemnation, and other times with an 
uneasy lack of conviction. Most importantly, once analyzed, the frames of personal 
responsibility and moral decay were discovered to be associated with pauses in conversation 
and statements of not knowing enough information. Participants seemed to reach for these 
frames when they were lacked other available explanations. The importance of this will be 
discussed in a later section, but first is an introduction to the first frame – participants’ stories of 
victimization during the financial crisis and economic recession.  
Victim Stories 
 
Unlike the previous chapter where participants had no personal interaction with national 
level politics, victim stories were a topic where participants had very little need to reference the 
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media. In Talking Politics (1992) Gamson hypothesized individuals would employ different 
strategies to utilize media information in their daily lives.  He predicted some people would 
have an “integration strategy,” in which they would be “selectively influenced by the relative 
prominence of media frames, responding to the degree that these frames are consistent with 
their popular wisdom and experiential knowledge.”  The result is a worldview that is 
“constrained by media discourse, but relatively immune to differences in the relative 
prominence of visible frames” (Gamson 1992, p.196).  
This hypothesis seems to bear out in these discussions.  Participants used multiple 
strategies for integrating media information, popular wisdom, and personal experience which 
were often employed by the same individuals depending upon the topic at hand. The belief in a 
dysfunctional government discussed in the previous chapter did not appear to be influenced by 
personal experiences - participants cited none and they would logically have had few.  When it 
came to survivor stories, however, participants had plenty from their experiences and those of 
their community.  
 Without prompting, participants often shared their experiences of the financial crisis and 
recession. These were usually the most emotionally charged parts of the discussions. These 
stories are important as they are the backdrop against which facts and stories from the media 
about the financial crisis and recession are understood. Participants’ victim stories did not 
conform to a narrative of a “before” that was good followed by an event that brought downfall 
as seen in the media’s survivor story frame. Instead, participants’ stories usually started at the 
beginning of the event and moved simply to consequences which were still being dealt with. 
The participants’ stories were expressions of fear, disappointment, and rupture.  For 70-year-old 
Judith, the financial crisis hit just after her husband had died.  
Judith: The [experience] I remember was watching my investment 
portfolio taking a deep nose dive and sitting on a couch and not having a 
clue what to do about it because my husband had always taken care of 
that and I thought “it will be okay, it will be okay, it will be okay.” And then, 
all of a sudden, I realized probably it wasn't going to be okay and there 
was some things that happened that turned out to be a blessing because 
I was just... in the end I was changing it myself and redoing these things 
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for the first time after he had done it for 40 years. Over time it has 
recovered, but it was very scary. 
 
 In the end, Judith had to sell her house and move across the country. She now rents a 
small apartment on what is left of her retirement.  Participants’ survivor stories show how 
personal experiences can overtake media narratives in how an individual understand an issue or 
event, what Gamson (1992) called ‘personal strategies.’ These personal experiences are tools 
people use to make sense of the world around them, and Gamson predicted when people use 
these personal strategies they “are relatively immune to media effects, ignoring or discounting 
the relative prominence of frames, including even those that support their experiential 
knowledge and popular wisdom” (p.180).  
 As nearly every participant had some sort of survivor story of their own, media frames 
did take a backseat when discussion turned to the impact or effects of the financial crisis and 
recession. At no point did participants end their tales as the media bootstraps and opportunity in 
disaster frames with a moral lesson learned and/or a statement of being “happier now.”  Instead, 
participants reported experiencing permanent shifts in their attitudes toward their own financial 
and material security. What is present in the participants’ victim stories but not the media’s 
survivor story frame is a sense of change - a sense that things today are markedly different from 
what they were before. Every group reported worrying more about their futures and the futures 
of those around them than they had before the recession. The media survivor story frame, by 
contrast, often presented the crisis as naturalized – a cyclical, predictable, causeless disaster. 
The teacher focus group often spoke through their professional experience with their students, 
and change, or the perception of it, was repeatedly brought up.   
 
Mark:  ‘Cause I’m not in the social studies, I’m not seeing that regularly 
...it’s not been in the kind of magazines that I’m reading, learning about… 
but I agree with Steven that I’ve seen some of that same kind of decline 
[in student quality], and their skills sets. 
And decline in their technologies that they have [access to] like ah, a lot 
of my assignments, I ask, I require that they are typed and a lot of 
students are unable to accommodate that. They don’t have that access at 
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home or, or it’s always broken or they have to share with three other 
siblings and they couldn’t get on it to do that.  
So, a lot of assignments have to be in written because of that, and 
obviously I will always accept that but … it’s just something I’ve noticed. 
 
 Other participants admitted it had been “easier” for them to establish themselves and 
survive financially when they were younger, in contrast to what they were observing with their 
children moving into adulthood. Many of the participants were older and more established in 
their careers. Because of this many were in a better position to weather the effects of the crisis 
and their victim stories were actually about their adult children. This was particularly the case 
for the group of nurses.  Four of the five had adult children (over the age of 21), while the fifth 
had four young children. All of the four nurses with adult children were supporting them in very 
significant ways, by either paying a significant portion of their living expenses or by having 
their children and grandchildren live with them: 
Linda:  My daughter is 36.  She lost her job and she couldn't pay rent so 
she and her kids had to move in with me.  Otherwise, she'd be on the 
streets. 
Nancy:  I've got a daughter.  Well, my daughter that came back from, 
from, uh, Europe, from Asia, you know, she's working in Houston, but she 
is just barely making it from paycheck to paycheck.  She can't find a good 
paying job.  She works on commission.  She doesn't get any paid 
vacation or holidays or nothing.  She takes day off.  She's just out of 
money, you know.  And, and she's just struggling.  My other daughter that 
lives with me, she was unemployed for a year.  She just finally found a 
job just as her unemployment was running out.  Um, her unemployment, 
um, I helped her buy a car so she wasn’t using her [unemployment] 
checks to buy a car, or you know, to make her car payments, so that she 
could look for a job.  You know, I am paying all of the bills at home.  I'm 
supporting paying for her kids for clothes and she's, while she's not 
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buying groceries.  But, you know, it's just, um -- There's not enough help 
for the people that are really, really trying. 
Susan:  And this is something close to home for you.  I have my college 
graduate daughter.  She got a part time job but that fortunately for her, 
somebody had just, uh, decided to put in a resignation so she had an 
opportunity within after being hired to go full time and she was fortunate 
to get that.  But the majority of the people she's still in touch with that she 
graduated with, majority still are looking for have not found a job yet.  And 
she recognizes how fortunate she was, but it's still very low paying job 
and no benefits, you know, and...you know, just that kind of thing.  But 
still, I mean, it's just different from when we were college graduates, I still 
feel.  It's because mostly part time is only out there for new grads, it 
seems like, and it's just not like it was. 
 Though participants were utilizing their own personal stories they shared an interest in 
the question of personal and financial virtue similar to the media bootstraps frame cluster. Those 
who shared their survivor stories stressed that they and their children had “done nothing 
wrong.” Some participants specifically stated that they wouldn’t have extended such aid to their 
children had they become destitute because of “drugs or something.” This construction of the 
“good victim” both highlights actual injustice as well as necessarily excludes some people into a 
“deserving victim” category. 
 
 
 
Personal Responsibility and Moral Decay 
 
The ‘integration strategy’ or interaction between received information from the media 
and experienced information from everyday life can be broken down into three further types. 
The first is replacement. When someone employs a replacement strategy, personal experience is 
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the preferred or only way that an issue is discussed, and input from the media is not brought in 
at all. This was the strategy behind participants’ victim stories. Another strategy is to partially 
adopt media frames and mix them with personal experiences and cultural wisdom. Evidence 
that this sort of strategy is employed is the use of vague indicators (“I hear,” “these people,” 
“people out there”) demonstrating an issue is not being processed exclusively through personal 
experience (Bauer & Gaskell 2000; Corbin & Strauss 2007). These ideas can be the products of 
second-hand discussions and conversations with others, “popular wisdom’ grounded in 
traditional and popular culture, or stories from the media. Often, they are the mix of all three. 
These discussions often mirror themes or frames that can be found in news stories and in 
general cultural beliefs. Both of the previous two interactions can coincide with a third 
interaction (or non-interaction) – lack of alternative information or interpretation. Notably, and 
typically, this is often a failure to notice or articulate structural issues or causal events – the sort 
of information that will not typically come from normal everyday experiences, but instead from 
either formal education or some form of journalism.  
Contradicting the statements that participants and those closest to them “did nothing 
wrong,” was a repeated return to a discussion of personal responsibility, particularly in regard to 
personal finances. The personal responsibility theme is demonstrably not ‘bootstraps,’ nor 
‘opportunity in disaster.’  Personal responsibility was a theme that focused upon the prevention 
of personal disaster rather than on a good outcome following the fallout of the crisis. There was 
very little confidence that one could simply “rebuild” without a corresponding recovery in 
opportunities or wages. However, this theme had a confused quality; participants would speak 
in terms of a general morality like ‘greed,’ and ‘impatience,’ and these terms would be applied 
as equally to their neighbors as to large central bankers. This would often also be presented in a 
narrative of general moral decay within the culture – the evidence for this was often given in the 
behavior of unspecified others or, very surprisingly, young children.  
 
Sharon: Yeah, I just spent 3 days with my grandkids and I’m telling you 
everything is “right now, right now, right now.” 
 
Patty: Exactly. 
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Sharon: Not only that, they’re so wasteful. 
 
Patty: Yes. 
 
Sharon: It kills me how wasteful.  
 
Karen: Wasteful meaning they want it right now, but in 10 minutes they 
want something else and that thing  gets thrown away or tossed out, or 
whatever.  
 
Sharon: Yeah.  Very... very, they have this.... I think that, they must think 
that money just grows on trees because they think. ...Mom and Dad give 
them everything; they are 6, 8, and 10  
 
Patty: What I wanted to add...what amazes me is that, I’m trying to 
breathe, technology has us throwing stuff out ...you know computers, 
games,  whatever, I think technology has something to do with it. 
 
Barbarah: Like every 6 months you need to get an update. 
 
Patty: Oh yeah, and you can pull stuff up so fast on the computer.  I 
mean we are so used to just pulling up their phone just have information 
in there. I think that kind of teaches us to expect things. 
          
Betty: Like the grandchildren I have who have an iPhone 5, say they 
“have to have the iPhone 6.” 
 
Sharon: Not only that, when we were camping they were shocked that 
they had to leave their electronics at home.  
 
Barbarah: Oh, my goodness. 
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Sharon: They do not know what to do with themselves if they are not 
constantly stimulated, constantly, constantly, they don’t know what to do, 
they’re bored, “I’m bored, I’m bored.” 
 
Barbarah: And adults that have phones - that is fascinating to me. I’m 
really, it’s just something I think how the brain works and that human 
chemistry becomes so dependent and fixated or kind of mesmerized by 
that technology. 
  
It seemed to be lost at this point of discussion that not a single child caused the crisis or 
recession. Active information seekers and others who had contradicting personal experience 
often resisted this turn in conversation, usually by pointing out the predatory tactics of 
institutions that were granting loans to middle and low income households. However, these 
people carried the burden of having to introduce new information to the group for the first time. 
The new frame was not rejected outright by the rest of the group and many participants even 
nodded in agreement with the point, but the new frame did not “stick.”  Conversation instead 
bounced back to the personal responsibility and moral decay themes.  This shared similarities 
with the media frame of “moral decay” which was found infrequently in the news content 
samples, typically in segments of FOX News:  
 
FOX News O’Reilly Factor 
October 3rd, 2011  
“Amanda Knox is Free; Spinning the Economy; Campaign Controversy; 
Class Warfare” 
 
O'REILLY: So it comes down to this. You, the American voter, will 
eventually have to make the call between the two strategies. "Talking 
Points" does not believe the Democrats are in a strong position because 
the debt is just too huge and blaming Mr. Bush is just too old. 
Of course, I could be wrong because there is one other thing in play here. 
We are becoming a nation of excuse-makers. Younger Americans 
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especially have a tendency to accept excuses for bad behavior and 
failure no matter how outlandish those excuses are. Our culture has 
shifted from personal responsibility to, "It's somebody's else's fault if I 
don't do well." 
These frames were so infrequent that it is difficult to describe shared characteristics, however it 
clearly shares this concern of a national, cultural decline in character.  
Below is this discussion as it occurred in the bible study group. Judith had a son who had 
worked at a bank approving home loans, and so she knew how predatory many mortgages were 
thanks to her son explaining what he did in the course of his job. In the middle of a discussion 
about “irresponsibility” being a key cause of the crisis, she tried to point this out:  
 
Gary: I guess, yeah, homeowners living outside their means, getting 
second or third mortgages and realizing that all of a sudden that actually 
without their credit cards they can't afford anything. 
 
Judith: I remember my son was working for a bank at that time, and he 
said he was having trouble sleeping at night because he would have the 
young couples come in they would be approved for a loan that he was 
certain they were not able to afford and then he would be telling them that 
they were approved for this loan. And after watching all that happen he 
ended up finding a 1950s house that made...that needed a lot of updating 
and repair and so forth, so he wouldn't be in that situation.  I mean, it was 
just a lesson for him.  
 
Gary: ... no, like personal irresponsibility covers all the gamblers, I mean, 
it's the bankers, it's the loan lenders, it's the homeowners, it's the-- people 
go into business and anybody who gets... 
 
Judith’s information, coming from second-hand experience of her son is very important and 
directly related to the causes of the financial crisis. However, the less informed Gary redirects 
the conversation towards what he seems to feel is a more comprehensive answer; an overall 
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moral decline where people of all levels of society being equally irresponsible. The rest of the 
group, also lacking Judith’s personal insight, follow along: 
 
Terry: When I worked construction we did a lot of projects that we knew 
our clients shouldn't be doing it was that sort of a thing and they did it 
they handle money at the moment. 
 
Gary: And it was systemic. 
 
Terry: Right. 
 
Judith: I know at that bank he was experiencing... he knew it was wrong. 
He didn't feel it was right, he didn't stay with the bank, but he didn't leave 
it either because he had a family to feed, so, it is a... 
 
Gary: It’s systemic because that's been the deal. 
 
Terry: ... systemic. 
     
By “systemic,” I suspect they mean something closer to “pervasive,” meaning 
irresponsibility could be found everywhere and not that there was an institutional or cultural 
structure moving individual actions toward irresponsibility. The bible study group, like most 
groups, seemed to lack the sort of understanding of the crisis and recession that would allow for 
a “systemic” level critique.   
The teachers had similar difficulty contextualizing their personal experiences within the 
crisis. In the following example, the discussion was at this point about the declining skill levels 
among their students, and the school counselor in the discussion group pointed out that many of 
their students now lived out of cars or with grandparents and frequently missed meals. Yet, the 
conversation drifted back to the moral destruction wreaked by the presence of smart phones.  
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Mark:  All technology, all technology is causing, you know, some of these 
kids to become stupid actually.  They sit in front of these video games all 
day long and do nothing else, I mean, it’s, it’s -- 
Nicole:  Or even on their iPhone, like, we’re talking about how much the 
economy has affected them, I mean I still see people like all of my kids 
have seemed, most of my kids have Smart Phones. 
David:  Mom and Dad’s plan was to save to pay for that themselves but 
the kids had to have it.  
 
Interestingly, Mark had just moments before stated that an increasing amount of his students did 
not have access to a single computer at home.  
The personal responsibility theme consistently appeared at the beginning of a topic or 
when there was a lull at the end when a topic had been otherwise exhausted. The reliance and 
preference for the personal responsibility frame, which is notably never applied to the 
participants themselves, appears to result from a combination of personal experience and a lack 
of access to alternative frames. For explanation of the financial crisis, the recession, and the 
precarity of the American middle class participants struggled to articulate or understand the 
structural issues in the economy or the actions of major financial and political institutions. 
Instead, they reached for the more familiar ground of their students, their grandchildren, and 
their neighbors with the big house. These are personally accessible pieces of information that 
are filling a void of more systematic explanations. Within these appeals to morality is a 
potentially legitimate critique of a culture that encourages materialism and acquisitiveness, but 
it is not developed nor is it empathetic.  Instead it appears in a context that is clearly 
condemnatory.  
There was a tendency towards a conflation of villains where, in the minds of 
participants, greedy banks were hand-in-hand with their victims in culpability for the crisis.  
This overwhelming power given to personal responsibility as a way to understand the nature of 
the financial crisis would be a hard belief to reconcile with an understanding of the systemic 
actions of professionals and the deconstructions of legal protections that occurred for decades 
leading up to the crisis. However, given how little the participants were able to recall about the 
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foundational causes of the crisis, there was likely no need to reconcile that belief with 
knowledge because they simply did not have this information. Personal responsibility and moral 
decay themes were instead the fallback explanations when faced with an informational vacuum.   
The Practice of Not Sharing Stories  
 
In spite of how often participants expressed a profound experience of change, and in spite 
of the emotional power many of their survivor stories had, for many participants the discussion 
groups were the first time that they had actually shared their stories out loud. For others, it was 
the first time that they had explicitly connected these experiences to the financial crisis or 
recession.  Even the teachers, who had the experiential advantage of knowing hundreds of their 
students’ experiences in addition to their own, reported they had never made the connection 
between the struggles experienced by their students and the recession until the group discussion. 
David: The residual toll has been taken. 
Mark: So I’ve, I’ve noticed the, the skills, the overall skill set of the 
students that are coming in is deteriorating, ... there are more less adept 
readers, they’re less adept at writing...in we’re having to remediate or 
we’re having to try build skills, that we used to be able to assume the kids 
had at a certain level that we are seeing here.  
That’s—they’re not at level anymore, or fewer kids are at the level that we 
used to see.  
David: Yeah, that’s probably the best way to frame that. 
Mark:    I must say though I’ve never associated that decline, and I’ve 
seen in my years of teaching with the decline in the economy. I’ve never 
thought... 
David: Hmm. Yeah.  
 
 Like the habit of turning to some sources of information and not seeking others as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the participants again have provided insight into another key 
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practice which keeps them aligned with cultural hegemony in spite of their discontent. If 
“practice is a way of knowing, and how we live our lives is how we know our lives …[and] we 
understand the world through our participation in economic, political, and cultural practices” 
this includes these practices of not sharing personal experiences of economic hardship (Artz & 
Murphy 2000, p.27). Many participants shared similar experiences of hardship during the 
economic crisis, and yet were unaware of the hardships of their friends and co-workers simply 
because it was not in their normal practice to discuss these things. 
  There are a multitude of effects this may have on an individual and a community. In 
regards to the information climates of these participants, they are now also devoid of 
experiences which are similar to theirs from their own community. What is interesting is that as 
soon as these experiences were shared in context of a discussion amongst their peers, individual 
participants were able to make connections between things they had experienced (like students 
who were less prepared for school) and the financial crisis and recession in a way they had not 
achieved in the six years since the crisis.  
SUMMARY  
Survivor stories, personal responsibility, and collective action frames  
 
 There is very little ground shared between the media’s bootstraps frame cluster and 
collective action frames.  Only the first sub-frame, survivor stories, has the potential to foster a 
sense of injustice, as the suffering of “average” people is one half of the requirement to fulfill 
the injustice element. However, the other half of injustice is to tie that suffering to the actions of 
human beings. This does not happen within the frame. Any connection made by the audience 
between the suffering detailed in a survivor story and the malfeasance of a group of individual 
actors (those who performed the actions that resulted in the crisis) would have to be made in the 
interpretation of the audience. This requires them to have the information from prior news 
stories of a different frame. Theoretically this is not a difficult interpretive task and it is possible 
that this frame combines with other into a whole picture of injustice. How likely audiences are 
to come across this other half of the frame will be discussed in the final chapter.  
As for agency and identity, bootstraps and opportunity in disaster frames convey 
efficacy, but not “the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through 
collective action” (Gamson 1992: 7).  Within the logic of these frames, the individual has 
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extraordinary powers to find new employment, find creative investments, and exploit all sorts of 
eccentric financial opportunities. And, if these things fail, the individual also has infinite ability 
to find a spiritual sort of acceptance in their current plight.  However, it is clear that what the 
individual cannot do is to band together to change the basic circumstances of their situation.  In 
one of the above examples, it is even explicitly stated; 
 
ROBIN ROBERTS (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) So, should we pay attention if we were using our credit card 
at a gas station, discount store, things like that? 
CHRIS CUOMO (ABC NEWS) Unfortunately, yes. Shouldn't have to. You 
should focus on paying your bill on time but now there are other factors. 
Chris Cuomo openly admits to an injustice in the actions of a credit card company, but the 
solution is to simply comply with their new demands. In these human-interest frames, there is 
no “we,” merely “I.”  
 When presenting the financial crisis in episodic terms, through small and personalized 
stories journalists are taking a massive event and telling it through the story of a single point of 
experience. However, when the discussion participants used their own experiences to 
understand the crisis, it is better understood as going the opposite direction, from small story to 
larger story. What happened to them is the main reality, and it is up to the participants to link it 
to the broader financial crisis. Lang and Lang (1981) argued that “low threshold” issues – issues 
where average individuals would have personal experiences to draw their understanding from – 
would prefer their experiences over those presented by the media. In the group discussions, 
participants readily used and shared their personal experiences but seemed to struggle to link 
them meaningfully to the financial crisis. They, of course, understood that these experiences 
were a result of the financial crisis, but they did not use them to probe or question media-
received understandings. Moreover, they would as often draw from erroneous experiences like 
how their grandchildren or students interacted with personal media technology for their 
understanding of what had happened to cause the crisis. 
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 Overall, there is a mixed and contradictory understanding of the impact of the financial 
crisis. Participants had sympathy for themselves and close neighbors, but still had some 
impression of a mass of financially immoral “others.” These appear to be dueling frames which 
participants switched rapidly between: one from personal experience and one from received 
cultural and media themes. What is most interesting is that these frames were never presented as 
conflicting – often both would come from the statements of the same individual in the course of 
a couple of minutes.  
One of the most vexing qualities to survey based research is the apparent ability of 
surveys to completely switch public opinion majorities through simple changes to question 
wording (Lewis 2001; Michael X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). One of the theories attempting 
to explain this phenomenon is that different words can “trigger” different explanatory frames  
(Lewis 2001). This appears to happen in conversation as well. In the same conversation 
participants switched readily from one theme to the other: from moral decay to personal 
responsibility to injustice and then back again and all without any apparent conflict. Like the 
survivor stories media frame, the telling of victim stories has the potential of feeding into a 
narrative of injustice, particularly as participants emphasized a sense of significant change. 
There was an expressed belief that things today are not what they were years before and that 
turn has been made for the worse. The survivor stories in the media, on the other hand, tend to 
emphasize a sense of nature, cycles, and inevitability.  
When there has been a significant change for the worse in human experience, there is a 
preferred state that used to exist, and the decline is potentially the fault of human actors. 
Conceptualizing all of these elements is all required for the full manifestation of a sense of 
injustice.  Peer group discussions of their victim stories are then merely one half of a full 
injustice narrative. It has the potential to be connected cognitively and conversationally with the 
actions of humans and an understanding of structural conditions, but those are not made in this 
conversation.  
 Agency is a complex issue in regard to the themes of survivor stories and personal 
responsibility. In telling their victim stories, participants actively deny their own agency in their 
personal lives (or that of their families, or individuals that they identify/sympathize with).  They 
“do everything right” or at least “do nothing wrong,” and yet are unable to better their situation 
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or avoid financial misfortune. The system, whatever it is, seems to not serve them or people like 
them. They express feelings of anger and despair over this sense of inevitability.  
On the other hand, this understanding of “there’s nothing I (or they) could have done,” is 
undercut by the personal responsibility and moral decay themes. Like the bootstraps frame, 
individuals are understood to have quite a bit of power in crafting their fate. The difference 
between the media frames and the participants’ belief in personal responsibility is participants 
imagine this power for the individual to be in protecting themselves from crises, rather than 
being able to help themselves recover from one.  Ultimately, neither of these themes 
demonstrates an understanding of a solution through collective action.  Instead the 
understanding is of an unfortunate event which had unfair consequences for the fiscally virtuous 
and entirely predictable, fair, consequences for the fiscally irresponsible. 
 In regard to the element of identity, it was interesting that most participants confessed to 
discussing this topic rarely even though they all had been personally impacted in one way or 
another. On a community level, it was clear that no “we” was being built prior to the discussion 
groups.  During the group discussions, the themes of victim stories and personal responsibility 
build potential forms of identity.  Through the telling of victim stories, the ‘we’ are the friends 
and family of the participants - normal people who “did everything right” and yet still are not 
able to obtain financial security - but the “they” is merely implied. Participants did not explicitly 
connect their struggles with the actions of other people who are responsible for their suffering. 
Personal responsibility, on the other hand, constructs a clear “they” – those who are 
irresponsible with their money, those who are too greedy, and those who have different values 
in relation to their work or material acquisition.  This construction of the identity other is so 
expansive here that it includes everything from bankers down to the participants’ young 
grandchildren.  
Isolated Suffering without Context 
 
If we return to Williams’ (1977) notion of emergent and residual cultural practices, like 
strategy-game frame, the human-impact cluster of frames can also be understood as arising out 
of a residual practice. These frames are the financial crisis versions of known frame types, 
notably the human-impact frame (W. Russel Neuman, Marion R. Just 1992) and general 
episodic frames (Iyengar 1991a). Both are favored heavily by journalists in making sense of 
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issues and events.  Also like strategy-game frame, the results in this chapter suggest this frame 
cluster has a dominant relationship to the broader hegemonic system because it largely 
reinforces the status quo:  
 
The interpretations and spins we put on social reality are chosen from an existing 
set of visions and relations based on commodity production. The contradictions 
and inequities of commodity capitalism are not understood as structural defects, 
however, but experienced in hegemonically ideological terms as individual or 
group inadequacies. (Artz & Murphy 2000, pp.235–236) 
 
  
When the financial crisis is narrated through a survivor story, a bootstraps frame, or an 
opportunity in disaster the economic system is understood not as a human construction but as a 
naturalized system to which there is no alternative. The causes of the crisis recede into the 
background where no questions are asked and no person or institution is held accountable. 
Instead accountability is projected onto the crisis victims. These victims are turned into heroes if 
their response to their victimization is to commit themselves further to a capitalist system in the 
form of seeking a job or building a business while simultaneously expecting less recompense. 
With these hero stories come sub-textual warning to those victims who may not have dedicated 
themselves enough to “hard-work” before the crisis by suggesting they may not be victims at all 
but merely facing the consequences of their own laziness or foolishness. 
 These frames ideologically encourage viewers to turn their attention to issues of 
individual worthiness and to hypothetical opportunities in employment or investment rather than 
to understanding the crisis as an event with systemic causes. Victimhood is re-narrated and 
articulated with heroism and rugged individualism, and capitalism becomes articulated with 
nature. The impact of this frame cluster on the information environment for potential viewers of 
television news is that it remains empty of factual and systematic understanding of the crisis and 
its causes. Also like strategy-game frame, this individualist cluster of frames keeps the 
information environment free of facts regarding any potential solutions to the recession or the 
economic insecurity being experienced by the average news viewer. 
 This process of framing the financial crisis in personal narratives of disaster, heroism, 
and opportunity supports an ideological understanding of suffering as a result of the financial 
crisis as personal failure and isolated experience.  In the face of an information environment that 
167 
 
did not support other interpretations, the discussion groups demonstrated Therborn’s hegemonic 
processes of displacement and isolation (Therborn 1983). Therborn argued class antagonisms 
often get projected onto other social characteristics, and this is one way that we can understand 
the repeated turn in discussion to a theme of moral decay. Unarmed with knowledge that would 
tie their personal experiences of the recession with the events in the crisis participants began to 
speak of others who lacked the same qualities that formed the heroes in the bootstraps narrative. 
Rendered suspect were all those who displayed insufficient commitment to work, job-seeking, 
personal finances, and particularly material austerity and humility – up to and including their 
own children and grandchildren. 
 Causes of the financial crisis were understood by these groups more as the greed of 
everyday homeowners rather than the institutions which knowingly sold them their risky 
mortgages. Anger that could be turned towards the banks is thus turned back on hypothetical 
neighbors and spoiled children. This same lack of understanding of the financial crisis seemed 
to combine with the participants’ practice of not discussing politics or their own economic 
vulnerability with each other to form Therborn’s final hegemonic tool of isolation, where 
members of the subordinate class do not understand themselves as such and are unable to 
connect with their class as a whole.  
What these results suggest is that cultural hegemony does not have to deny the existence 
of suffering, just make sure that it is experienced within hegemonic roles. Individualist frames, 
combined with a sparse information environment and a practice amongst participants of not 
discussing their plight socially meant the crisis was experienced as individual consumers and 
job seekers rather than as a vulnerable class that experiences the consequences of the decisions 
and practices of the capitalist class without any power to influence those decisions or practices.  
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CHAPTER 5 
POPULISM   
 
 The second most prominent frame found through the qualitative frame analysis of financial 
crisis news coverage was a genuine surprise. Generally, media research would predict that the 
news would be unlikely to produce anti-elite frames or narratives (McChesney 1997; Herman & 
Chomsky 1988; Behr & Iyengar 1985; Bartels 2008). Yet one of the most prominent frames 
found in the coverage of the financial crisis can only be described as populist. Even more 
surprising, this frame was echoed in the peer discussion groups. Antonio Gramsci described 
cultural hegemony as a system of dominance that was always under some level of contention. 
Consent is a continual process of orienting beliefs and practices towards the dominant hierarchal 
system, and this chapter discusses a point where this system of consent may have become 
strained.  
 In the following chapter, the populist media and discussion frames will be discussed. 
First there is a demonstration of how the media constructed the classic populist dichotomy of 
the “elite” and “the people.” Next these constructions will be examined as they relate to the 
broader capitalist hegemony and to the elements of a collective action frame. The populist frame 
build by the peer groups in their discussion of the financial crisis and recession will be 
demonstrated and examined. Finally, it will be discussed whether this populism truly constitutes 
the formation of a counter-hegemony to the dominant American capitalist system.  
A Challenging Concept 
 
Populism is a challenging concept to work with academically, Ernesto Laclau 
acknowledged “few [concepts] have been defined with less precision ...we know intuitively to 
what we are referring when we call a movement or an ideology populist, but we have the 
greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts” (1977, p.43). The struggle to 
translate populism into a concept we can operationalize as a field has led some scholars to call 
for its abandonment as a theoretical construct altogether, arguing that it is not specific enough to 
have analytical merit and instead more specific terms should be used (Bale, Van Kessel, and 
Taggart 2011; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Ionscu and Gellner 1969; Jansen 2011; 
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Meny and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001).  Jansen (2011) goes so far to argue that 
populism is so ill-defined that it should never be used in social science at all. 
Suspicion towards populism appears to be largely a result of its ability to catch in its 
conceptual net a surprisingly wide variety of political movements throughout recent history. For 
example, populism has been applied equally to the charismatic authoritarian regimes of Latin 
America and to the uprising of late 19th century Russian farmers (Canovan 1981; Laclau 2005). 
This should rightly warrant a closer look at the functionality of the term. However, Laclau and 
others have suggested that the ability of populism to appear repeatedly across disparate times 
and cultures is not a flaw of the concept but a sign of its utility (Laclau 2005; Moffitt & Tormey 
2014; Woods 2014). These theorists point out that for populism to be useful we should approach 
it as a rhetorical and ideological perspective which is dependent upon cultural and political 
context by those adopting it for its salience. Populism is a template of understanding that can 
illuminate basic social power relations in otherwise disparate cultural, political realities.  
The problem many theorists struggle with when working with populism as a concept is a 
result of demanding too much of this otherwise useful blueprint to social understandings of 
hierarchy. Populism is a category of type, and the identification of populism in any given time 
and place is not an end to analysis but an insight that points the way to further investigation. 
Jägers and Walgrave (2007) take the necessary step back in defining populism which reveals its 
analytical usefulness: 
 
Populism always refers to “the people” and it justifies its actions by appealing to 
and identifying with the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it considers 
the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some 
very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy. (p.322)  
 
Similarly, a working definition from Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012): 
 
Populism is a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and 
the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which  argues that politics should be an expression of the 
general will. (p.8) 
 
It is the “thin centered” nature of populism which makes it difficult to operationalize. 
“Populism,” explains Woods (2014) “is not a theory in terms of having a system of self-
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consistent assumptions….it is a robust concept that is easily fitted into different theoretical 
frameworks” (p.4).  Another concept which functions this way is authoritarianism. An ideology, 
political platform, or leadership style can be described accurately as authoritarian in addition to 
being a number of other more culturally and structurally specific things without doing away 
with the usefulness of the authoritarian label.  Just like authoritarianism we would expect, and 
find, many culturally and temporally specific articulations of populism. Indeed we do, and the 
populisms of the last two-hundred years of human history are legion.  
When dealing with populist movements or rhetoric, the interesting question is not 
necessarily “is it populism?” The definition provided by Jägers and Walgrave (2007) shows 
how populism articulates social classes into a “people” versus an “elite,” with the virtuous and 
worthy position being held by “the people.” Investigating the nature and structure of these 
opposing constructions can provide a more interesting and useful avenue of analysis (Laclau 
2005; Woods 2014). Once a frame is established as populist a host of useful questions remain 
open to us. It is within these follow-up questions where we can provide insight into a new social 
movement or party rhetoric. Who make up “the people?” Who are “the elite?” What 
characteristics are applied to these groups, and what puts them in opposition? And, finally, what 
is it that “the people” want?  
 Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012; see also Canovan 1981) offer a categorization of the 
three major movements of populism which have been used historically as comparative 
benchmarks. This categorization will be used in this paper to briefly define which populism this 
chapter deals with historically and culturally, and which it does not. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s 
(2012) three movements are the agrarian populism of the late 19th century in Russia and the 
United States, the Latin American populist regimes of the 20th century, and the “New-Right” 
populism of Europe in this 21st century which is known for its focus on domestic issues of 
immigration, crime, and nationalism (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012).  
The populism discussed in this chapter is not directly akin to the populisms of Latin 
America or of the European New-Right. If it has a historical or cultural ancestry it is most likely 
to be the strain of American rural/agrarian populism which manifested into the American 
People’s Party of late 19th century United States. This party was never formally admitted into 
the US political structure but had a lasting rhetorical and local impact in the American political 
landscape, particularly in rural areas (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; Canovan 1981).  The 
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American People’s Party, in their own words, “appealed to the unprivileged position of the 
ordinary people and reclaimed the power to the people as a whole... ‘We seek to restore the 
government of the Republic to the hands of the plain people, with whose class it originated’” 
(Houwen 2011, p.9).   
The methods of this study were not designed to trace any direct ideological ancestry 
between the populist frame found here and the historic movement of the American People’s 
Party, so it is not able to claim any direct lineage (though this would be an interesting question 
for future research). Rather, these frames seem to parallel the concerns of that original 
American populist movement: the moral righteousness of “ordinary” people, and a capture of 
government by a business class.  
POPULIST NEWS FRAMES 
Constructing The Elite  
 
If you were a viewer during the sampling periods of any major news channel, a common 
newscast you would encounter would be one about the business, financial, and political elite 
creating havoc for the rest of the country. The large financial institutions, and those that ran 
them, were openly, even poetically, characterized as voracious in their pursuit of wealth and 
lavish in their lifestyles. Financiers and hedge-fund managers were pilloried, sometimes by 
name, and set in narrative contrast to every other person in the United States. In the logic of the 
frame, the class of “everyday Americans” now found their fates and fortunes mangled by the 
capricious actions of the elite and were only able to look on with mounting anxiety. This story, 
with minor differences in characters and quotes, played out in coverage month after month. It 
was present in every sampling period and across networks.  
The financial crisis was created by a set of practices occurring within the upper circles of 
the finance sector, which do involve an elite class of individuals even by wealthy “business-
class” standards. The presence of a populist narrative in media discourse is not surprising in this 
sense nor is it necessarily incorrect.  It could be argued that a populist frame of two classes 
pitched in conflict due to the upper classes’ misdeeds is the actually the appropriate lens with 
which to view the financial crisis and its fallout (Shehata 2014; Calhoun 2011; Calhoun & 
Derluguian 2011). However, the particular articulation of this populist media discourse is 
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interesting and important. Populism functions as a flexible container which a culture may pour 
itself into given the right conditions (Laclau 2005). The elite group targeted by one populist 
movement will not necessarily match that of another. In the media frame of the financial crisis 
the elite half of the populist equation was formed by two groups. The first group was the 
financial, business, and private sector elite. In the populist media frame this group was usually 
condensed into the term “Wall Street.” Wall Street was presented with terms like “greedy” and 
“reckless.” In the narrative presented by the media’s populist frame, it was Wall Street’s 
fraudulent practices which caused the crisis. The other group the media included in its populist 
dichotomy construct of the elite was the U.S. government. The U.S. government did not directly 
cause the financial crisis, though it can be argued that it created the legislative environment that 
made the crisis possible. However, this was rarely the reason given within media discourse. 
Instead government, particularly congress, was presented as decadent and culturally “out-of-
touch” with everyday Americans. 
 
CNN 
October 9th, 2008  
“Lavish Spending on Your Dime” 
  
ROBERTS: Troubled insurance giant, AIG, apparently is getting the 
message. It faced widespread outrage for spending hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on a luxury retreat just days after taking a massive 
government bailout -- and it was about to do it again. 
CNN's Dan Simon is in Half Moon Bay, California, just south of San 
Francisco -- Dan, update our viewers on all this. 
DAN SIMON, CNN CORRESPONDENT: John, this is where AIG was 
going to be hosting its next extravagant event. This is The Ritz Carlton at 
Half Moon Bay. Rooms at this the scenic and very windy resort go for 
about $400 a night. 
Now, we all know AIG got absolutely hammered for hosting a similar 
event, that one at the St. Regis Resort in Southern California. The 
company spent about $400,000. 
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Yet, as early as this morning, AIG was defending the junket here at The 
Ritz, basically saying it's something they need to do for the health of their 
business. 
But about an hour or so later, the company reversed itself, canceled the 
event here at The Ritz. Perhaps it had something to do with those harsh 
exchanges on Capitol Hill between lawmakers and AIG executives. 
 
These were clearly populist frames and the above is a characteristic example. The financial 
bailout is presented as the dolling out of “taxpayer” money to wealthy financiers. This piece 
directly connects taxpayer money and the purchase of a luxury retreat for high-level AIG 
employees.  The lavishness in this frame is presented as audacious and sinful, and AIG is 
presented as large (“giant”) and feckless (“faced widespread outrage,” “troubled”). The outrage 
from the taxpayer, on the other hand, is presented without qualifier and is not questioned within 
the context of the frame.    
In its most common form, the media populist frame accuses the government of aiding 
and abetting the dangerous behavior of the finance sector. In this scenario, the government and 
Wall Street function directly together as an elite cooperative group. Another version of this 
frame presents the government as the main instigator of the crisis. In these stories the financial 
meltdown and recession is a governance issue caused by incompetent or excessive regulation of 
private economic markets, though this version of the populist frame was significantly less 
common in the sample.  
Overall, the interplay of these two elite groups within the media’s populist frame was 
narratively and ideologically complex. Sometimes Wall Street and the government were 
presented as a single unified entity while other news stories would present them as distinct 
institutions at cross-purposes.  Some frames, particularly those found in FOX News, presented 
the corrupt elite as exclusively one institution, either Wall Street or the government, while the 
other institution stood exonerated. In the end, however, the most prominently identified elite 
class was Wall Street. These populist news frames began heaping blame upon financial industry 
titans immediately upon the start of the financial crisis and this frame remained present 
throughout the coverage sampled for the next three years.  
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ABC News 
September 15th, 2009 
“Closing Argument; Wall Street Culture”  
 
TERRY MORAN (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) And although we may be seeing some signs of recovery, an 
ABC News poll released this week found that 65% of Americans have 
been hurt by this meltdown, a staggering 15 million people are out of 
work. Despite so much pain, however, you are starting to hear some of 
the same headlines that triggered outrage a year ago. More big bonuses 
for corporate executives and the same risky lending that got us into this 
mess in first place. So tonight we ask you simply, has the culture really 
changed on Wall Street? 
 
The framing devices here characterize Wall Street as greedy, excessively luxurious, and “tone-
deaf” in their public relations efforts. The frame casts them as unsympathetic to the plight of 
“average” people even though they are guilty of creating the financial crisis and recession. Here 
also is a demonstration found throughout many populist frames where Wall Street’s partner-in-
crime is the government. In the media’s populist frame the framing device of “the government” 
usually manifests abstractly; as a singular monolithic institution which needs no introduction or 
explanation.  Other times this character is presented as Congress, the President, or specific 
government agencies and programs.  Below is a news story from ABC News in early October of 
2008. Here, the government – in the form of Ben Bernanke of the Federal Reserve – is 
lambasted for failing to predict and prevent the crisis. The “government” here is presented as 
guilty by way of negligence regarding its assumed duty to protect “millions of homeowners” 
and the economy of the country.  
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ABC News Nightline 
October 6, 2008 
“The Reckoning; Hard Questions.”   
 
 
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL (CONNECTICUT ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
The failure to see that the dots not only were connected, but demanded 
action is completely reprehensible and now should lead to strong and 
effective indictments and prosecutions for fraud. 
 
BRIAN ROSS (ABC NEWS) 
(Voiceover) There's more than enough blame to go around for failing to 
see the crisis coming. Civil rights groups actually went to the Federal 
Reserve in the summer of 2007 to warn of an impending crisis due to all 
of the fraudulent mortgages. 
 
WADE HENDERSON (PRESIDENT LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS): What we saw were millions, literally millions of 
homeowners likely to be pushed into foreclosure because of the crisis 
that we now see has befallen the country as a whole. 
 
BRIAN ROSS (Voiceover): The meeting was with Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, according to the president of the leadership council on civil 
rights, Wade Henderson. Henderson gives Bernanke credit for attending 
the meeting, but not much else. 
 
WADE HENDERSON: I wish he had done more. I wish he had sounded 
the alarm more directly. I do understand the cautious nature of the 
institution that he leads, but I'm just disappointed that more was not done. 
 
When the government enters the populist frame of the financial crisis, it is portrayed as 
out-of-touch and ineffective at best, and openly corrupt and in cooperation with Wall 
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Street at worst. Occasionally politicians get implicated as inhabiting the wealth class, 
thus inherently in an adversarial position with the “average American.”  
 
ABC News 
September 7th, 2011 
“Bringing America Back; Grande Ideas”  
 
CYNTHIA MCFADDEN (ABC NEWS)  
(Off-camera) The President will give his speech about jobs tomorrow 
night. Now, there are plenty of people who are pretty angry that 
politicians only seem to be getting around to talking about jobs now. 
 
This was particularly the case with FOX News, which wove a narrative that brought 
government very close to the cause of the crisis. 
 
FOX News THE O’REILLY FACTOR 
February 20, 2009 
“Personal Story”  
 
 
O'REILLY: "Personal Story" segment tonight Herbert and Marion Sandler 
are billionaires. They're not having any problems in the stock market right 
now. They are billionaires after their bank -- they sold their bank to 
Wachovia in 2006. 
 
The problem is that bank, Golden West Financial, specialized in risky 
loans, the kind that eventually bankrupted Wachovia. But the Sandlers 
took their two and a half billion with a "B" and ran right into the arms of far 
left loons to whom they have donated millions. .... That's unbelievable. 
And it's true. They sold it for 24 billion, and their cut out of it was 2.5 
billion. Now, after that skit ran, the Sandlers apparently complained to 
NBC, and some of the material was removed online, including the 
references to our pal Barney Frank. NBC saying the censored parts, 
quote, "didn't meet our standards." Sure. 
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Here's a partial list of donations made by the Sandlers: 2.5 million to 
Move On; 3.5 million to the ACLU. More than 2 million to the Center for 
American Progress, a far left group run by John Podesta. And 3.5 million 
to Human Rights Watch, the group challenging the U.S. government on 
terrorist detentions. 
Now, remember, those people made some of their money by peddling 
subprime loans. As they said, the kind of paper that's caused the financial 
disaster. But there is no disaster for the Sandlers. They got out large. 
 
This characterization of government as the center of the corrupt elite appears to hit its peak 
during the period of coverage during the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011. While the sampling and 
analysis methods used in this study are not designed to prove such things, it appears that 
particular types of events would lead to more coverage of either one or the other elite group. 
During certain events that involved politicians and legislative activity, like the debt ceiling crisis 
of 2011, the government became the primary populist elite group. If this is the case, it may 
explain the large presence of the government in this populist narrative trend overall. Even 
though the financial crisis and resulting fallout was primarily due to the actions of the business 
elite, or Wall Street, the day-to-day news events centered on legislative efforts to deal with that 
crisis. This once again brought the subject of government to the forefront. This becomes more 
pronounced in regards to FOX News. In the FOX News sample, Wall Street is included among 
the list of populist enemies only at the very beginning. By the time of the second sampling 
period of 2009, the government had become the singular elite group and this stayed consistent 
through stories sampled through late 2011.  
There is another important characteristic of the elite as constructed by the media populist 
frame, aside from its inclusion of the government.” While the elite, both Wall Street and the 
government, were clearly understood as responsible for the crisis in the context of the populist 
frame the real nature of that responsibility was rarely explained. Titles for populist frame stories 
included “Who Paid for those Tickets?; Banking Execs Party at the Super Bowl,” “Wall St.’s 
Madam; Did Execs use Corporate Money?”“Citigroup Plans to Buy $50 Million Corporate 
Jet.” and  “Richard Fuld, Former CEO of Lehman Bros, under fire for transferring ownership 
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of multi-million dollar home to his wife for 100$. Negativity towards elites was discussed 
through their actions as consumers.  This has two immediately apparent impacts. The first is 
that this frame also denies the information environment of information on the actual chain of 
events and decisions that led to the financial crisis and any available policy responses. 
 The second impact is ideological. As the media’s populist frame presents it, the elite are 
not a problem because they have outsized political or material power relative to all other 
classes. Nor is the problem that the elite were able to make decisions which negatively impacted 
the members of all other classes (including internationally), which would again suggest outsized 
power. Instead, the media presents elite class membership as merely a matter of consumer 
habits and ability. It almost implies that if these business executives had been more frugal with 
their wealth, or less ostentatious in their spending, then there would be little for the other classes 
to find grievance with. The question of real power, the ability to shape issues of governance and 
material security for millions of citizens, remains outside of the frame.  
 
The Difficulty of Injustice 
 
Ultimately Wall Street and the government were presented as a pair and shown to the 
audience as working in tandem to the detriment of the American people.  According to the 
populist media frame, the financial crisis was a joint failure of both American business and 
American government. The lavishness of lifestyle and the constant insinuation of intentional 
fraud and mindless greed create a media environment that holds a key ingredient to the 
formation of a collective action frame – injustice. Again, injustice in this model is more than a 
simple acknowledgement that unfairness was committed. Gamson insists that the key to a 
working collective action frame is that it highlights a “consciousness of motivated human actors 
who carry some of the onus for bringing about human suffering” (p.7). In the construction of an 
elite class, populist media frames at the onset of the great recession includes specific 
individuals; Ben Bernanke, Herbert and Marion Sanders, or Hank Paulson. Other times it offers 
up institutions; AIG or The White House. Moreover, the language used in these broadcasts is 
highly emotive and make frequent appeals to morality, which is a hallmark of the “hot 
cognition” which lies behind a sense of injustice.  
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Injustice also poses a problem for those looking to start a revolution, however.  Gamson 
and others suggest the injustice element of social awareness must walk a tightrope between 
concreteness and abstraction in order to actually inspire action amongst citizens. The 
requirement for the acknowledgement of human actors behind the unjust act is due to the 
tendency for “vague, abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem 
foolish…we may think it dreadfully unfair when it rains on our parade, but bad luck or nature 
makes a poor target for an injustice frame….we are taught to accept what cannot be changed 
and make the best of it” (p. 31-32). However, go too far in the other direction and concreteness 
of the target becomes its own problem, because “as long as moral indignation is narrowly 
focused on human actors without regard to the broader structure in when they operate, injustice 
frames will be a poor tool for collective action, leading to ineffectiveness and frustration” (p. 
33).  In this case, the populist narrative within media discourse provides, at least in the 
beginning, ample individuals upon which to direct ire. However, it is consistently unclear what 
their crime actually is. There is an implied link between both governmental and business actors 
and the crisis, but this link is rarely explained and instead their lavishness of lifestyle stands in 
for a proxy of their crime. One could easily get the impression, if this was their sole introduction 
to the topic of the crisis, that the injustice done was merely one of material inequality and not 
that the material inequality was actively caused by these same individuals via fraudulent and 
predatory practices. This is issue number one.  
Issue number two is as time went on and coverage got farther from the actual crisis and 
deep into the economic recession, concreteness in target gave way to the immense abstractions 
of “Wall Street.” Given only these frames it would be reasonable to assume that those who had 
caused so much suffering were those trading stocks on the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange, not the people and practices of multinational financial conglomerates. In this way the 
populist media frames seem to present the worst of both possibilities. They are too concrete in 
the beginning and too abstract in the aftermath. Again, while the narrative elements needed to 
form a collective action frame seem present, an insufficient information environment appears to 
prevent it from really taking form.  
The potential consequences of this will be discussed later in the chapter, but the elite are 
only one half of a populist construction. The following is a discussion on how the media’s 
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populist frame constructs the other half, “The People” (Laclau 2005; Woods 2014; Mudde & 
Kaltwasser 2012).  
Constructing The People  
 
In the classic dichotomy of populism, “Main Street” sat opposite to “Wall Street” in the 
media populist frame. The term Main Street and its associated imagery have important cultural 
resonance in America even when not juxtaposed against Wall Street. Not necessarily obvious to 
non-Americans, this small phrase evokes the a culturally powerful image of idyllic small-town 
Americana (Neuman 2008; Orvell 2012). It is the cultural imaginary created for early U.S. 
television consumption through iconic shows like Leave it to Beaver and The Andy Griffith 
Show (Neuman 2008).  
The architectural feature of the Main Street is a recurring road design that arose out of 
the rapid white settlement of the American West in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Main 
Street was the name typically given to a street which through the middle of a Western town. 
This street usually held all of the structures that made up the public sphere of local American 
life, everything from the local mercantile to the Town Hall (Orvell 2012). This is where people 
would put on Independence Day parades, run their small businesses, go to get marriage licenses 
or their mail, and trek regularly to church or to the saloon. These main streets were historically 
where (white, semi-rural) Americans came together as Americans. The use of the term Main 
Street in the media’s populist frame is a symbolic invocation of the “American People” in this 
context of a combination of cultural imaginaries and history. Main Street refers to the (again, 
historically white) middle and working classes who rely on wages or their small local business 
to sustain themselves and raise their families. Other terms were used in the media populist 
frame in this same way, a key one being the “Average Joe” which relies on similar cultural 
imagery. Another important symbolic conceptualization of “the people” used in the media 
populist frame is “the taxpayer.” This permutation of “the people” implies less of the 
vulnerability that “Main Street” and “Average Joe” invoke, and instead demands respect vis-à-
vis their provision of the revenue stream for the government.  
This is a typical story in a populist frame from CBS, detailing a family who cannot find 
work and now found themselves homeless and living in a tent-city in Reno, Nevada.  Notice 
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how this frame shares a similarity with the bootstraps frame in its emphasis of a life of “hard 
work.”  
CBS News 
October 1, 2008 
“The Other America; Life in tent city in Reno, Nevada.”  
 
Ms. MARIAN SCHAMP (Tent City Resident): I mean, we worked hard all 
our life. We shouldn't be, at our age, having to sleep in the dirt. 
DOANE: Just last Christmas the couple lived in a rented house in 
Portland, until Michael lost the job he'd had for three years at a gas 
station. They moved to Reno in search of jobs. 
This resume says you have your GED, you're a veteran, you've worked in 
warehouse operations before with forklifts. 
Mr. MICHAEL MOORE (Tent City Resident): Yes, sir. 
DOANE: But there are just not jobs, or no jobs for you, it sounds. 
Mr. MOORE: Not right now. 
 
“Hard work” played an important role in these populist media frames.  Images and 
interviews of “average” Americans were consistently paired with descriptions of their “hard 
working” character. Most important was their willingness to work in paid employment again, 
and their efforts in finding new work immediately.  This is different from the way “hard work” 
is used in the bootstraps frame, where hard work is the vehicle to personal empowerment and 
economic recovery. Instead, the populist frame uses hard work as proof of a systemic 
unfairness. Mr. Moore works hard, is willing to work again, and yet the economy does not have 
room for him.  This is the only major frame to put this idea of a structural, systemic problem 
forward. The ideological impact of this emphasis on “hard work” is two-fold. On the one hand, 
this frame element is similar to the bootstrap frame identified in the previous chapter, in that it 
discursively excludes those who may have been unemployed prior to the crisis. However, in this 
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context “hard work” also stands in contrast to the idle elite, who are portrayed to possess their 
money fraudulently and easily and then spend it wastefully.  
Some populist frames came from coverage of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street 
movements. This populist frame coverage presented these movements as coming from and 
representing “the people.” Here the outbreak of Tea Party protests is presented simply as “rage 
in America,” and adds that the collapse of Lehman Brothers had taken “the market and the 
economy with it.”  
 
CNN  
September 14th, 2009 
“Rising Anger in America”  
 
COOPER: Tonight, rage in America. You saw the anti-Obama march over 
the weekend in Washington. You've seen all the money raised for and 
against Congressman Joe Wilson after he called President Obama a liar 
during the president speech to Congress. 
The anger and fear is real. There's new polling tonight on the discontent 
in America, especially after a year from millions of Americans. One year 
ago today, the broker, Lehman Brothers collapsed, taking the market and 
the economy with it. Today on Wall Street the president said we are 
making progress. 
 
Below is a sister story from CNN broadcast during the middle of the Occupy Wall Street 
protests. CNN draws a direct connection between the two protest movements. They’re both 
characterized as backlash to the events of the financial crisis.  
CNN 
October 5, 2011 
“Bank Backlash”  
 
Well Wall Street protests are growing. New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, 
San Francisco, Albuquerque -- you're looking at shots of all of them now. 
There is something here reminiscent of the early days of the Tea Party, 
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which actually shares some things in common with the Wall Street 
occupiers. They're both grassroots organization, from the ground up. 
They're both angry at Washington. 
And while most participants are sincere, there is hate in both groups. 
Most important, while they're on opposite sides of American politics, they 
agree on something huge. They both hate the bailout of the banks and 
share animosity to the banks in general, which we think is a sign of a real 
issue because banks should be great for America. Never mind what we 
do without ATMs and places to store our money. 
In the media’s populist frame “the people’s” hard work stands in stark contrast to the 
obscene lavishness of the elite.  The construction of “the people” in the financial crisis populist 
frame also seems to lend itself to a collective action frame. The definition of a “we” in 
opposition to some “they” is at the heart of both populist rhetoric and a collective action frame’s 
element of identity. In this case, the “we” are the middle and working classes who are virtuous 
by way of their willingness and ability to do “hard work.” However, this whole function is 
complicated immediately by who the “Main Street” and the “hard work” discourses may 
exclude – racial and ethnic minorities,  the already poor, the disabled, or anyone else who did 
not already fit into the pre-financial crisis economy. If the “we” is not inclusive enough, there is 
always the danger that the construction of a collective identity prevents effective mobilization of 
a movement through preventing sufficient numbers in the ranks or by encouraging the 
movement to turn back and attack those below them on the social hierarchy as scapegoats rather 
than those above them who set the original terms (Gamson 1992; Entman & Rojecki 2000).  
Injustice without Remedy 
 
In evaluating this populist media frame’s effectiveness in presenting a real counter-
hegemony, it is important to consider what many scholars consider a key requirement for 
oppositional movements. It is frequently believed that “any political movement against 
oppression has to develop a new diagnosis and remedy by which this suffering stands morally 
condemned” (Moore 1978, p.88: emphasis mine). The populist media frame presents injustice 
and two competing classes of an elite and a people. However, it fails to present a cogent 
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solution to this injustice. Both the targets and the culprits of injustice appear to move wildly, 
from business to government and from concrete to abstract. If utilizing media discourse alone, 
the audience would be left with a sense of being wronged, but an unclear image of by whom or 
what they might be able to do about it. This is an utter absence of the requirement of agency 
prescribed by Gamson (1992) and others in the successful construction of a collective action 
frame. Moreover, much of the construction of the elites and the people in the media populist 
frame conform to hegemonic roles. The elites are understood as elites mainly through consumer 
power, and their outsized real power remains unexplained and thus obscured. On the other 
hand, in constructing “the People” virtue is ascribed through a dedication to and willingness for 
“hard work.” This is nothing new in various manifestations of populist rhetoric (Canovan 1981; 
Laclau 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012; Woods 2014). However, the emphasis on conformity 
to hegemonic roles and an implicit acceptance to how the dominated classes relate to the 
hegemonic system raises real questions as to whether this populist frame actually functions as a 
counter-ideology which may support a broader counter-hegemony.  
In the next section, the populism within the peer group discussions will be examined 
with these caveats in mind.  
PEER GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Emergent Populism  
 
The association exercises which started each discussion group produced three lists for 
each group, which were later ranked according to how key or important the concepts on these 
lists were to the group. This system allowed the discussants to offer their understanding of the 
event while still allowing for that understanding to be complex (and contradictory). The ranking 
exercise revealed the participants’ reasoning behind their understanding, and gave a window 
into their comfort and ability in sharing these reasonings.  
Viewed as a whole, the lists created from these exercises revealed a decidedly populist 
picture. On every list of causes of the crisis sat “Wall Street” and various terms which denoted 
the government. Also on these lists were broader concepts like “greed” and “irresponsibility.”  
At the top of every list of financial crisis victims was “the middle class.”  During discussions 
Wall Street was mentioned frequently, standing in for big businesses and large banks in the 
same way it was used in the media’s populist frame. Like the media frame, participants also 
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described Wall Street and its institutions as voracious in their greed and obscene in their 
lifestyles. Participants spoke of politicians who were “out for themselves,” and “out of touch” 
with the realities that working people like themselves had to face every day. Elected officials 
were portrayed as unreliable in the matters of holding large business interests accountable, and 
sometimes they were accused of being in direct collaboration with those businesses.  
However, like the other discussion frames and themes, participants had very few details 
at their command when describing these issues. Specific events and institutional practices were 
sometimes listed amongst the causes of the financial crisis, but they were never shared between 
groups. For example, the bible study group listed “the housing bubble” as a cause but no other 
group did. Meanwhile the rock climbers cited “predatory loans” amongst their list of culprits, 
but this did not make it onto any other list either.  
When participants went on to list “victims” of the crisis and recession they painted a 
picture of themselves and their communities. Unlike their understanding of “causes,” 
participants’ knowledge of victimization was a mixture of sources that included personal 
experience as well as journalism. Occasionally, a value or conceptual ideal would be listed as a 
“victim.” Every group voted the number one victim of the financial crisis as the “middle class.” 
“Young people/college grads” and “small businesses” were also listed consistently on every 
group’s top five victims. Less consistent but still common were “the poor” and “homeowners.” 
The “victims” lists created by the discussion groups were often very specific, and discussion 
was accompanied by rich discussion including personal stories and thoughtful, drawn out 
arguments.  The construction of the “causes” list was much more difficult, and the groups 
compiled uncertain lists of vague conceptual terms like “greed” and “irresponsibility,” which 
they had a difficult time justifying or explaining. When sources were mentioned for their 
understanding of the cause of the financial crisis, they were always from the media. They cited 
“the news” and documentaries, though they usually could not remember any specific shows. 
Occasionally participants would remember explanations that they had read in books about the 
financial crisis. 
Difficulty aside, the overall picture mirrors not only the populist media frame detailed 
above, but also a populist construction generally. The elite, again consisting of both the political 
and the financial classes, are out-of-touch with the lives of ordinary people. This elite class lives 
differently and their advantage is both unfair and at the expense of “everyday people,” which 
186 
 
for participants meant people like themselves. Accordingly, they built a construction of “the 
People” when they are asked to discuss victims of the financial crisis. Interestingly, the focus 
groups were more inclusive than the media discourse on who was victimized by the financial 
crisis and often made a point of including those who were already poor or homeless. The stories 
they presented in support of their inclusions of these groups were personal. They had come into 
contact with those who were homeless or poor in their daily lives, and had seen first-hand how 
life had become even more difficult after the financial crisis.  
 
Nancy: I have just heard stories recently from teachers, my other 
daughter is doing student teaching and she was telling me about how the 
teachers have talked in about how much they've seen children being 
affected by this in the last three years.  And it has startled them.  I guess, 
it's just made a reality to them …. housing issues and all.   
Susan: Yeah. 
Nancy: It's probably going to affect them. 
Angela: There's, I think, a lot more homeless people than we're aware of.  
One of my classes that I took a few years ago, we had to do -- We did a 
research on school kids that were homeless and it was-- 
Nancy: Exactly, yeah. 
Angela: Astronomical. 
Nancy: Yeah, yeah. 
Angela: I was thinking we should add homeless. 
Linda: Yeah, that's a good point. 
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Here in the nursing group participants listed “small businesses” among the victims of the crisis, 
and used their personal experience of watching local businesses close in their community, and a 
story that had been filtered down from a friend who had to close her business.  
Linda:  Yeah, just knowing of what happened in our own communities, 
seeing all these places close.  
Susan:  We heard from somebody not in our department but in our, one 
of the councilors, her and her husband started a business in the last 
couple of years.  And they started it and, I think, maybe had it open for a 
year or two and closed it. 
Often discussions turned to the intangible impact of the financial crisis. They expressed a 
change in the way they perceived their lives or the world around them. The rock climbing group 
listed “sense of trust” among the victims during this exercise.  As a group they discussed their 
experiences of loss and economic instability, and how this led them to question their faith in 
major social institutions like education and private employment.  
 
Kevin:  [I used to trust my future employability because of] what I bring … 
for the employer. And then, when I got laid off…it had -- it had very little to 
do with, you know, what I could deliver for the company. It was -- the end 
had just dropped and we have to choose some people. 
 
Charles:  That’s what -- changed about my opinion the most. I truly 
believed before the crash that if you were excellent at something that got 
you paid to do, you would get paid. 
 
Kevin:  It worked out. 
 
Todd: Uh-hmm. Like if you had skill. 
 
Kevin:  Yeah. 
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Charles: Yeah. 
 
Kevin:  I no longer believe that if you are the best at something, you're 
going to be paid as though you were the best at it. 
 
Charles:  Right. 
 
This world-view is not necessarily conscious of its own populist stance. I would be 
confident that if asked few participants would be able to define populism and not one would 
actively identify themselves as “a populist.” However, the world they construct in their 
conversation around the financial crisis and recession conforms to the base definition – there is 
an elite group, and there are themselves, “the people.” The elite are corrupt, and their interests 
are in direct contradiction to the interests of themselves, the people. Moreover, the financial 
crisis stands as evidence of this uneven societal structure. This is not a strong populism, and is 
far from becoming a populist movement – but it is populism nonetheless.  
The raw emotion behind these discussions, which turns discussion from an 
acknowledgement of inequity to the “hot cognition” of injustice, was clearly evident. 
These stories were not related in a tone of cynicism or emotionally removed in any 
fashion. Participants were often openly angry and frustrated. On a couple of occasions 
participants were moved nearly to tears as they expressed a sense of betrayal and 
hopelessness. In the following example, one of the nursing participants asked me as the 
facilitator if it was alright to use swear words before relating her next set of emotions (in 
the end she seemed to forget to actually swear):  
 
Susan:  And, you know, you guys hit the nail right on the head, because I 
think they say the largest…. increase in the homeless were the children, 
is what I was hearing. 
I'm angry. I'm angry at our country right now for I don't think any child 
should have to be hungry or homeless or, you know, people that want to 
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work should be able to work.  Like we were saying, keep their benefits if 
they're not making enough to make ends meet.   
And I just get really angry that we are sending so much money overseas, 
you know.  I think our country should be number one.  Our people should 
be number one.  And it really makes me angry and, and I agree with you 
that everything is so unstable.  I can remember when I graduated from 
high school and…I was one that got married right after high school and 
my husband had a good -- Or we thought a good job.  And I never ever 
worried about anything.  But my kids worry all the time. 
Linda:  Oh, yeah. 
Susan:  You know.  And I never -- I never did.  So, I know that's really 
different from the generation. 
Nancy:  I know for me, I feel like this is some of the population thing, but 
as baby boomers got older, I mean, of course, there probably won't be 
social security, all those kinds of things, I don't even think there'll be 
Medicare, I think, like all of these things they'll be used up and gone and 
we'll be working until, I don't know, be working until I'm 80 probably, if I 
live that long.  I'll be working until I die…. 
Linda: Yeah. 
Nancy:… just to kind of provide basic necessities because I don't think -- 
I don't have confidence in any kind of government security, I guess.   
Linda:  Yeah. 
Nancy:  That some older people do have now that they've worked their 
life.  But I've -- Well, I've worked my whole life too.  And then I wonder 
what's going to happen as my kids got older too. 
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Susan:  You know, I feel like the government has taken our money 
against our will for taxes and Medicare, et cetera.  We don't have any say 
in it.  And then when it comes to us needing it, it's probably not going to 
be there.  And it's like, "I want my money back."  But, you know, that's -- It 
will be gone.   
 
Susan and Nancy use the U.S. welfare institutions of Medicare and Social Security to express an 
underlying loss of trust in institutions, particularly in government. They also express that this is 
a change in belief for them and relate this loss of trust as the direct result of the financial crisis 
and recession.  Susan has noticed that for her adult children that this loss of trust was 
experienced as a normal part of their transition into adult life. The world has become unstable 
for Susan and Nancy and they are expressing a deep sense of vulnerability. This turns back onto 
the government, whom she sees as breaking a pact – the disappearance of Social Security being 
a foregone conclusion in her mind – and spending money “overseas.” Presumably on 
International aid, which she mentions in another part of the group discussion. While many of 
her facts are incorrect or vague, her emotional state is very real and it is ultimately tied to her 
own experiences with the financial crisis – to what happened to her and to members of her 
community.  
 This anger was present in every focus group. The rock climbing social club 
expressed a similar exasperation, albeit in more satirical language.  
 
Charles:  No. But I say like -- really, the people who suffered the 
most…you suffer more, the poorer you are. If there’s a point at which you 
did not suffer that point is probably about being a millionaire. Above being 
a millionaire? You actually won, you got better…. 
Todd:  Well, It’s not. It’s the -- it’s the corollary to ‘a rising tide, floats all 
boats.’ 
Kevin:  Yeah. 
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Todd:  Right? The sinking tide grounds all except the yacht. 
 
The target of the anger is different here. Charles and Todd are singling out the wealthy for 
having experienced no hardship during the crisis, suggesting they may in fact be benefitting 
from it. However, the anger remains present. In both instances, the threshold for injustice has 
been cleared. The participants could easily list harms to themselves, those in their communities, 
and those in communities they had only heard about.  They could target human actors as the 
source for these harms – though importantly it could be either the wealthy or the government.  
 
Nancy:  Our, our population, I think, is waking up and, you know, getting 
fed up with all of this stuff money going out of our country or that 
politicians getting richer and richer while we don't work and, I think, 
maybe that's what's it's going to take to.  It's like an uprising almost. 
Linda:  A revolt, yeah. Revolution. 
Susan:  Our country to put our feet down and say, "We're not going to 
take it anymore."  
Angela:  Yeah. 
Nancy:  And that’s it.   
Interviewer:   Would you elaborate? 
Nancy:  I think, you know, these dishonest people in the government are 
just -- What state was it where all the -- New York.  All these hundreds of 
police and firefighters just arrested for defrauding the government for 9/11 
disabilities and they went undercover and they're buying yachts and out 
water skiing and big homes and, I think, half a million dollars is what 
some of them got.  Just this immorality all over our country.  I mean, it 
has to start— 
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This is a group of women in their fifties, nurses no less, openly talking about the need for a 
revolution. It is no small thing that the conversation went this far, and it was within the first 
fifteen minutes of discussion. But we can also see in this same conversation some of the factors 
that separate these nurses expressing wistful longing for a revolution and walking out into the 
streets themselves. As Gamson warns, “the conditions of peoples’ daily lives are, in fact, 
determined by abstract sociocultural forces that are largely invisible to them. Critical views of 
“the System,” however accurate, may still encourage reification just as much as benign ones as 
long as they lack a focus on human actors” (1992, p.33). The main speaker is under the 
impression that the United States gives a significant portion of its budget to other countries. 
While it is true that the U.S. government does provide some types of aid to some countries, it is 
not a significant portion of the overall expenditure, nor is it the cause of low spending on 
welfare programs within the United States (Fiscal Year Budget 2015). Much more relevant 
expenditures, the tax subsidies granted to enormous and highly profitable businesses, many of 
which are multi-national, were not brought up (Foster & Magdoff 2009; DeHaven 2012).  
Similarly, dishonesty in the government is associated with pension fraud committed by a 
handful of police and firefighters in New York City. This, like foreign aid, amounts to a very 
small portion of the government budget. The anger felt by these participants is very real, and the 
struggles they faced as the result of the financial crisis are also very real.  Where the story 
becomes confused in these conversations how broader economic trends and policies actually 
intersect with their experiences. Their understanding of the larger picture of political and 
economic actors is piecemeal and fuzzy. Many anecdotes they bring in to support their points 
are erroneous or irrelevant. Those that might be relevant are often lack the detail to be helpful to 
them.  
 
Susan:  And probably, I, you know, I mean from what I've heard.  You 
know, there, there's, they were, you know, in cahoots.  
 
Nancy: Right. 
 
Susan: ...people in government making money... 
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[All] :  [Agrees] Yeah...  Yeah...  And just said hey!.. Yeah... 
 
Nancy: I mean, it was... So I mean, people were... 
 
Linda: That's true! 
 
Interviewer: So you're saying, there's an actual active relationship 
[between politicians and Wall Street]? 
 
Nancy: Yeah, exactly!  To some degree.  I don't think, I, I guess I don't, 
I'm sure, you know, there was some under the table stuff or some kind… 
or, both sides therefore they, Wall Street got a hand because one was 
gaining from the other. 
 
Linda: I think so too, right. 
 
[All]: [agrees] Yeah.  Yeah. 
 
Linda: Can we call them assholes? 
 
Linda: Alright, assholes! 
 
Angela: Assholes.  
 
There is a clear emotional picture of betrayal by a system these women trusted. However, 
the details within picture are loosely associated and inconsistent. The political understanding of 
the group is almost impressionistic. It’s colorful and emotive, but the objects – the actors, the 
policies, the historic events – blend together the more they try to pin them down in the 
discussion. These crucial details of understanding are instead expressed in conceptual terms like 
“The System” and “how things are done today.” When Wall Street and “Banks” were singled 
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out, there were no particular names, or the names were only partially incorrect, and many 
institutions were used interchangeably, with little understanding of who did what.  
 
Richard:  Just a general….sort what's going on Wall Street. 
 
Theresa:  Yeah, I mean, yeah, I don't understand…but, yeah.  
 
Terry:  In what that I read it started back where all those…people did 
intentionally buy stocks knowing that that would drive the prices up and 
then they sold it. I mean, it was shady, it was shady, they were in 
cahoots. 
 
Similarly, the aspersions cast upon the government, consistently implying fraud and decadency, 
were non-specific. The actions of the government were discussed in the same symbolic terms 
that broadcast news frames used; lavishness of lifestyle and implications of isolation from the 
middle and working class realities. They are not grounded in an understanding of policy 
supported or passed, nor of campaign funding structures that tie very wealthy private 
individuals to political campaigns.  
 
Nancy:  Um, okay.  I think the politicians should be given a $10,000 a 
year job and they have to find their home and feed their families.  And 
they found out for a year and then take their findings back to their peers. 
Interviewer:  So, that seems like a solution to “out of touch leadership.” 
Nancy:  Yeah, yeah, I do, you know.  I feel that they should live amongst 
us, live amongst the homeless, the low paying job people and see what -- 
Give them a taste of reality.  Because what-- 
Susan:  They wouldn't need a year.  They'd need about a week. 
Linda:  Yeah, yeah. 
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Angela:  Exactly. 
Nancy:  When they consider-- 
Susan:  A week and they'd be like, "Oh, my gosh." 
Nancy:  You know, people are cut off, uh, certain, um, help, food stamps 
whatever when they are 15% below the poverty level.  Well, the poverty 
level is, is, you know, so low that people can't survive even on poverty 
level.  You know, it's just -- Government needs a reality check.  I think 
they just really need a reality check. 
SUMMARY 
A Collective without Agency  
 
In Williams’ (1977) system of hegemonic practices, the populist frame sits as an 
emergent oppositional understanding. As explained above the populist understanding has risen 
out of the frustration experienced at the contradiction exposed by the financial crisis. Because it 
begins to question the shape and nature of this system, this populist frame is also oppositional. 
These are elements that we would anticipate with the forming of a true counter-hegemony in 
response to the financial crisis. However, by measuring the populist media frame and the 
populism in the peer group discussions against Gamson’s concept of the collective action frame 
we can see why the revolution may not be in our near future.  
 The first element of a functioning collective action frame, injustice, is defined as an 
emotionally charged sense of moral indignation. This was a central element to both the populist 
media frame and the populist element in the discussions. Furthermore, Gamson’s “injustice” 
requires an understanding of human actors which bear some responsibility for suffering. The 
construction of an elite class by the populist frame gives a fairly significant target for this 
injustice. Thus, the frame appears to fulfill this first requirement, though with the caveats 
explained above of abstraction versus concreteness.   
Another requirement of Gamson’s collective action frame is identity. In this regard too, 
populism passes the test as the construction of a symbolically significant “us” versus “them” is a 
fundamental characteristic of a populist construction. Indeed, there is some evidence that within 
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the peer group discussions participants were beginning to define themselves as part of a larger 
class, most significantly in the prominence of the “middle class” making it onto every group’s 
list of major victims of the financial crisis. However, this class identification is somewhat 
undercut by the presence of the themes of moral decay and personal responsibility in the same 
discussions, which suggests an understanding that some members of this class are more 
culpable for their suffering than others. Such a construction has the potential to conceptually 
cripple a significant identification with others as part of the same shared class. 
 The final element of a collective action frame is where the prospect of a fully-fledged 
counter-hegemony may falter. Agency, defined as “the consciousness that it is possible to alter 
conditions or policies through collective action” is conspicuously absent from both the media 
frame and the discussion groups (Gamson 1992, p.7).  The media’s populist frames present few 
concrete examples of individuals or groups acting on their populist resentment to try and 
significantly challenge the prevailing order. Moreover, the media frame tends to present victims 
of the crisis through the lens of a loss of consumer power rather than as part of a politically and 
economically dominated class. The peer group discussions also understood themselves and their 
experiences through the largely passive roles as voter and consumer. Finally, the information 
environment was simply too sparse for most participants to build a firm understanding of the 
issue at hand, let alone potential solutions to these broader problems.  
Resentment, Not Revolution 
 
This populist frame as created by both the media and by the discussion groups set up the 
classic dichotomy between an elite class and the people. This dichotomy conformed to the 
criticism of the hierarchal system that underlies populist ideologies wherein the elite unjustly 
dominate the people and the people are not only more numerous but more morally deserving. 
Beyond these points this apparent populism becomes more complicated. There are two major 
issues in how the media and the discussion group expressed this populist understanding that 
appear to thwart a full-throated populist ideology which might support a true counter-
hegemony. The first is that it appears to contradict with the other dominant frames of 
understanding described in the two previous chapters. The second is the characterization of the 
elite as opposed to the people is done through their consumer power rather than their access to 
real political and material power.   
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With the full force of the contradiction in the hegemonic system buffered in this way, 
populist resentment appears to have turned to the unequal expression of consumer power 
between the elite group and the populist base. This may be part of the reason why the main 
attributable lasting effect of the Occupy Wall Street movement is the persistent discussion of 
“income inequality” by news outlets and politicians (Shah et al. 2012). The populist news 
frames relied heavily on the consumer behavior of elite individuals to express populist 
resentment. The most prominent themes in these frames was the lavishness in lifestyles and 
ostentatious consumerism of the elites. The focus was not on out-sized influence on policy or 
the unequal distribution of power, but on CEOs’ ability to buy Super-Bowl tickets and how 
much they spent re-decorating their personal offices. On the other side of the populist equation, 
the people and their suffering was often described through their loss of consumer power rather 
than their innate vulnerability to the market or their unequal access to real power.  
Williams’ concept of emergent practices in cultural hegemonies is those practices that 
arise out of the contradictions in the present system (1977).  In this case, we can view the 
populist media frame and the constructed discussion frame as one such emergent practice born 
out of the contradiction presented by the financial crisis. In a neoliberal capitalist hegemony the 
market, like all hegemonies, is tasked with providing a certain level of material security (Lewis 
1999; Artz & Murphy 2000; Scherrer 2011). This exchange faltered during the financial crisis 
and the recession and created a significant contradiction. Access to the market was denied to 
many average citizens who had previously enjoyed it due to loss of income, and this loss of 
access was exacerbated and prolonged thanks to the following collapse of the job market. The 
practice of having a job and thus gaining access to the consumer market was the legitimate way 
for the average U.S. citizen to participate in the hegemonic system and this is a major basis for 
consent to the current system. 
 However, the strategy-game frame asserts that this contradiction is a failure primarily of 
politicians and the government not the markets, and the belief in a dysfunctional government 
within the discussion groups shows an agreement with this interpretation. Additionally, the 
bootstraps frame cluster and the belief in personal responsibility insists that employment 
remains the legitimate way to access the market, ensure material security and to express the 
important personal virtue of hard-work. Because all of these frames do not appear as a linear 
logical progression but exist simultaneously in coverage and among participants the full impact 
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of the populist frame is dulled. The contradictions in the hegemonic system that the financial 
crisis and recession exposed are never fully experienced as such, in very large part due to the 
direction of attention towards the government as a culpable perpetrator. Thus the contradictions 
are never called to be resolved one way or another.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This research was an attempt to situate media power within the larger production 
of cultural hegemony in the United States.  The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was used 
as a window into this process. To do this, a frame analysis was conducted on samples of 
television news coverage from major moments during the financial crisis and the resulting 
economic recession. Additionally, peer group discussions were conducted as a window 
into how people who fit the social and cultural imaginary of “Middle America,” an 
important part of the historic bloc which forms the United States cultural hegemony. 
These peer groups provided a discussion of the financial crisis and recession in a social 
context. Once this data was gathered, the following questions were asked of it:  
1. Did the news media act as a hegemonic apparatus and function to absorb the 
contradictions of the United States’ capitalist hegemony exposed by the financial 
crisis and frame them in such a way to protect or re-form hegemonic ideology?  If 
so, how? 
 
2. Were middle/working-class, non-activist participants engaged in civic discussions 
able to form partial or whole counter-hegemonies out of their understanding of the 
financial crisis and their available information environment? And, were they able to 
use them during persuasive conversation with their peers? 
 
3. Did middle/working-class, non-activist participants utilize, mobilize, and rely on 
news media frames to form and communicate their understandings and beliefs about 
the financial crisis? 
Qualitative analysis methods were used to answer each of these questions. For the first 
question, a qualitative frame analysis was conducted on the television media frames, with 
particular attention to explanatory and causal frames. 
200 
 
To analyze the peer groups’ discussions, I reconstructed their basic understanding of 
the financial crisis from the lists of causes and victims which the groups produced and 
collectively ranked. In addition, the entire discussion was analyzed for consistent themes 
to uncover recurring statements of beliefs and understanding.  In the first part of this 
conclusion, I will summarize the findings of this research by answering each of these 
questions in turn.   
The Media as Hegemonic Apparatus 
 
1. Did the news media act as a hegemonic apparatus and function to absorb the 
contradictions of the United States’ capitalist hegemony exposed by the financial crisis 
and frame them in such a way to protect or re-form hegemonic ideology?  If so, how? 
At the onset of this study, the intent was to re-center the issue of power in how we 
analyze media. To do this I used Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony – 
understood as a process where dominated classes of a society consent to the rule of the 
dominating classes. To operationalize this concept to examine the media, I used framing 
theory. Framing theory was useful to a cultural hegemony lens because by deconstructing 
the devices which make up a media frame, one also deconstructs the ideological 
articulations which underpin those same frames. In this way, we are theoretically able to 
examine the articulations as they form, break, and reform in media content. Thus, an 
inductive frame analysis was conducted on selected frames from television news coverage 
of the financial crisis. This frame analysis revealed five major explanatory frames: 
strategy-game frame, survivor stories, bootstraps frame, opportunity in disaster, and 
populism.  
 These frames all functioned to direct audience attention away from an ideological 
understanding of the financial crisis as a crisis within the economic system. The strategy-
game frame and human-impact frame cluster deflected attention away from actions which 
occurred in major financial institutions and the members of the capitalist class by 
presenting frames and narratives which focused upon other actors. The strategy-game 
frame instead promoted the idea that the government was ultimately responsible for the 
health of capitalist markets. By reframing the crisis as a failure of the government to react 
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to a disaster, the understanding of the crisis was reformed into something that was 
ideologically consistent with the neoliberal concept of the role of the state as an arbiter of 
the free market, rather than directly responsible for the general welfare of the population 
(Harvey 2005; Peck 2010; Crouch 2011).  
The human-impact frame cluster focused upon the experiences of the non-capitalist 
classes during the fallout of the financial crisis. Instead of presenting these experiences as 
the result of the actions of the capitalist class, or as the result of the American economic 
structure, these frames understood the hardship experienced by the subjects of their 
coverage as the result of various levels of personal misfortune. Moreover, these frames 
constructed narratives which often negated the suffering and exposure experienced by 
these “everyday” people by finding and emphasizing stories which emphasized personal 
growth and achievement. The survivor stories, bootstraps, and opportunity in disaster 
frames reworked the experience of vulnerability to the economic system into a stage for 
enacting personal heroism through further commitment to that same capitalist system.  
The final major frame to be identified, populism, was a surprising find. This frame 
expressed an oppositional position to those who occupy to top of the existing American 
power structure.  Many frames expressed anger and dissatisfaction around the financial 
crisis, and resentment towards politicians and business elites who were understood to 
have caused it. However, the media’s populist frame and its utility as a counter-ideology 
was under-cut by its presentation of class relations as a function of unequal consumer 
power rather than real material and political power. For example, instead of describing 
the practices which lead to the financial crisis, the frames focused on the purchases CEO’s 
made prior to their company collapsing. Instead of relating a description of how financial 
institutions worked closely with the American legislature to dismantle regulations of the 
financial industry, the frames shared which politicians went to parties with hedge-fund 
managers.  
In the end, every one of the frames found in the television media’s coverage of the 
financial crisis deprived the national information environment of facts and knowledge, 
and failed to place significant focus upon the economic system and its most powerful 
actors. Instead the information environment was full of minutia regarding partisan 
202 
 
political maneuvering, opinion polls, and lavish expenditures by a handful of named 
business elites.  
These findings suggest several things, the first and possibly most important being that, 
even at the advent of a major economic scandal and crisis, modern American journalism is 
unlikely to form counter-hegemonic frames. This runs counter to some other research 
arguing that journalism’s incentive towards controversy will naturally drive the media to 
counter-narratives (Schudson 2008). The reliance on pre-existing frames, likely caused by 
existing practices and industry pressures, creates ideological momentum which in this 
case re-narrated the crisis event along hegemonic narratives. The cumulative impact of 
this is a news environment which largely reinforced the prevailing hegemony and an 
information environment devoid of real detail about the causes or consequences of the 
financial crisis.  
Main Street’s (Non) Counter-Hegemony 
 
2. Were middle/working-class, non-activist participants engaged in civic discussions able 
to form partial or whole counter-hegemonies out of their understanding of the financial 
crisis and their available information environment? And, were they able to use them 
during persuasive conversation with their peers? 
 
Another intent of this study was to move away from relying on the individual as a point 
of analysis in media research and to ask questions of how people construct political 
meaning and identity as members of social groups (Lewis 2001; Gamson 1992).  The study 
was designed to foreground social discussion and debate as the focus of analysis to see 
how people were able to form and utilize media frames in conversation. In doing this, it 
was hoped that we might get a picture into how audiences’ understandings of the financial 
crisis aligned with or diverged from the dominant, hegemonic understandings presented 
by television news.  
In the peer group discussions, participants expressed deep dissatisfaction with their 
current economic and political powers. However, participants of the peer discussion 
groups were unable to construct true counter-hegemonies in their discussions. Their 
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inability to do this was caused in large part by their lack of a fundamental understanding 
of the financial crisis or their relative place in the economic system.  What little they could 
remember of the financial crisis turned their attention towards the government, which 
they believed to be dysfunctional. Many participants possessed and expressed a strong 
sense that “the government” was unable to “cooperate” with itself. However, these same 
participants could not demonstrate or explain why they held these beliefs.  
Moreover, they did not understand the role of financial institutions in the crisis. At no 
point were participants able to express a cogent criticism of the American financial 
system. Instead they typically turned their anger towards government officials and 
government programs. This understanding of the government as responsible for the 
financial crisis and recession fundamentally aligns with the most prominent picture 
provided in news media, the strategy-game frame.  
Often in moments where they lacked explanation or understanding, participants 
reached for broad themes of morality. They expressed a belief in personal financial 
responsibility, which they considered key to keeping oneself out of economic hardship.  
Because they felt that individuals had this sort of control over their economic destiny, 
many seemed to interpret the financial crisis and recession as evidence of a general moral 
decay in American culture. If protecting oneself from financial hardship can be done 
through frugality, then those experiencing hardship are suspected of “greed” and 
“irresponsibility.”  In these moments the financial crisis was approached as an inevitable, 
almost natural, event. Participants’ attention was thus turned away from the powerful 
institutions and the practices which caused the crisis and turned inward to their own 
communities, and in some cases their own children and grand-children.  
A strong populist theme, constructed early on in discussion through the creation of 
association lists, suggested the first hints of a counter-ideology if not a full counter-
hegemony. In spite of four years since the financial crisis, the event remained a very 
emotionally difficult experience and many were angry at the repercussions they were still 
facing. All participants reported coming away from the crisis and recession with a new 
awareness of their economic vulnerability, which they looked to elected officials to 
remedy. However, all participant groups were currently unable to connect their populist 
sentiment to concrete reforms or solutions that would suit their real interests (Artz & 
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Murphy 2000).  In the end, their understanding of themselves as “hard workers” and their 
resentment of unequal consumer power meant that their overall orientation to the 
economic system remained unquestioned (Artz & Murphy 2000; Kalberg 2016; Kaelber 
2016). Ultimately the participants remained aligned with a capitalist cultural hegemony.  
The Information Desert  
 
3. Did middle/working-class, non-activist participants utilize, mobilize, and rely on news 
media frames to form and communicate their understandings and beliefs about the 
financial crisis? 
It was anticipated at the onset of this research that participants in the peer group 
discussions would utilize recognizable media frames to articulate their positions and 
argue for them. What was actually discovered was far more complex. On one hand, 
participants clearly reconstructed the populist frame in the associations and ranking 
exercises.  Every peer group reconstructed “the elite” and “the people” in a manner that 
was identical to the populist media frame. Most importantly, in the peer group populist 
frame the government played a prominent role in the elite group, just as was found in the 
populist media frame. This association of government officials with the elite was made 
even though participants had no understanding of any relevant regulations before or after 
the financial crisis, nor could they explain any causal relationship between the two. 
Instead, when prompted, participants would discuss differences in lifestyles between 
themselves and politicians – an understanding echoed directly in the populist media 
frame.  
Beyond this clear construction of a populist frame, the relationship between television 
news frames and the participants’ discussions got far more complex. Participants often 
used phrases that could be found in the media samples. For example, “Wall Street” and 
“Main Street” were used frequently in discussion in the same way as was in the news 
coverage. There is no way to definitively demonstrate that these shared terms and phrases 
came directly from news media, but it was clear that there was at the very least a shared 
language between the two.  It was also evident in discussion that most participants relied 
on television news for their source of information on events like the financial crisis. This 
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was confirmed by the post-discussion questionnaires, which were dominated by 
descriptions of both broadcast and cable-news networks and television news shows.  
Unanticipated, however, was how important the role of participants’ information 
environments and their command of knowledge was to their ability to form and utilize 
frames of any kind – including those that appear to originate in the media. Participants 
were hesitant to form opinions or even share experiences about the financial crisis 
because they felt they lacked sufficient understanding of the event and the surrounding 
issues.  Thus, instead of having a discussion where individuals mobilized media frames 
alongside frames from other information sources, individuals would cite phrases that 
appear to come from the media and then struggle to piece these phrases into a coherent 
narrative. This lead participants to fall back on beliefs of dysfunctional government, which 
echoed the strategy-game frames logic, as well as beliefs of personal responsibility and 
moral decay. What information participants were certain of was generally related to the 
realm of electoral politics, and was used to feed into their belief of a leading role of 
partisan electoral politics as a cause of the financial crisis.  
I believe these results support what some researchers have called for, namely greater 
scholarly attention to the role of information as it plays out in the media and as it plays out 
in systems of power (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1992; Lewis 1999; Lewis 2001). It is 
important that future research on public opinion and public knowledge takes seriously 
questions about what types of information are available and to whom, rather than simply 
trying to quantify whether there is “more” or “less” information in any given person or 
newscast.  
 In the next section of this chapter is a brief final discussion of the methods 
employed in this thesis: what was illuminated, what remains to be examined, and what 
can be done better in the future. Beyond that is a final discussion of the findings of this 
study.  
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STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
  
This study holds all of the limitations that would be expected of the qualitative 
methods employed. The methods used here facilitated a rich understanding of the 
ideological articulations and narrative logic which underpinned the major explanatory 
frames of mainstream, American news coverage of the financial crisis and economic 
recession. However, these methods could not provide answers as to just how ubiquitous 
these frames were in news coverage, or whether or not there were significant patterns 
regarding when they were employed or by what channel. Initially, it was hoped that the 
qualitative frame analysis could be turned into a quantitative content analysis to quantify 
the extent of these frames in the coverage of economic issues and to check for patterns of 
frame use.  Unfortunately, this was time-prohibitive given the time span of the project. 
Hopefully future research will take up this part of the project to address these still-open 
questions.  
Additionally, the limitations of qualitative research, and of limiting the scope of the 
study to a particular social demographic, are weaknesses in the research design that were 
known from the outset. However, there is one particular weakness that became apparent 
as the study went on that should be remedied in future research. The conceptual approach 
to information environments was not developed enough at the outset. The reason for this 
is due to information environments not being anticipated playing such a key role in the 
findings. As the results eventually made clear that information had such an impact on 
participants’ ability to form and communicate beliefs and understandings, it also became 
clear that the design of the research tools was inadequate for the depth of this issue. In the 
end, the analysis from the tools available were able to reveal a significant lack of 
information amongst the media frames and the discussion groups, and I believe 
demonstrate that this had a significant effect on participants ability to hold meaningful 
conversations. However, because of this inadequacy in research tools significant detail 
regarding the variation among personal information environments and the practices 
which developed them were never captured.  This is regrettable and it is my hope that 
future research will be able to improve these and similar tools to better effect. 
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Finally, while the qualitative peer discussion groups offered insight into the way 
people utilized frames and information in discussions, they could not tell us how widely 
held these opinions and understandings are in the general population. Also left out of the 
window of inquiry are how other demographic and relative social factors play out in 
relation to the financial crisis and recession. This study taken alone can give no insight 
into the role of race, gender, profession or any other number of issues of interest on how 
the financial crisis was experienced or understood. This is also true for members of other 
American socioeconomic classes. It would be important to know how these same 
conversations play out in groups who find themselves above or below the participants of 
this study on the economic ladder. Also of particular interest after these results would be 
the inclusion of class-issue activists to see how and where counter-hegemonies form or 
fail in different information climates and social contexts. The neglect of all of these issues 
and groups was not due to a determination that they are not important questions of 
interest, but simply a result of limited resources.  
Those limitations being fully understood, these methods did result in findings that 
can be counted as a contribution to the communications field. First, the inductive frame 
analysis allowed for the discovery of frames which were not anticipated by existing 
literature. Without this in-depth qualitative analysis, the opportunity in disaster frame and 
the populist frame may have not been fully discovered or articulated. The knowledge of 
these frames should allow for future research into both their distribution throughout the 
news media and further exploration into how they articulate with other ideological 
systems and events.  
Second, the qualitative treatment allowed for a rich understanding of the 
ideological underpinnings and articulations within these frames as they relate to the 
financial crisis specifically. This method revealed how consistently the financial crisis was 
articulated with natural disaster and how the economy was articulated with nature. 
Similarly, it revealed how the media tied the victimhood of everyday people to a discourse 
of heroism, and how this heroism was also tied to an increased commitment to the 
economic system.   
The choice of the qualitative peer group discussions also provided findings which 
are unique insights to the communications field. The facilitation of a natural discussion 
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provided a realistic window into how well participants were able to grasp and mobilize 
information about the financial crisis and their understanding of it. The results suggest 
that there may be a far greater amount of ideological and opinion contradiction within and 
among individuals than might be apparent through the use of surveys (Popkin 1991; Page 
& Shapiro 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1992; M. X. Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; De Vreese 
& Semetko 2002). These natural conversations allowed participants to both hold and 
express multiple complex and often contradictory opinions at the same time, often 
without realizing that their opinions were complex or contradictory.  Had this research 
been done through traditional opinion research, participants would have been encouraged 
to make discrete choices which may well have masked this sort of complexity of belief. 
Moreover, it would have been difficult to capture one of the key findings of this paper: 
even as opinions and beliefs were contradictory and lacked knowledge grounding, they 
were carried with great conviction and backed with significant emotion.  
Taken in aggregate, the findings and conclusions of this thesis can serve as a 
foundation for further qualitative and quantitative research in the communications field. 
Moreover, it is my hope that they demonstrate the importance of tying the existing 
conceptual toolkit of the communications field into a broader understanding of systems of 
hegemonic and economic power.  
LOW-INFORMATION PROTOPOPULISM  
 
 The rhetorical question asked at the beginning of this study was this: was 
Tocqueville right when he predicted that there would be no more revolutions in America 
(1835)? The answer appears to be “perhaps,” but not necessarily for the reason that 
Tocqueville gave us.  
Tocqueville anticipated that the American middle class would avoid any attempts 
for increased political power in exchange for political stability, so that they could keep 
their newly acquired property secure. The results of this research suggest that, at least in 
contemporary America, revolutions are quelled far earlier in their conception.  Instead of 
making a knowing exchange of power for stability, the middle class participants struggled 
to understand what political power entailed in the first place.   
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Because this research deliberately set out to talk to non-activists, it was assumed 
that participants would not necessarily hold or be able to articulate counter-hegemonic 
positions. As recognition of this, the analysis mobilized the collective action frame as a 
way to test for nascent counter-hegemonies or, at least, counter-ideologies (O’Gorman 
1986; Gamson 1992).  Analysis of the group discussions searched for the presence of three 
elements of collective action frames; injustice, agency, and identity. The presence or 
absence of these elements informed how or why a counter-ideology/hegemony may be 
encouraged or thwarted in any given discussion moment or frame. In comparing the 
results of the peer discussion groups with collective action frames, it seems that many 
elements required for a collective action frame were actually present. These mostly white 
working and middle-class people who had not otherwise become activists persistently 
expressed understandings of a sort of collective identity (Gamson 1992). They repeatedly 
expressed an understanding of themselves, their families, and their communities as 
distinct from and in opposition to an elite class which was loosely understood to be formed 
of government officials and financial institutions. In conversation, they frequently evoked 
images of “everyday people” and regularly used the phrase “Main Street.”  Even more 
pronounced was the immediate and consistent sense of injustice committed against 
themselves, their families, and other “everyday” people.  They expressed feeling betrayed, 
and they expressed feeling vulnerable. Participants clearly felt wronged. 
However, this sense of injustice was aimed towards the government and 
particularly the actors within the system of electoral politics. Agency, the third element to 
a collective action frame, was narrowly conceived by participants as voting in elections. 
When this narrow conception of civic participation was combined with a feeling that 
government officials were “out-of-touch” and in league with the economic elite the result 
were expressions of despair and a withdrawal from civic life.  This withdrawal from public 
life echoes the findings of Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s Spiral of 
Cynicism (1997a), which found higher levels of cynicism and public withdrawal in people 
who had been exposed to news stories cast within a strategy-game frame.  
The sense of injustice expressed by participants was also prevented from 
translating into a counter-ideology/hegemony by a lack of information. The information 
environment as it existed directed the sense of injustice away from the capitalist class, and 
210 
 
the information environment was generally so sparse that participants felt too unsure of 
their understanding to even properly discuss the topic, let alone confidently move to 
action, collective or otherwise.  
Ultimately, the peer group participants resented their current experience of 
economic vulnerability and insecurity, but this did not translate into a counter-ideology, 
and certainly not a counter-hegemony.  Though, they resented those in power and they 
lacked an ability to conceptualize or articulate any alternative systems or practices which 
would better serve their interests. Instead, participants’ practices and attentions stayed 
firmly attuned to the prevailing cultural hegemony. This is precisely what one would 
expect to find in a functioning hegemonic system:  
 
American hegemony and its oppositions are constrained by the material, political, and 
 cultural practices of capitalism and are ideologically expressed in beliefs such as 
 individualism, democratic pluralism, and consumerism. Over the years, these beliefs 
 have been neatly codified into the tenets of the American Dream: hard work, fair play, 
 individual freedom, economic security, progress, and so on. (Artz & Murphy, 2000,              
 p. 238) 
 
Participants still very much believed in the importance of having work and showed 
suspicion towards those who might with be too lazy to work or expect too much in 
material gain in exchange for their work (Kalberg 2016). Experiencing the fall-out of the 
financial crisis and recession did not result in the participants questioning the value they 
placed in “hard-work.” Instead, they generally embraced this value as a way to protect 
themselves from an unpredictable and unkind national economy.   
The formation of a counter-ideology/hegemony was also prevented by 
participants’ understanding of class relations as a function of unequal access to consumer 
power (Schudson 2007; Artz & Murphy 2000).  When they spoke of politicians and other 
elites as being “out-of-touch” they meant that elite individuals did not know how difficult 
it was to survive on income salaries similar to their own. This is where Tocqueville’s 
prediction may have had some predictive merit in that he theorized that the access to 
some security, whether it’s the ownership of property in an agrarian economy or 
purchasing power in a consumer one, may the keep the attention of middle classes upon 
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what they have and could-have in terms of material wealth, rather than aspiring to actual 
decision making power in society at large.  
Fundamentally, participants either did not grasp, or could not articulate, the actual 
power discrepancy between themselves and the elite classes. They did not express 
resentment at their relative inability to influence important policy or to make decisions 
which would influence multi-national corporations. To them, the elite had the power to 
buy a house and not worry about paying it off, or the power to not worry about whether or 
not they could afford a vacation or their retirement. The corollary of this understanding is 
that with a bit more purchasing power, participants would be on equal footing with 
members of the elite. This again turns attention back to the ability to make money, not 
decisions. Given this, it is no wonder that the issue of “income inequality” became a 
campaign issue in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, rather than equality of 
representation on corporate boards, the further inclusion of organized labor in U.S. 
budgetary deliberations, or even wealth inequality (Tankersley 2015). 
Media frames never presented the U.S. economy as a system which is 
fundamentally built by humanity and containing individuals who hold agency over how 
this system functions and to whom those functions may benefit. As a result of this, it 
appears that both media frames and the participants themselves approached the economic 
system as a natural system. Understanding the economy as system of nature meant that to 
participants the financial crisis was just another storm. Faced with an event which was 
fundamentally inexplicable to them, and with no help from their main source of 
information to make that event explicable, participants focused on how they could prevent 
personal disaster. Each group took time in their discussion detailing how people should 
have known to not take out loans, to abstain from expensive mortgages, or to undertake 
work in secure industries. They spoke of moving to protect themselves and their family 
like they would protect themselves from any numbers of dangers from the natural world.  
From a practical standpoint, there is truth to how these participants saw 
themselves in relation to the economy. Their vulnerability to this economic system is very 
real – this is the same economic system which had lost them their jobs, destroyed their 
retirements, and forced them to care for their adult children and grand-children. Moving 
to protect themselves under these conditions is not only understandable, it is advisable. 
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However, participants never articulated an understanding that what lies behind this 
system which had served them so poorly in the past few years is a human made structure, 
not a natural process.   
When expressing a desire for this economic system to change in a way where 
participants felt more secure and less vulnerable, they looked to the group they 
understood as holding power – the elected politicians and political parties they were 
familiar with. Politicians and the political sphere would have been familiar to participants. 
They would have repeatedly heard politicians’ names and actions associated with these 
same topics of the financial crisis and economy from the news sources they turned to on a 
daily basis: CBS, NBC, CNN, and all the other television news channels they tuned to on a 
daily or weekly basis. Participants would have also been familiar with politics and 
politicians through their participation with the democratic system as consistent voters.  
Ultimately, in the peer group discussions participants were not able to conceptually 
step outside of their roles as workers, voters, and consumers.  This study deliberately held 
back from offering other roles, and it is possible that if handed alternative identities that 
participants would have readily taken them up. However, it is an important finding that 
participants did not do this on their own in conversation with the peers they worked with 
and spoke to every day. Participants were not turning to each other as sites of experience 
or information on political or economic events. Even when confronted with evidence of a 
negative impact on their community, as was the case with teacher Mark and his struggling 
students, participants did not always connect them to the financial crisis or recession.  
Instead of turning to their own communities as a source of information, when it 
came to issues of politics and the economy participants’ attention was turned towards 
mainstream television news.  This echoes similar research on the role of the media, 
particularly news media, in the daily lives of individuals (Couldry et al. 2007; Madianou 
2010). And we now know that when participants watch the nightly news, as their main 
window into the outside world, they will have these exact same roles of workers, voters, 
and consumers reflected right back at them. This finding underscores the warning given in 
the beginning of this paper: if we are going to take audiences seriously it is not enough to 
speak only in terms of habits, rituals, and consumption (Bird & Dardenne 1997; Madianou 
2010; Bird 2010). We must take seriously the role of power in these everyday practices.  It 
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is not enough to accept that people perceive themselves to be in touch with “their 
community” through the media. It is a researcher’s responsibility to ask whether or not 
this perception is based in a reality that serves people and their communities’ real 
interests.  
In the end, this is not a story of full consent to the dominant system so much as a 
partial picture of thwarted opposition. Currently, this functions the same as active consent 
in the sense that participants can be trusted to participate normally in the American 
economic-political system. They will go to work, they will invest in financial products, and 
they will consume certain material goods, and generally fulfill their role in the economic 
order without much question. That said, there is a chance for action if the sense of deep 
injustice expressed by all of the peer groups were to ever be attached to a more functional 
concept of identity or some form of agency (Good 1990; Shah et al. 2012; Gamson 1992). 
Just because participants were unable to make these connections themselves does not 
mean they would be unwilling to take up a message which aimed to address their 
grievances should it appear.  
There is a warning here. Because they have so little understanding of the financial 
crisis or the structure of real class relations there is no guarantee that such an articulation 
of their sense of injustice to agency and identity would be in these participants’ real 
interests.  Participants felt vulnerable, but they were unsure what they were vulnerable to. 
Participants also felt wronged, but they were unclear who had wronged them. They also 
felt insecure in their futures, but they could not – even when asked – offer any solutions 
which would make their futures more secure. Unless something changes drastically, these 
questions will not be answered by the news media any time soon.  
The populism expressed by the participants and in the news media frames was not 
a counter-hegemonic populism (Artz & Murphy 2000; Laclau 2006; Mudde & Kaltwasser 
2012; Woods 2014).  It showed no real understanding of the system which created the 
inequities faced by “everyday” Americans – the same inequities which were felt so keenly 
when the financial system came crashing down around itself in 2008. The construction of 
the elite and the people were evidence of a sort of proto-populism which is currently 
ungrounded in specific knowledge of the practices which created the resentment from 
which populist characters spring (Laclau 2005). These constructions are so lightly formed 
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that currently nearly any group could be included or excluded from either category. There 
is the potential that any ideology which speaks to the sense of injustice expressed by these 
participants and those like them and convincingly attaches it to an equally fervent sense of 
agency could potentially aim the resulting action in any direction they chose; radical, 
revolutionary, or reactionary.  
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APPENDIX A: PEER GROUP DISCUSSION SCRIPT 
 
 
FOCUS GROUPS SCRIPT 
Preamble 
 
I am interested in your opinions around the financial crisis and the recession – this is meant to be a 
casual discussion – it is in no way a test. I do not expect you to have any particular knowledge or 
expertise on the topics we will be discussing. Even if you feel like what you have as a response is 
vague, I am still interested in hearing about it. Even the smallest opinions are of interest for this 
study. I am interested in you as citizens of the U.S. and of Colorado.  
I will be recording this session; it will be for my own use only and will be immediately 
disassociated from any of your identifying information. I will be assigning you a number to help me 
keep you anonymous.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Participants state name, occupation, and hobbies for recording. (Extended information for voice 
identification) 
Ten Minutes 
ASSOCIATIONS EXERCISE 
 
(Participants given large sheets of paper) 
On Paper #1, ask participants to throw out things they think of when they hear “Financial Crisis.”  
On Paper #2, ask participants to offer things they think of as causes of the crisis.   
On Paper #3, ask participants to offer who or what was damaged by the crisis/recession.  
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Ranking Exercise: 
 
Ask participants to collaboratively try to rank the causes from “most important” to “least 
important.” Repeat this exercise with things/people they believe were damaged or victimized by 
the financial crisis, ranking them from “most impacted” to “least impacted.”  
Purpose: To get to the available explanations/understandings of the crisis and recession. To engage 
the participants in a persuasive, consensus building exercise, to see how they use these 
explanations to state their position and opinions.  
Thirty-Five Minutes 
 
OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS 
 
 “There have been a lot of interpretations of who or what might be to blame for the crisis – 
what or who do you think might be to blame, if anything?”  
 
 “What are some of the other explanations you remember hearing about?” 
 
 
 “Do you think these have merit?” 
o  Why or why not? 
 
 “Have you changed your opinion on this over time? Why? ” If no “when did you first form 
this opinion”  
 
 
 “There have been many suggestions as to what needs to be done to come out of the 
recession, are there any that you agree with?” 
 
 “What do you think needs to/ should be/ or could be done?” 
 
 “What are some of the other suggestions you’ve heard of? Do you think they’re potentially 
valid?  
 
o Why or why not?”  
 
 “Have you changed your opinion on this over time?  
o Why?  
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o  IF NO, “when did you first form this opinion?”  
 
 
 
Thirty Minutes 
CITIZENSHIP QUESTIONS 
 
 “How confident do you feel in your understanding of the economy? The crisis? The 
recession?” 
 
 “If asked to vote on legislation related to the recession or the crisis, would you feel 
comfortably prepared to make a decision? Where do you turn to for trusted information on 
this sort of thing, if anything?”  
 
Ten Minutes 
ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRE  
Ten Minutes 
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Focus Group Participant Questionnaire  
Participant Number _____________ Age: ______  Gender: ________ 
Questions YOUR ANSWERS 
 
Where do you typically get your information 
on current events?  
 
 
 
If you watch television news, list the top 
three shows you’re most likely to turn to for 
information, in order.  
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
Where else do you turn to find reliable 
information on current events?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever watched any documentaries 
or investigative reports on the financial 
crisis or recession?  If so, which ones? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you read newspapers? If so, which 
ones? 
 
 
 
If you seek news from websites, where do 
you typically go? 
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Do you discuss the financial 
crisis/recession with family and/or peers? 
How often?  
 
 
Do you find your opinions on the financial 
crisis/recession to be similar to those of 
your peers? If not, how so? 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you identify with a political party or 
philosophy? If so, what is it?  
 
 
 
Do you typically vote?  
If not, why?  
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APPENDIX C: PEER GROUP DISCUSSION LISTS 
 
 
Bible Study 
Warm-Up List – “What do you think of when you think of the financial crisis?” 
 “kind of criss cross” 
 Automotive Bailout 
 9/11 
 Stock Market Crash 
 Uncertainty 
 Unemployment 
 Foreclosures (“you took mine”) 
 Bankruptcy 
 Concerns for the Future 
 “Hanging on to your job – not changing jobs”  
 Job Loss 
 “Fear of the Unknown” 
 Pessimism 
 “It was depressing” 
 
Bible Study 
Causes List 
 Leniency in the loans  
 Personal irresponsibility 
 Greed (Personal and Political) 
 “Shady” Wall Street 
 Questionable Financial Instruments 
 Everybody thinking they can “have it all”  
 People living beyond their means 
 People in business 
 “We’ve always done it this way” 
 Wall Street 
 “Pretend money going back and forth” 
 Decentralization/non-accountability  
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Bible Study  
Ranked Causes 
1. Greed (business to homeowners) 
2. “Shady” Wall Street 
3. Housing Bubble 
4. Personal Irresponsibility 
5. “Decentralization”  
 
Bible Study 
Bible Study 
Victims List 
 The housing industry 
 Lehman Bros, and other big banks 
 Young families who had bought their first home 
 Small businesses 
 Retirees and their 401k 
 Highways 
 Charities 
 Middle Class 
 Education (funding, infrastructure) 
 Kids 
 
Bible Study  
Ranked Victims 
1. Middle Class 
2. Homeownership/Housing 
3. Small Business 
4. Young families w/children 
5. Infrastructure 
6. Charities 
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Book Club 
Warm-Up List – “What do you think of when you think of the financial crisis?” 
 Poverty 
 Inequality 
 Rising cost of living 
 Increased Crime 
 Depression (emotional) 
 Increase in Home Loss 
 Complex (causes and solutions) 
 Guilt (for not having more money) 
 
Book Club  
Causes List 
 Globalization 
 Greed 
 “Spending too much on healthcare and the military” 
 “Power” (malfeasance by those in power) 
 Wall Street regulations 
 The government (Partisanship) 
 
Book Club  
Ranked Causes List 
1. Greed (“Wall Street stuff”) 
2. Power (Misused, people in power) 
3. “Spending too much” 
4. Greedy culture 
5. Partisanship 
6. International Aid 
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Book Club  
Victims List  
 Middle Class 
 “Lower Class” 
 Government credibility 
 Funding for education 
 Elderly, retirees 
 Teens and young adults 
 Small businesses 
 Automobile businesses 
 Social Services  
 
Book Club 
Ranked Victims List 
1. Middle Class 
2. “the poor” 
3. Small businesses 
4. Young People  
5. Government credibility 
6. Big business 
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Rock Climbers 
Warm-Up List – “What do you think of when you think of the financial crisis?” 
 George Bush 
 Subprime loans 
 “Ninja loans” 
 “Crash of the petrol-dollar”  
 “Job creators” 
 Corporations as People 
 Trickle-down Economics 
 Reagan 
 Investment bankers 
 “Gordan Geko culture” 
 Collateralized debt obligations 
 Fear 
 “Too Big to Fail” 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 Tax breaks for the wealthy 
 Deregulation Fraudulent Security Ratings 
 Credit Default Swaps 
 Underwater mortgages/loans 
 Congressional gridlock 
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Rock Climbers 
Causes List 
 Tax breaks for the wealthy 
 “predatory loans and irresponsible loan taking” 
 Deregulation 
 Fraudulent security rating 
 Credit default swaps 
 “Crash of the Petrol-Dollar” 
 Congressional Gridlock 
 “Job creators” 
 Decline of the Middle Class 
 Unregulated Wall Street Greed 
 A lack of national priorities 
 War (Iraq/Afghanistan) 
 
Rock Climbers  
Ranked Causes List 
1. Wall Street Greed 
2. Consumer debt 
3. Predatory loans/fraudulent security rating 
4. Decline of the middle class 
 
 
Rock Climbers 
Victims List 
 Middle Class 
 Everybody below the middle class 
 “The 47%” 
 People under 35  
 College grads 
 The wealthy  
 Blue collar workers  
 Non-corporate farmers 
 Start-up companies 
 Academia 
 Government workers 
 Public institutions 
 Luxury-related companies (vacations, restaurants) 
 Artists 
238 
 
 
Rock Climbers 
Ranked Victims 
1. Middle Class 
2. People under 35 
3. College grads 
4. The poor/working Class 
 
Nurses 
Warm-Up List – “What do you think of when you think of the financial crisis?” 
 “major problem” 
 Housing bubble 
 Government deficit 
 Lower income (people) pay the price 
 Wall Street 
 Increase in poverty 
 Lack of leadership 
 Unemployment, jobless 
 Depression (emotional) 
 Mental health issues (increase in the hospital) 
 Loss of healthcare 
 Homelessness 
 
Nurses 
Causes List 
 Unstable leadership 
 Housing bubble 
 Dishonest banking 
 “Creative” investment practices (risky) 
 Unrealistic government leaders (out-of-touch) 
 Rising Cost of Living 
 Regulatory Issues 
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Nurses  
Ranked Causes 
1. Banks and Government (Mutual gains) 
2. No regulations 
3. Housing bubble 
4. Unstable leadership 
5. Cost of living 
 
Nurses 
Victims List 
 Middle and lower income 
 Children 
 Elderly/fixed income 
 Honest small business owner 
 First time home buyers 
 University students 
 Young adults (under 30) 
 Unemployed 
 Economy (the World economy) 
 Homeless 
 
Nurses 
Ranked Victims 
1. Middle class 
2. Unemployed 
3. Children/elderly 
4. Newly homeless 
5. Young adults 
6. Small businesses 
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Teachers 
Warm-Up List – “What do you think of when you think of the financial crisis?” 
 Wall Street 
 Stock market crash 
 “Underwater homes” 
 HP leaving 
 9/11 
 “Kids living out of cars” 
 “Hiring freezes” 
 Insecurity (economic) 
 
 
Teachers 
Causes list 
 Greed 
 Deregulation  
 The government (no cooperation) 
 “Bad loans” 
 “Credit default….switching? swapping?” 
 Debt (consumer)  
 Deficit 
 Wall Street 
 
 
Teachers  
Ranked causes 
1. Wall Street 
2. Greed 
3. Debt  
4. “Bad loans” 
5. The government (no cooperation) 
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Teachers  
Victims List  
 Middle Class 
 Kids 
 College students 
 Teachers (rising workloads, pay-freezes) 
 Local businesses 
 Other government workers 
 The elderly (retirement funds) 
 Public infrastructure 
 
Teachers  
Ranked Victims 
1. Middle Class 
2. Kids  
3. Government workers (incl. teachers) 
4. Local businesses 
5. College students 
 
